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Abstract
All-source navigation has become increasingly relevant over the past decade with the
development of viable alternative sensor technologies. However, as the number and type
of sensors informing a system increases, so does the probability of corrupting the system
with sensor modeling errors, signal interference, and undetected faults. Though the latter of
these has been extensively researched, the majority of existing approaches have constrained
faults to biases, and designed algorithms centered around the assumption of simultaneously
redundant, synchronous sensors with valid measurement models, none of which are
guaranteed for all-source systems. This research aims to provide all-source multi-sensor
resiliency, assurance, and integrity through an autonomous sensor management framework.
The proposed framework dynamically places each sensor in an all-source system into one
of four modes: monitoring, validation, calibration, and remodeling. Each mode contains
specific and novel realtime processes that affect how a navigation system responds to sensor
measurements. The monitoring mode is driven by a novel sensor-agnostic fault detection,
exclusion, and integrity monitoring method that minimizes the assumptions on the fault
type, all-source sensor composition, and the number of faulty sensors. The validation
mode provides a novel method for the online validation of sensors which have questionable
sensor models, in a fault-agnostic and sensor-agnostic manner, and without compromising
the ongoing navigation solution in the process. The remaining two modes, calibration and
remodeling, generalize and integrate online calibration and model identification processes
to provide autonomous and dynamic estimation of candidate model functions and their
parameters, which when paired with the monitoring and validation processes, directly
enable resilient, self-correcting, plug-and-play open architecture navigation systems.
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AUTONOMOUS AND RESILIENT MANAGEMENT OF ALL-SOURCE SENSORS
FOR NAVIGATION ASSURANCE
I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, the United States Air Force has focused on complementing
its reliance on the Global Positioning System (GPS) for navigation and timing solutions
through the use of alternative navigation sources and sensors. Additionally, senior leaders
within the Air Force have recently stated one of the top priorities for the service “to cost-
effectively modernize to increase the lethality of the force and drive innovation to secure
our future.” [104]. With this in mind, the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Autonomy
and Navigation Technology (ANT) Center has made its vision to provide “defense-focused
autonomy and navigation, anywhere, anytime, using anything.”
Unlike the well-understood, synchronous, and redundant nature of the GPS multi-
sensor constellation, all-source navigation systems tend to be heterogeneous in composi-
tion, with each sensor proven only within a well-controlled environment, and not guaran-
teed to be synchronous or redundant. Additionally, as the number of sensors and measure-
ment domains that are exploited for navigation purposes increases, so does the probability
of corrupting the navigation solution with errors in sensor modeling, unexpected signal in-
terference, and or undetected faults. Therefore, in order to fulfill this vision, alternative
(non-GPS) all-source navigation technology must be brought up to a level of operational
readiness that allows its use in a manner that is resilient, and thus capable of not only de-
tecting when any of the above failure modes are present, but also of assuring navigation
integrity in their presence, and self-correcting and recovering from such failures, all in an
autonomous, real-time, plug-and-play architecture.
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This dissertation details a wide-ranging research effort aimed at solving the “all-source
navigation assurance problem,” through the development of an online autonomous and
resilient sensor management framework. Each component of the framework in focused
on solving a portion of the overall problem set, which includes: all-source fault detection
and exclusion, integrity monitoring, sensor initialization and validation, online sensor
calibration, and online model identification. Existing and related research in each of
the problem subsets is briefly summarized below and further expounded in each of its
corresponding chapters of this dissertation.
1.1 Summary of Related Research
1.1.1 Sensor Management Frameworks.
As discussed in Chapter 3, sensor management in navigation has been mostly focused
on managing sensors from a resources perspective by selecting optimal sensor subsets
based on available computational load. Though also important for real-time operational
all-source systems, computational load management is not the focus of this research, as it
does not address any of the problem subsets identified above. Other research efforts in the
area of Visual-Inertial System (VINS) navigation have proposed the use of online statistical
tests to trigger camera calibration routines. This line of research addresses a portion of the
fault detection and sensor calibration problem subsets, but only focuses on a system with a
single sensor, and the statistical tests used are typically custom-tailored for camera systems.
1.1.2 Fault Detection, Exclusion, and Integrity Monitoring.
As shown in Chapter 4, multi-sensor fault detection and exclusion, and integrity
monitoring have been extensively researched in the area of GPS navigation. Typically,
each satellite in the GPS constellation is regarded as a different (albeit identical in nature
and synchronous) sensor in the multi-sensor system, and the “fault” is usually defined as
an unmodeled bias that is assumed to only affect one of the sensors (satellites) at any given
time, which allows for rigorous computations of system integrity using the probability of a
2
missed (bias) detection. Though adequate for homogeneous and synchronously redundant
sensors like GPS, these techniques are inadequate for our research, since the assumptions
and conditions necessary for fault detection and system integrity cannot be guaranteed in
an all-source environment.
1.1.3 Sensor Initialization and Validation.
Online sensor initialization and validation constitutes a key enabling technology for
self-correcting and plug-and-play navigation systems. As discussed in Chapter 5, though
the problem is statistically similar to multi-sensor fault detection, the primary objective has
traditionally been to provide navigation solution integrity with the assumption that each
sensor in the system is equally likely to experience a fault, and that each sensor is properly
modeled at the start of the navigation process. These assumptions are invalid for all-source
sensors with questionable sensor models that are initialized “on-the-fly”, or sensors that
have been previously taken oﬄine and are to be re-initialized after experiencing a fault.
1.1.4 Online Sensor Calibration.
A common technique for improving the resiliency of a particular all-source sensor
technology is to provide a means for the online calibration of specific sensor model
parameters (e.g., lever arms, rotation matrices, scale factors, etc.). As discussed in
Chapter 3, many online calibration methods exist across a variety of sensor technologies.
One research area with significant recent advances is online calibration of a VINS.
However, as mature as these point-examples may be, they still only tend to focus on a
particular sensor, and often do not address the tasks of detecting the need for calibration or
independently evaluating the effectiveness of the calibration results.
1.1.5 Online Model Identification.
As described in Chapter 3, another class of existing methods for improving resiliency
is to provide a means for the online alteration the sensor model functional form to account
for missing parameters or changing environmental conditions (e.g., time-changing biases,
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stochastic clock errors, temperature effects, etc.). This line of research is typically referred
to as multiple-model estimation, or model identification. Current research in this area tends
to be divided between continuous estimation of sensor and process noise covariances and
model selection from a finite set of competing models. However, most techniques tend
to focus on permanent failure modes that require the model identification process to run
continuously. Similar to online calibration, these techniques also tend to lack independent
validation of model identification results.
1.2 Research Contributions
Having defined the overall all-source resiliency problem set, and the gaps in each
of the related problem subsets, we now define the research contributions provided in this
dissertation. In general, this research aims to provide all-source multi-sensor resiliency,
assurance, and integrity through an autonomous sensor management framework. The
proposed framework dynamically places each sensor in an all-source system into one of
four modes of operation: monitoring, validation, calibration, and remodeling. Each mode
contains specific and novel realtime processes that affect how a navigation system responds
to sensor measurements. The monitoring mode is driven by a novel sensor-agnostic fault
detection, exclusion, and integrity monitoring method that minimizes the assumptions on
the fault type, all-source sensor composition, and the number of faulty sensors. The
validation mode provides a novel method for the online validation of sensors which
have questionable sensor models, in a fault-agnostic and sensor-agnostic manner, and
without compromising the ongoing navigation solution in the process. The remaining two
modes (calibration and remodeling) generalize and integrate online calibration and model
identification processes to provide autonomous and dynamic estimation of candidate model
functions and their parameters. When paired with the monitoring and validation methods,
these processes directly enable resilient, self-correcting, plug-and-play open architecture
navigation systems. In addition to the overall framework and the novel methods enabling
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the monitoring and validation modes, this research also contributes two novel online sensor
calibration methods for Pitot-static, and inertial measurement sensors, respectively. Both
of these calibration methods can be regarded as complementary to the overall research
thrust by contributing to the list of available sensors supported in the calibration mode of
the framework. The specific research contributions claimed in this dissertation can then be
tracked to each problem subset and described as:
(1) A novel navigation assurance framework that provides:
(i) Twelve coherently interlaced resilient sensor management functions,
(ii) An object-oriented integrity interface for dynamic filter management, and
(iii) An open system architecture enabling self-correcting navigation systems.
(2) A novel sensor-agnostic residual monitoring method that provides:
(i) Generalized all-source multiple-fault detection and exclusion,
(ii) Asynchronous and cross-domain detection redundancy, and
(iii) A robust measure of system integrity without constraining the fault type.
(3) A novel all-source plug-and-play sensor validation method that enables:
(i) Initialization of oﬄine sensors without corrupting the navigation solution,
(ii) Improved sensor model fault detection over standard residual monitoring, and
(iii) Protection of system integrity during validation using only a single filter.
(4) A novel online and complete Air Data System calibration method that:
(i) Calibrates four key speed-dependent parameters in a single experiment,
(ii) Eliminates the need for costly external calibration reference sources,
(iii) Does not require the need to sustain transonic or supersonic speeds, and
(iv) Provides a novel smoothing spline model suitable for transonic characterization.
(5) A novel autonomous, regression-based method for Allan variance analysis that:
(i) Meets or exceeds the standard analysis method for usual data lengths,
(ii) Outperforms the standard analysis method for reduced data lengths, and
(iii) Eliminates the need for human input across varying sensor types.
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1.3 Outline
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into seven additional chapters. Chapter 2
contains the mathematical background and notation used throughout the dissertation as well
as a general summary of statistical modeling, model diagnostics, and remedial measures
and the methods used for estimating navigation solutions. Given the breadth and depth of
topics covered across the aforementioned research contributions, each chapter in Chapters 3
through 7 contains specific background, methodology, results, and conclusions for the
subset of topics covered therein. Chapter 3 develops the general framework needed to
provide multi-sensor resiliency, assurance, and integrity in an all-source environment.
Chapter 4 focuses on all-source fault detection and exclusion and integrity monitoring,
which enable the monitoring objective of the overall framework. Meanwhile, Chapter 5
discusses the developments in real-time sensor initialization and validation, which support
the framework’s validation objective. Chapters 6 and 7 provide the methodology, results,
and conclusions for two novel Pitot-static, and inertial sensor calibration algorithms,
respectively, which complement the online calibration objective of the overall framework.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the entire research effort, major findings and research
contributions, and sets the vision for future work in the area of all-source resilient
navigation.
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II. Background
While subsequent chapters in this dissertation contain specific research background
topics needed to understand their contributions, this chapter offers the foundational
background needed to understand the concepts of estimation, regression, and detection
and how they apply to navigation. Section 2.1 outlines the general notational conventions
used throughout this dissertation. Section 2.2 summarizes estimation and detection
fundamentals. Section 2.3 describes the expected properties of residual error terms and how
they can be used to analyze model performance. Finally, Section 2.4 frames the navigation
problem in the context of model regression, while Section 2.5 summarizes how recursive
estimation techniques are used to solve the navigation problem.
2.1 Notational Conventions
Scalars: Scalars are represented by either upper or lowercase characters in italics, e.g., a
or A.
Vectors: Vector quantities are represented by lowercase characters in bold, e.g., a. Unless
specifically stated otherwise, all vectors should be interpreted as column vectors.
Vector Components: The scalar components of a vector are represented with subscripts
indicating their entry, e.g., the kth entry in the vector a is denoted ak.
Vector Subscripts: Vectors annotated with subscripts (e.g., xk) indicate distinct versions
of the vector. In the context of recursive estimation, such as the Kalman Filter (KF)
algorithm, it indicates a discrete time sample of its argument.
Time Indices: When subscript notation such as xk is impractical, a discrete time index
such as x(tk) may be also be used to indicate a discrete time sample of its preceding
vector.
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Estimated Variables: Variables that represent an estimate of a particular quantity are
represented with the circumflex accent, e.g., aˆ.
A Priori and A Posteriori Estimates: When describing the operation of a KF algorithm,
it is necessary to distinguish between estimates computed before (a priori) or after (a
posteriori) a measurement update. In such instances, a “minus” character superscript
is added to the variable for a priori estimates while a “plus” character superscript is
added to a posteriori estimates, e.g., aˆ−k or aˆ
+
k and aˆ(t
−
k ) or aˆ(t
+
k ).
Matrices: Matrices are represented by uppercase characters in bold, e.g., A or Ψ.
Transpose: The superscript (·)T denotes the transpose operator.
Identity and Zero: The vectors 0, 1 contain all zeros and all ones, respectively.
Additionally, the matrix I is the identity matrix. When it is not clear from the context,
they will be subscripted with their dimensionality.
Reference Frames: If a vector is expressed in a specific reference frame, a superscript
letter is used to designate the reference frame, e.g., pa is a vector in the a-frame.
Multi-Sensor Parameters In the context of multi-sensor and multi-filter navigation,
parameters obtained from a particular sensor or filter source are denoted with a
bracketed superscript. For example, the measurement vector z[i] is obtained from
Sensor i, while the estimated measurement vector zˆ[ j] is obtained from Filter j.
Direction Cosine Matrices: Direction Cosine Matrices (DCMs) representing a rotation
from frame a to frame b are denoted by Cba.
Natural Logarithm: The operator log(·) indicates the natural logarithm unless otherwise
noted.
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Statistical Notation: A statistical expectation is denoted E [·]. The statistical distribution
of a random variable is denoted via ∼. For example, if a random vector a at time
k follows the multivariate normal distribution with mean vector µk and covariance
matrix Σk, it is denoted ak ∼ N (µk,Σk).
2.2 Estimation and Detection Fundamentals
Model estimation refers to determining the statistical relationship between a set of
predictor variables and a response variable through a number of estimated coefficients
or model parameters. In classical estimation, the values of a reasonable set of predictor
variables are recorded along with the corresponding response variable values in a properly
designed experiment. Then, the values of the coefficients relating predictor variables to
the response variable are determined using any number of estimation techniques. The
type of estimation technique varies, depending on the relationship between predictor
variables, unknown coefficients, and response variables. In general, an attempt is always
made to utilize an optimal estimator, such as a Minimum Variance Unbiased Estimator
(MVUE), which guarantees unbiased coefficient estimates with the lowest variance
possible. However, depending on the conditions of the experiment or the relationship
among the predictor variables, one may choose to accept biased coefficient estimates in
order to further minimize variance as done in the ridge regression technique [68] discussed
later in this chapter. Classical model estimation forms the basis for the more applicable
online model estimation techniques summarized in later sections. Under classical model
estimation, the coefficient estimation technique varies greatly depending on the relationship
between the predictor variables and the unknown coefficients, leading to linear and non-
linear regression techniques.
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2.2.1 Linear Regression.
In linear regression, the relationship between observations of a response variable and
the corresponding values of their predictor variables is given by
y = Xβ + , (2.1)
where y is a N × 1 vector containing the response variable observations, X is a N × M
matrix containing N observations of each of the M predictor variables, β is a M × 1 vector
containing the unknown model coefficients to be estimated, and  is a N × 1 vector of
normal Independent Identically Distributed (IID) error terms with
 ∼ N
(
0, σ2I
)
. (2.2)
The optimal (MVUE) estimator for this type of problem is referred to as Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) as proven in the Gauss-Markov Theorem [68]. Based on OLS, the
optimal estimate of β is given by the least-squares projection of the vector Xβ onto the
subspace containing y and computed using the normal equations
XTy = XTXβ (2.3)
=⇒ βˆ =
(
XTX
)−1
XTy. (2.4)
The estimated model coefficients then yield the estimated model response using
yˆ = Xβˆ (2.5)
= X
(
XTX
)−1
XTy (2.6)
= Hy, (2.7)
where the matrix H, referred to as the “hat” matrix, obtained by substituting (2.4) into (2.5),
plays a significant role in the model diagnostic techniques. The resulting residual terms are
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given by
e = y − yˆ (2.8)
= y −Hy (2.9)
= (I −H) y. (2.10)
Finally, the estimated covariance matrix of the residual terms is given by
P =
eTe
N − M (I −H) (2.11)
= s2 (I −H) , (2.12)
where the quantity eTe is referred to as the Sum of Squared Errors (SSE), s2 is referred to
as Mean Squared Error (MSE) and
E
[
s2
]
= σ2. (2.13)
2.2.2 Non-linear Regression.
Often, the relationship between predictor variables and model coefficients cannot
be described by the linear operation Xβ. In this case, we turn to nonlinear regression
techniques [8]. The nonlinear regression model is given by
y = f[X,β] + , (2.14)
where y is a N×1 vector containing the response variable observations, f is a N×1 nonlinear
function of predictor variables and model coefficients, X is a N × M matrix containing
N observations of each of the M predictor variables, β is a P × 1 vector containing the
unknown model coefficients to be estimated, and  is a N × 1 vector of IID error terms with
the same properties as described in (2.2). It is important to note that in the nonlinear case,
the number of predictor variables (M) and the number of model coefficients (P) does not
have to match as it did in the linear case. In this case, the optimal estimator is still given by
least squares, but additional linear approximations must be applied to the problem in order
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to find a solution. Using the Gauss-Newton method [8] as one of many available methods,
we begin with an initial guess of the model coefficients βˆ0 and use the first-order Taylor
Series Expansion (TSE) of f in order to iteratively improve the guess until convergence.
The first-order TSE of f about β0 is given by
f[X,β] ≈ f[X, βˆ0] + ∂f[X,β]
∂β
∣∣∣∣∣
βˆ0
(
β − βˆ0
)
(2.15)
=⇒ η(β) = η(βˆ0) + V0δ0, (2.16)
where η(β) is the model response given X and β, the matrix V0 represents the Jacobian
matrix of f with respect to the variables β evaluated at βˆ0, and the vector δ0 is the difference
between the unknown true parameter values β and the current guess βˆ0. Next the model
residuals given the current guess are given by
e(θ) = y − η(θ) ≈ y −
[
η(βˆ0) + V0δ0
]
(2.17)
=
[
y − η(βˆ0)
]
− V0δ0 (2.18)
= e0 − V0δ0 (2.19)
=⇒ e0 = V0δ0. (2.20)
Minimizing the approximate residual sum of squares ‖e0 − V0δ0‖2 is equivalent to solving
the least squares system given by (2.20), which yields the Gauss Increment for the initial
guess, δ0, using
VT0 e0 = V
T
0 V0δ0 (2.21)
=⇒ (Q1R1)T e0 = (Q1R1)T Q1R1δ0 (2.22)
=⇒ RT1 QT1 e0 = RT1 R1δ0 (2.23)
=⇒ QT1 e0 = R1δ0 (2.24)
=⇒ δ0 =
(
RT1 R1
)−1
RT1 Q
T
1 e0 (2.25)
=
(
RT1 R1
)−1
VT0 e0, (2.26)
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where V0 = [Q1Q2][R1R2]T is the QR decomposition of V0 utilized to take advantage of
the sparseness of V0 when inverting it. Next, the initial guess, βˆ0, is updated using
βˆ1 = βˆ0 + δ0, (2.27)
which allows for the computation of a new Jacobian matrix, V1, new estimated residuals,
e1, and a new Gauss Increment, δ1. The process is then repeated until
|δk+1 − δk| < γ, (2.28)
where γ is a predetermined convergence threshold appropriate for the problem. Given
the invertibility of R is highly dependent on its condition, and the fact that R may be
ill-conditioned if the initial guess, βˆ0, is significantly far from its optimal value, the
”Levenberg-Marquardt” compromise [8][75] calls for the addition of a small bias prior
to inverting R1 using
δk =
(
RT1 R1 + λI
)−1
VTk ek, (2.29)
where λ is a small conditioning factor appropriate for the problem that stabilizes the
algorithm in a similar fashion to the ridge regression technique [44], which will be
discussed in the next section.
Once convergence has been achieved, the final model coefficients, β f can be used to
produce the final residual vector e f , leading to similar computations of MSE and covariance
matrix, P as shown in (2.11) by letting M = P. For further information on the Gauss-
Newton and other nonlinear regression and optimization techniques (e.g., Newton-Rapson),
the reader is directed to the works of Arora [5] and Bates [8].
2.2.3 Ridge Regression.
Ridge regression refers to a class of biased estimators, proposed to solve the
problem of multicollinearity, or dependence among predictor variables (i.e., columns in
X). Multicollinearity does not affect the reliability of the fitted model as a whole, but does
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affect the inferences that may be drawn upon individual model coefficients or predictor
variables. Since this problem was encountered in the research contained in Chapter 7,
its mitigating procedure (ridge regression) is briefly summarized. Although not directly
categorized as a residual-based model diagnostic, multicollinearity can be detected via
the Variance Inflation Factor diagnostic test [68]. The ridge regression technique [44]
introduces a small biasing constant, λ, to the normal equations such that
XTy =
(
XTX + λI
)
β (2.30)
=⇒ βˆ =
(
XTX + λI
)−1
XTy, (2.31)
which stabilizes the ill-conditioned XTX matrix, making it invertible in a similar fashion
as the Levenberg-Marquardt conditioning bias from Section 2.2.2. The result is slightly
biased, yet much less variable estimates of the model coefficients βˆ, which are more likely
to be close to their true values than their unbiased counterparts. Further information such
as the optimal choice of λ can be found in [68].
2.2.4 Weighted Least Squares.
The effects of heteroscedasticity, or unequal error term variances can be mitigated
via a weighted least squares technique [68]. Recalling the true error terms are assumed
to be distributed as shown in (2.2), we can modify the diagonal covariance matrix σ2I to
account for changing variances. Given a set of error term variances σ2k , . . . , σ
2
N , let the set
of weights, wk be defined as
wk =
1
σ2k
, k = 1, . . . ,N, (2.32)
then the corresponding weight matrix, W, is given by
W =

w1 0 . . . 0
0 w2 . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
0 0 . . . wN

. (2.33)
14
Next, the normal equations from (2.3) can be modified to produce estimated model
coefficients using
XTWy =
(
XTWX
)
β (2.34)
=⇒ βˆ =
(
XTWX
)−1
XTWy, (2.35)
which can also be derived using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) as shown in the
OLS case. The obvious complication with this technique is that true error term variances
are seldom known. To alleviate this complication, [68] provides several techniques for
estimating the variances needed to build W. Additionally, W can be used to discount, or
de-weight, suspected observations such as outliers or observations where data quality is
known to be lower compared to the rest of the observed data. The latter use is exploited
in Chapter 6 to de-weight known low-quality Pitot-static sensor data during turns, as later
described.
2.2.5 Smoothing Splines.
Often, model transformations are useful in modifying the nature of the regression
function in order to satisfy the conditions or assumptions for optimality. A common
problem found in classical regression is a lack-of-fit determination by the F-Test for Lack
of Fit (FTLF), which can be symptomatic of a mismatch between the true underlying
functional form between y and X (in both the linear and nonlinear cases) and the form
specified in the fitted model. In some cases, the functional form may not exist in closed
form or apply to the entire domain of the predictor variables. In these cases, it may be
useful to use the concept of a smoothing spline [89] as will be shown in the developments
of Chapter 6. In the linear context, a second-order smoothing spline follows the form
y =

1 x1 x21 (x1 − s1)2+ . . . (x1 − sP)2+
...
...
...
... . . .
...
1 xN x2N (xN − s1)2+ . . . (xN − sP)2+
β + , (2.36)
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where each sp, p = 1, . . . , P, referred to as a knot, is a preselected inflection point
along the domain of x, and the operator ()+ denotes negative values of its argument are
set to zero, which is equivalent to multiplying by the Heaviside function centered at
the knot location. Several works of literature are dedicated at selecting the optimal sp
locations [31][89][90][102]. When splines are used in this research, the knot locations
will be selected using data quantiles as shown in [89]. It is important to note if a
nonlinear regression technique is used, the knot locations themselves can be set as unknown
parameters to be estimated as long as the observed data contains enough independent
information for stable estimation. One of the main benefits of using smoothing splines
is the ability to provide excellent fit using windowed polynomials even if the observed data
is clearly not polynomial in nature. Even further, smoothing splines can be successfully
used when the true functional form between y and X is unknown. Figure 2.1 illustrates
a fitted smoothing spline with eight knots adequately modeling a clearly non-polynomial
function using second order polynomials.
2.2.6 Model Selection.
Model selection refers to the class of techniques used to analyze the overall
effectiveness of a chosen model. One common criterion is simply the amount of
unexplained variation left in the observed data after fitting the model (i.e., SSE or MSE).
However, more robust criteria tend to balance error reduction with model complexity (i.e.,
number of model coefficients in β). One of the more popular criterion in model selection,
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [2], is rooted in information theory and is given by
AIC(P) = N log(s2P) − N log(N) + 2P, (2.37)
where P is the number of model coefficients (i.e., the dimension of β), N is the number of
observations (i.e., the dimension of y) and s2P is the SSE of the model with P parameters
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Figure 2.1: Example of a fitted smoothing spline model with eight knots selected using
quantiles [89]. The second-order polynomial smoothing spline is able to model an
exponential functional form with no prior knowledge.
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included. Additionally, for small sample sizes, an adjusted AIC is given by
AICc(P) = AIC(P) +
2P(P + 1)
N − P − 1 . (2.38)
Although the adjustment given in (2.38) is only necessary for N/P ratios less than 40 [2],
the value of the adjustment tends to decrease dramatically as N increases, allowing for the
use of AICc ubiquitously, regardless of sample size. As later shown in Chapter 3, AIC
is used as the model selection criteria in the remodeling mode of the overall framework.
Additionally, in Chapter 6, AIC is combined with the concept of smoothing splines in order
to autonomously select an appropriate number of knots while balancing error reduction and
model complexity.
2.2.7 Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
MLE [62] refers to the concept of estimating model parameters, β, through the
optimization, or maximization, of the associated model likelihood function. The likelihood
function is simply the joint Probability Distribution Function (PDF) of the observed data,
y, viewed as a function of β, given y. Given a model of the form shown in (2.1) with
error terms given by (2.2), the likelihood function of the model coefficients, β, given the
observed data, y is given by
L (β|y,X) = 1√|2piσ2I|e− 12σ2 (y−Xβ)T(y−Xβ), (2.39)
where the linear model Xβ can be replaced by a nonlinear function f[X,β] in the nonlinear
case. Given the exponential form of (2.39), it is often convenient to take its natural
logarithm prior to maximizing the function. This leads to the log-likelihood function
log(L) = L = −1
2
log
(
|2piσ2I|
)
− 1
2σ2
(y − Xβ)T (y − Xβ) , (2.40)
and the optimization problem given by
arg max
β
L = arg max
β
(y − Xβ)T (y − Xβ) , (2.41)
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which is solved by setting the first-order derivative of L to zero, yielding
∂L
∂β
= 0 =
∂
∂β
(
yTy − 2βTXTy + βTXTXβ
)
(2.42)
=
(
0 − 2XTy + 2XTXβ
)
(2.43)
=⇒ XTXβ = XTy (2.44)
=⇒ βˆMLE =
(
XTX
)−1
XTy, (2.45)
which is identical to the optimal estimator in the linear model given by (2.4). This same
procedure can be applied to the nonlinear function f[X,β] given it is once-differentiable
with respect to β. MLE estimation is part of a broader set of estimation applications, under
which OLS fits, as shown by the above result. Although MLE has additional benefits,
such as the ability to handle arbitrary error term distributions or specify known (possibly
unequal) error term variances, the majority of the concepts leveraged in the proposed
framework are specific to OLS theory and normally distributed error terms. Further
information on MLE estimation of linear and nonlinear models is found in [8][62][68].
2.2.8 Binary Detection.
Although not directly used in parameter estimation, detection theory plays a
significant role in statistical hypothesis testing as well as many model diagnostic
techniques. Classical detection theory is described in [63] and can be generally thought
of as classifying a received signal (e.g., a sensor measurement) into one of many plausible
originating sources or distributions. In the binary case, a received measurement can be
thought of as originating from one of two possible distributions. The detection problem
then reduces to choosing (possibly multivariate) thresholds for classification based on
desired Probability of Detection (PD) and Probability of False Alarm (PF) rates. In general,
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a binary detection problem can be defined using
H0 : p(x|H0) = p0(x) (2.46)
H1 : p(x|H1) = p1(x) (2.47)
=⇒ p1(x)
p0(x)
H1
≷
H0
λ, (2.48)
where λ is a likelihood ratio threshold that is proportional to the desired PD and PF. The
Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) described in (2.48) can then be solved for x such that
f (x)
H1
≷
H0
γ, (2.49)
where f (x) is a function of the vector x, and γ is a scalar-valued threshold on the function
output. In the case where x is one-dimensional, then f (x) reduces to x, and the LRT
becomes a simple threshold on the value of x. The corresponding PD and PF rates are
then given by
pD =
∫
Γ1
p1(x)dx, (2.50)
pF =
∫
Γ1
p0(x)dx, (2.51)
where Γ1 is the set of x values such that f (x) > γ. The values of PD and PF vary from zero
to one and constitute unique points along the so-called Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve. Figure 2.2 illustrates a simple one-dimensional binary detection scenario
using univariate Gaussian distributions for H0 and H1 along with the corresponding ROC
curve. In statistics, pF can also be described as a hypothesis test’s significance level, α.
Based on Wilks’ Theorem [84], the (possibly multivariate) integral in (2.51) can be related
to a corresponding Chi-Square (denoted χ2) distribution given a desired α, with number of
degrees of freedom based on the differences in p1 and p0. This relationship gives rise to a
multitude of χ2-based tests such as the ones used in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Figure 2.2: Example LRT for binary detection using univariate Gaussian distributions. The
Γ1 region corresponds to x > γ and drives PD and PF based on which distribution is
integrated. The ROC curve on the bottom graph illustrates the possible combinations of
PD and PF for the given problem as well as the operating point based on the chosen γ. The
corresponding λ value is equal to the ROC slope at the operating point.
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2.3 Residuals and Their Properties
As previously alluded to, and shown in (2.8), model residuals, e, are defined by the
difference between the fitted model response, yˆ, and the actual observed response, y. The
residual vector is thought of as the “observed” error terms, as opposed to the true error
terms, which are defined by
 = y − yˆ (2.52)
= y − E [y] , (2.53)
which are assumed to be IID normal random variables with zero mean and constant
variance as shown in (2.2). The overarching term given to the techniques to be discussed
in this section is “residual analysis,” in which the properties of the observed error terms are
compared against the expected properties of the true error terms to assess the adequacy of
the fitted model and its assumptions. Three residual properties are commonly studied in
residual analysis: mean, variance, and independence.
2.3.1 Mean.
The mean of the N residuals for a fitted model is given by
e¯ =
∑N
k=1 ek
N
, (2.54)
and as enforced by OLS, the sum of residuals always equals zero, which makes the mean
of residuals always equal to zero [68]. As such, the mean of residuals cannot be used to
assess the mean of the true error terms, since residuals are constructed, by definition, to
be zero mean based on the model estimation technique. However, as later discussed, this
property can indeed be exploited when analyzing KF residuals [76], since the difference
between actual and expected sensor measurements does not necessarily equal zero and can
pinpoint the existence of un-modeled sensor biases.
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2.3.2 Variance.
The variance of the N residuals for a fitted model is given by (2.11). Additionally, per
(2.13), s2 is an unbiased estimator for the variance of the true error terms σ2. As previously
noted, the variance of the true error terms, , is assumed to be constant throughout the N
observations. Therefore, the variance of the observed error terms, e, can be analyzed across
the observations to validate this assumption.
2.3.3 Nonindependence.
In a similar fashion to their mean, residual terms are by definition dependent random
variables since they all involve the fitted model yˆ. However, serial correlation among the
residual terms does point at a number of potential problems with the fitted model including
missing predictor variables, and temporal, cyclical, or spatially correlated effects that were
not accounted for in the original model.
2.4 The Navigation Problem
Having defined the necessary mechanisms for classical, or oﬄine, model estimation,
we now turn our attention to the general motivating problem for this research: navigation.
Navigation in the context of this research refers to the real-time estimation of navigation
parameters, which describe a vehicle’s position, velocity, and attitude (or subset of these)
within a defined reference frame.
2.4.1 Relation to Model Estimation.
Navigation is rooted in the estimation of key vehicle properties, usually called states.
These states often include the estimated current three-dimensional position, velocity, and
attitude of the vehicle as well as their time histories and covariances. As such, the concept
of navigation is deeply related to model estimation. The navigation states can be regarded
as unknown model coefficients, β (later referred to as system states x). Such states are
to be estimated recursively and in real-time by combining (via weighted least squares)
known vehicle dynamics and external sensor measurements, y (later referred to as z), which
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can be mapped to the navigation states via a measurement model X (later referred to as
H). Although the concepts are similar, the requirement for online or real-time estimation
makes classical model estimation techniques discussed in previous sections not completely
suitable. Fortunately, an adaptation of such, found in the KF algorithm [59] and discussed
in a later section, lends itself not only for efficient estimation of kinematic errors, but for
the online integration of external measurements. As it will be later shown, although the
concept of online model estimation has been well developed thus far in existing literature,
the accompanying diagnostic and remedial measures are not as well-defined as those found
in classical estimation. Herein lies a key contribution of the proposed framework.
2.4.2 Reference Frames.
Navigation reference frames are fundamentally important when expressing the
position, velocity, and orientation of a vehicle. In general, the following major reference
frames defined in [95] are used throughout this research.
The true inertial frame (I-frame) - a theoretical reference frame in which Newton’s
laws of motion apply. The frame is defined by a non-accelerating, non-rotating
orthonormal basis in R3. Because of the relative nature of the universe, the true
inertial frame has no predefined origin or orientation.
The Earth-centered inertial frame (i-frame) - an orthonormal basis inR3, with its origin
at the center of mass of the Earth. The x and y axes are located on the equatorial plane
with the x-axis pointing towards Aries. The z-axis points towards the North Pole. The
i-frame is a non-rotating frame, but it does accelerate with respect to the true inertial
frame due to the relative rotation between celestial bodies. However, for terrestrial
navigation purposes, it can be considered an inertial reference frame. The i-frame is
illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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The Earth-centered Earth-fixed frame (e-frame) - an orthonormal basis in R3, with its
origin also at the Earth’s center of mass. The e-frame is rigidly attached to the Earth,
with the x-axis on the equatorial plane pointing toward the Greenwich meridian, the
z-axis aligned with the North Pole, and the y-axis on the equatorial plane pointing
toward 90 degrees East longitude. Because the e-frame is a true Cartesian reference
frame, some navigation computations are simplified. The e-frame is illustrated in
Figure 2.3.
The Earth-fixed navigation frame (n-frame) - an orthonormal basis in R3, with its
origin located at a predefined location on the Earth, typically on the surface. The
Earth-fixed navigation frame’s x, y, and z axes point in the North, East, and
down directions relative to the origin, respectively. In this frame, down is defined
geometrically as a vector normal to the Earth ellipsoid, which on average, is aligned
with the local gravity vector. The Earth-fixed navigation frame remains fixed to the
surface of the Earth. While this frame is not useful for very-long distance navigation,
it can simplify the navigation kinematic equations for shorter navigation routes. The
n-frame is illustrated in in Figure 2.3. Though the Earth-fixed n-frame was used
in Chapter 6, it is important to note long-term navigation problems usually employ a
local-level navigation frame, where the origin is moved with the vehicle, as described
in [95].
The aircraft body frame (b-frame) - an orthonormal basis in R3, rigidly attached to the
aircraft with its origin located on the aircraft’s center of mass. The x, y, and z axes
point out the nose, right wing, and bottom of the aircraft, respectively. Strap-down
inertial sensors are fixed to the b-frame, although they may not be located at the
origin or aligned with the axes. The b-frame is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
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The wind frame (w-frame) - an orthonormal basis in R3, rigidly attached to the aircraft
with its origin located on the aircraft’s center of mass. The x axis is aligned with
the direction of the aircraft’s velocity vector relative to the airmass, the z axis is
perpendicular to the x axis, in the plane of symmetry of the aircraft, and is positive
below the aircraft. Finally, the y axis completes the right-handed coordinate system.
The w-frame is necessary when using Pitot-static airspeed measurements and is
usually rotated about the b-frame via the Angle of Attack (AoA) and Angle of
Sideslip (AoS). The w-frame is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
2.4.3 Inertial Navigation.
Inertial navigation is based on the concept that, starting from a known location,
attitude, and velocity, a vehicle’s current position and attitude can be estimated by
integrating measured changes in velocity and rotation. Inertial navigation measurement
devices such as an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) consist of accelerometers, which
measure specific forces, and gyroscopes (commonly referred to as gyros), which measure
rotational rates relative to the I-frame. When equipped with a navigation computer capable
of integrating measured changes into a position, velocity, and attitude solution, the entire
system is referred to as an Inertial Navigation System (INS). In general, there are two types
of INSs: platform and strap-down. A platform INS mounts three orthogonal accelerometers
onto a gimbaled platform that maintains the vertical accelerometer aligned with local
gravity via gyroscopic rigidity. In turn, the gyroscopes used to maintain spatial rigidity
are used to read off the vehicle’s attitude. In contrast, a strap-down INS consists of a
simple three-axis IMU rigidly mounted onto the vehicle with its motion sensors mounted
orthogonally and aligned with the vehicle’s b-frame. Consequently, the gyroscopes are
used to estimate the vehicle’s orientation relative to the I-frame, along which the specific
forces measured by the accelerometers are integrated by the navigation computer. Although
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of Earth centered i-frame, e-frame, and n-frame. The e- and i-
frames are rigidly attached to the Earth’s center of mass, while the n-frame is attached to
the surface of the Earth. The i-frame is non-rotating with respect to inertial space, while
the e-frame rotates along with the Earth’s rotation. The n-frame is aligned with north, east,
and local gravity vectors.
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of aircraft b-frame and w-frame. Both frames are rigidly attached
to the aircraft’s center of mass. The b-frame and w-frame are rotated by Angle of Attack,
α, and Angle of Sideslip, β, due to the relative orientation between the aircraft body and
the wind mass.
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more computationally complex, strap-down INSs reduce mechanical complexity, size,
and power requirements needed for navigation, especially when aided by an external
measurement sensor. This development subsequently enabled the integration of Micro
Electro-Mechanical INSs onto small-scale devices such as quad-rotors and mobile phones.
The specific mathematical processes governing navigation computers, including the so-
called INS mechanization equations are detailed in [95]. In Chapter 7, a novel method
for autonomously calibrating accelerometer and gyroscope error models is detailed as a
specific online calibration example within the proposed framework.
2.4.4 All-Source Navigation.
The concept of inertial navigation summarized in the previous section can now
be expanded into the main motivational thrust for this research, known as all-source
navigation. As foreshadowed in Chapter 1, inertial navigation alone is subject to “drift,” or
a growing error in navigation state estimation due to the buildup of small incremental errors
during each recursion of the mechanization equations. Since inertial navigation is a dead-
reckoning technique, errors accumulate during each iteration. The problem of drift has
been traditionally solved by incorporating a trusted, external measurement update in the KF
algorithm. Furthermore, the most common external measurement source has traditionally
been GPS position updates. Since GPS provides an absolute position measurement (as
opposed to a relative position), using it as a measurement update source tends to reset the
errors built-up from the INS-only solution between GPS updates. A considerable amount
of literature has been dedicated to researching optimal ways of integrating GPS and INS
using differing KF-based feedback and correction loops [18][76][77][95]. However, recent
research efforts have shifted focus onto alternative sources of INS aiding in order to combat
increasing reliance on GPS. Each major effort in this context has focused on a particular
external sensor, such as visual features [97][98], radar signals [60], magnetic fields [22],
and Very Low Frequency emissions [27], to name a few. The concept of navigating
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”anywhere, anytime, using anything” is the essence of all-source navigation. In each of the
aforementioned applications, researchers tend to develop unique optimization techniques
in order to use the intended sensor adequately. However, no general approach has been
developed to provide a resilient and assured solution in all-source applications.
2.5 Recursive Model Estimation
2.5.1 Kalman Filter.
The Kalman Filter (KF), developed by Rudolf Kalman in 1960 [59] provides a method
for the optimal combination of measurements made by multiple sensors. The KF uses
Bayesian statistics to combine dynamics and measurements models, which provides a
solution estimate with the lowest possible variance or uncertainty. This section outlines
the basic principles behind the KF as outlined by Maybeck [76][77]. The physical system
dynamics are modeled using the form
x˙(t) = Fx(t) + Bu(t) + Gw(t), (2.55)
where x is a vector containing the system states of interest, u is a vector containing system
control inputs and w is a vector of white Gaussian noise sources with
E [w(t)] = 0, (2.56)
E
[
w(t)wT(t + τ)
]
= Qδ(τ), (2.57)
while the matrices F, B and G contain constant coefficients, which specify linear
combinations of the vectors they multiply.
In order to implement the KF algorithm in a computer system, the continuous-time
model must be discretized to account for system propagation between samples. The
discrete process noise strength matrix Qd and the discrete control input matrix Bd are
obtained by changing the limits of integration to capture a single time step ∆t within
the general solution to the system, which is given by Maybeck [77] and VanLoan [96].
30
Additionally, the discrete state transition matrix, which is used to propagate system states
and derived from the system dynamics model, is given by
Φ = eF∆t. (2.58)
Linear discrete measurements from the various sensors are modeled by
zk = Hxk + vk, (2.59)
where z is a vector of sensor measurements and v is a vector of discrete-time, white
Gaussian noise sources with
E [vk] = 0, (2.60)
E
[
vkvTl
]
= Rδkl, (2.61)
while the matrix H contains constant coefficients, which specify linear combinations of the
system state vector x. Since the system is linear, the KF algorithm guarantees a Minimum
Mean Squared Error (MMSE) optimal solution for estimating the system states.
The quantities of interest estimated by the KF are contained within the random vector
x. The KF provides the probability density function for x at each discrete time step,
conditioned on noise corrupted measurements provided by sensors. The KF algorithm
begins with initial conditions, which include the initial state estimate vector xˆ0 and its
uncertainty, which is contained by the covariance matrix P0. The initial conditions are
propagated from one discrete time step to the next using the discrete state transition matrix
such that
xˆ−k+1 = Φxˆ
+
k + Bduk, (2.62)
P−k+1 = ΦP
+
kΦ
T + Qd. (2.63)
As linear measurements become available at discrete time intervals, the propagated
state estimates and their covariance are optimally combined with the incoming measure-
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ments using the Kalman gain matrix K, which is given by
Kk = P−k H
T
[
HP−k H
T + R
]−1
. (2.64)
The state estimates and covariances are updated with the Kalman gain matrix from
(2.64) using
xˆ+k = xˆ
−
k + Kk
[
zk −Hxˆ−k
]
, (2.65)
P+k = (I −KkH) P−k . (2.66)
As shown in Equations (2.65) and (2.66), the Kalman gain matrix serves as an optimal
weighting factor that gives adequate preference to either the propagated or measured
estimates, given their individual uncertainties, in order to minimize mean squared error.
2.5.2 Extended Kalman Filter.
If a particular system cannot be adequately represented using linear dynamics or
measurement models, the linear KF algorithm does not guarantee optimal solutions.
However, in certain cases, linear approximations to nonlinear systems can still yield
accurate estimates. In such cases, the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) is used. The basic
system dynamics equation for a nonlinear system are given by
x˙(t) = f [x(t),u(t), t] + G(t)w(t), (2.67)
where f is a vector containing functions which represent the system. In turn, the nonlinear
measurement equation is given by
zk = h [xk, tk] + vk, (2.68)
where h is a vector of functions which model the sensor. The main goal is to linearize
nonlinear models about their nominal estimates in order to use the conventional linear
Kalman update equations. To do so, the states are redefined using the perturbation model
given by
δx(t) , x(t) − xˆ(t), (2.69)
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where δx(t) represents the difference between the true state vector and its estimate. In order
to propagate the system from initial conditions or a previous measurement to the time of
the next measurement, the EKF integrates the nonlinear dynamics function over the discrete
time difference using
xˆ−k+1 =
∫ tk+1
tk
f[x(t),u(t), t]dt + xˆ+k , (2.70)
while the state covariance matrix is propagated using (2.58), (2.63) and a linearized
dynamics model matrix F given by
Fk =
∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
xˆ+k
. (2.71)
In order to update the propagated state estimates using incoming (possibly nonlinear)
measurements, the measurements must first be predicted by evaluating the measurement
model function with the most recent estimate using
zˆk = h
[
xˆ−k , tk
]
, (2.72)
δzk = zk − zˆk, (2.73)
where δz is called the pre-update measurement residual, or innovation, and represents the
difference between the actual and predicted measurements.
In order to combine the propagated and measured state estimates, the nonlinear
measurement function h is linearized to obtain Hk in a similar fashion to Fk using
Hk =
∂h
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
xˆ−k
. (2.74)
The linearized matrix H is then used in (2.64) to obtain a Kalman gain matrix, and the
measurement update equation reduces to
δxˆ+k = Kkδzk, (2.75)
due to the use of perturbation state estimates and measurements. The perturbation state
δxˆ, which starts at zero during each filter recursion, is updated using (2.75) and added
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to the nominal trajectory to produce a nominal estimate. Prior to the next recursion, the
perturbation state is reset to zero. Since the EKF does not guarantee optimal solutions,
it must often be tuned prior to use by adding process noise and selecting specific initial
conditions. Tuning increases filter stability and usually increases solution uncertainty.
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III. Autonomous and Resilient Management of All-source Sensors for Navigation
This chapter develops the general strategy for providing all-source multi-sensor
resiliency, assurance, and integrity through an autonomous sensor management framework.
The proposed framework dynamically places each sensor in an all-source system into one
of four modes: monitoring, validation, calibration, and remodeling. Each mode contains
specific and novel realtime processes that affect how a navigation system responds to
sensor measurements. The framework is developed by first defining the set of desired
resilient sensor management objectives, then developing novel approaches for achieving
these objectives in an all-source and real-time environment, and finally by interlacing
the processes governing each desired objective using a common application programming
interface, all in a fault- and sensor-agnostic manner. The benefits of using the proposed
framework are demonstrated by comparing all-source navigation performance against
conventional filtering using two simulated scenarios including multiple sequential sensor
failures and incorrectly modeled sensors. The research developed in this chapter has been
published in [52] and [54].
3.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, a significant portion of navigation research has been
devoted to alternative means of precision navigation and timing, through the modeling
and testing of non-traditional sensors (e.g., vision [97], radio [27], magnetic [22], etc.).
As research matures in each of these sensor areas, multi-sensor alternative navigation is
quickly becoming an operational possibility. However, with each additional sensor allowed
into a navigation system comes the increased possibility of corrupting the navigation
solution due to sensor model misspecification and undetected sensor failures or anomalies.
Therefore, a robust method of managing sensors with questionable models is now necessary
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to ensure navigation solutions are accurate and resilient against errors in sensor modeling,
unexpected signal interference, or undetected sensor faults, all in a plug-and-play or online
fashion.
Some research has been conducted in the areas of managing navigation sensors for
computational requirements [25], managing self-correcting Simultaneous Localization and
Mapping (SLAM) sensors [65], and validating ad-hoc sensor networks [82]. However,
there are currently no frameworks, to the author’s knowledge, that formalize the definitions
and interface between the processes of detecting faulty sensors, estimating sensor model
parameters, and adapting sensor model functions, all in an online fashion and while
protecting the integrity of the navigation solution. There is, however, compartmentalized
research in related areas, where common navigation challenges related to multi-sensor
navigation and sensor modeling have been solved, albeit in limited scope and usually aimed
at specific sensor technologies. These related research areas are summarized below.
The first and arguably most critical step in resilient sensor management is fault detec-
tion and exclusion. Multi-sensor fault detection and exclusion has been traditionally ac-
complished through statistical analysis of redundant snapshot measurements [36][86][93],
solution separation vectors [15][16][20][21][66][108][109], or filtered residuals [11][12]
[13][110]. However, most research has focused on the specific multi-sensor problem posed
by the GPS constellation, where each satellite is regarded as a different (albeit identical in
nature and synchronous) sensor in the multi-sensor system, and the “fault” is defined as an
unmodeled bias that is assumed to only affect one of the sensors (satellites) at any given
time; conditions which are not guaranteed in an all-source environment.
Nonetheless, detection and exclusion of a faulty sensor is only the first step of the
problem in creating a resilient sensor management system. Since many sensor faults may
be caused by model misspecification or temporary anomalies, there also exists a need
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to recover these failure modes (and continue using the sensor in question) through the
autonomous and online modification of the specified sensor model.
One common method for overcoming sensor misspecifications is to estimate variable
sensor model parameters that may have changed during navigation (e.g., lever arms,
rotation matrices, scale factors, etc.). This type of sensor model modification is often
referred to as calibration. There are a large number of online calibration examples across
many sensor fields such as magnetometers [10], accelerometers [105], gyroscopes [67],
lasers [71], audio sensors [79], Pitot-static sensors [56], to name a few. One such research
area with significant recent advances is online calibration of a VINS [29][47][64][74][106].
As mature as these calibration research areas may be, they still only tend to focus on a
particular sensor or sensor combination (e.g., visual and inertial or magnetic and inertial),
and often do not address the tasks of detecting the need for calibration and independently
evaluating the effectiveness of the calibration results. Additionally, they do not adequately
address other types of sensor model modifications that may be needed for resiliency.
A second class of methods for overcoming sensor misspecifications is to alter the
functional form of the sensor model to account for missing parameters or changing
environmental conditions (e.g., time-changing biases, stochastic clock errors, temperature
effects, etc.). This type of sensor model modification is often referred to as multiple-
model estimation or model identification. Current literature in this area tends to be
divided between continuous estimation of sensor and process noise covariances [3][14][99]
and multiple model estimation using a finite set of competing models [24][30][43].
However, most techniques tend to focus on permanent failure modes that require the model
identification process to run continuously. Similar to online calibration, these techniques
also tend to lack independent validation of model identification results.
This chapter proposes a novel framework that contributes both a common language
and a set of critical functions and their interactions, that together provide sensor-
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agnostic, statistically rigorous, and resilient sensor management. The proposed framework
combines fault detection and exclusion, sensor model validation, online calibration, and
online model identification into four interconnected modes of operation: monitoring,
validation, calibration, and remodeling. In doing so, it is able to provide resilient
and assured navigation for all-source applications, thereby directly enabling continued
navigation operations across a greater range of sensor anomalies. The complete set of
resiliency functions or objectives directly enabled through the proposed framework is
summarized in Table 3.1. The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections.
Section 3.2 describes related work in the areas of sensor management frameworks, fault
detection and identification, multiple-model estimation, and sensor model validation.
Section 3.3 illustrates the proposed framework and modes of operation in detail, and
provides simulation results for two multi-sensor navigation scenarios. Finally, Section 3.4
summarizes the contributions of the research in this chapter and areas for future work.
3.2 Related Work
Though no framework combining the aforementioned functions from Table 3.1 been
found in literature, several works have been found whose contributions were leveraged as
part of the framework development process. These works are briefly described below.
Statistical hypothesis testing forms an integral part of the fault detection, model
validation, and adaptive estimation tasks. In general, most hypothesis tests can be
stated using an LRT [63], by assigning competing statistical distributions to each of the
hypotheses in the test. Such LRTs are useful since their distribution tends to be Chi-
Square [23], regardless of the distributions of the competing hypotheses, and especially
if the competing hypotheses are assumed to be normally distributed. Integrity monitoring
and fault detection and exclusion research in the area of GPS and INS integration such
as [19][20][37][48][49][78][86][100][103] use LRTs and test statistics to detect faulty
38
Table 3.1: List of desired resilient sensor management objectives.
Mode Section Resilient sensor management objectives
Monitoring 3.3.1.2
Provide sensor-agnostic fault detection and exclusion
Ensure fault-agnostic system integrity
Trigger sensor model remedial measures
Validation 3.3.1.3
Initialize oﬄine sensors without compromising integrity
Validate questionable sensor models in real-time
Provide independent verification of remedial measures
Calibration 3.3.1.4
Augment state-space with specified model parameters
Follow a prescribed estimation sequence for observability
Reduce state-space after specified termination criteria
Remodeling 3.3.1.5
Dynamically spawn multiple-model filter bank
Select best candidate model using statistical criteria
Delete filter bank after specified termination criteria
GPS measurements, and more importantly, predict system performance in the presence
of undetected faults. Meanwhile, the work in [110] makes use of multiple filters to identify
biased satellite measurements and exclude them from affecting the solution, thereby
providing a form of system integrity. Leveraging the existing research in the area of GPS,
our monitoring mode contains a novel approach for all-source fault detection and exclusion,
and integrity monitoring, which is developed and validated in Chapter 4.
While our monitoring test provides the ability to detect and exclude faults across the
set of online sensors (i.e., sensors currently informing the navigation solution), there also
exists a need to initialize oﬄine sensors by validating their stated measurement models
while protecting the navigation solution. This challenge, which we are referring to as
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the sensor validation problem, is virtually unaddressed (at the time of writing) in current
research. The validation problem is further complicated by the fact that many navigation
sensors require the estimation of additional states needed in their measurement model (e.g.,
clock errors, biases, scale factors, etc.), and estimating these additional states would require
allowing sensor measurements from the sensor in question to affect the navigation solution.
Leveraging the partial update implementation [17] of the Kalman-Schmidt filter [81], our
validation mode contains a novel approach for the real-time validation of oﬄine sensors that
allows for the estimation of sensor-unique states while protecting the navigation solution
and maintaining system integrity. This method is developed and validated in Chapter 5.
Fault detection and exclusion, and independent model validation comprise just two
(albeit the most important) objectives in our resilient sensor management framework. The
goal, especially in the area of emerging and alternative sensors, is not only to detect and
prevent mismodeled sensors from affecting the navigation solution, but also to dynamically
modify their stated models in order to enable their continued use. The research in [65]
proposes a multi-phased process that accomplishes a subset of tasks from our proposed
framework. Namely, the VINS calibration method proposed therein continually estimates
camera extrinsic parameters and statistically compares, via a LRT, their short-term and
long-term estimates. If the short-term and long-term estimates are statistically different, a
three-phased calibration routine is initiated. Finally, the calibration routine is terminated
once the covariance of the estimated parameters exhibits desired convergence criteria. In
the context of our proposed framework, the research in [65] provides a VINS-centric sensor
manager that meets a subset of the objectives contained in our monitoring mode, and most
of the objectives contained in our calibration mode. However, it is focused on a single
sensor and is specifically designed to work with VINSs. Additionally, it does not provide a
method for independent validation of the calibration results.
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When perceived sensor faults are not recoverable by re-calibrating the sensor model
parameters, we may also consider the possibility of an incorrectly stated measurement
function. Since a particular measurement function may be incorrectly stated in an infinite
number of ways, the task of finding the most appropriate sensor model function is
usually solved by fitting a finite set of models in a multiple model technique such as
[30][43]. Alternatively, some may choose to estimate certain stochastic model parameters
continuously such as [3][14][99]. All of these methods for overcoming incomplete or
incorrectly stated model functions provide general examples of the objectives contained in
our remodeling mode. The specific remodeling technique shown in our example scenarios
from Section 3.3.2 uses a parallel filter bank with multiple parallel models, much like the
aforementioned research. However, it also uses statistical model selection criteria such
as AIC [2] to select the most likely model, and additionally independently validates the
selection results using our test in the validation mode.
3.3 An Autonomous and Resilient Sensor Manager
We now introduce a novel, autonomous method for resilient sensor management
that performs all the previously identified functions by expounding on the building
blocks contained in the previous research from Section 3.2, and coherently weaving their
functionality into a sensor-agnostic framework. The proposed framework, henceforth
referred to as Autonomous and Resilient Management of All-source Sensors (ARMAS),
statistically evaluates sensor performance and places each sensor into one of four
operating modes: monitoring, validation, calibration, and remodeling. ARMAS then
provides resilient sensor management by controlling how a navigation filter responds to
measurements from a particular sensor based on that sensor’s mode. Table 3.1 (shown
previously) summarizes the key functionality provided by each mode of operation.
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3.3.1 Framework Implementation.
In general, the ARMAS framework is designed around an online or plug-and-play
environment, applies to all navigation sensors, does not require sensor-specific tuning,
and can be adapted to any filtering technique. The examples illustrated in Section 3.3.2
were developed in MATLAB® using the SCORPION estimation framework [61] for filter
spawning and measurement processing. It is important to note that the proposed framework
was designed around the plug-and-play concept of operation, assuming sensors are serially
added onto an ongoing navigation process. The only assumption imposed onto the initial
ongoing navigation process is that the navigation solution is consistent (i.e., its estimates
are unbiased, and the estimated error covariance matches actual performance). This
assumption does not preclude a “weak” sensor (i.e., large measurement error covariance)
from being the only sensor in the system. It simply dictates that if there is only a single
sensor in the system when a new sensor is added, its residual statistics are assumed to
be accurate. Figure 3.1 illustrates a proposed state transition diagram that coherently
transitions sensors through the various modes of operation. The following sections
expound on each of the modes of operation and provide general guidelines for proper
implementation.
To facilitate further discussion on ARMAS development, we will adapt the stochastic
estimation convention from [76] for multi-sensor applications. Consider a navigation
problem of the form
x˙(t) = f [x(t), (t),u(t), t] + G(t)w(t), (3.1)
where x is the N × 1 navigation state vector containing the vehicle’s core navigation states
(position, velocity, attitude, time, etc.),  is an M × 1 vector containing additional states
needed to account for measurement errors, u is the control input vector, G is an (N+M)×W
linear operator, and w is a W × 1 white Gaussian noise process with a W ×W continuous
process noise strength matrix Q. The discretized [96] non-linear system is then solved using
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the EKF algorithm [76][77]. The state estimates are propagated using the (possibly) non-
linear state dynamics model, and updated using measurements from available sensors. In
a multi-sensor environment with J sensors, the jth sensor provides Z-dimensional discrete
measurements, z[ j]k , at time tk, which are modeled as
z[ j]k = h[
j] [x(t), [ j](t),u(t), t,p[ j]] + v[ j]k , (3.2)
where h[ j] is a (possibly) non-linear measurement function for sensor j, [ j] is a L×1 (L ≤
M) subset of  consisting of the additional states required for processing measurements for
sensor j (e.g., a clock error process, constant bias, etc.), p[ j] is a P× 1 vector of observable
model parameters for h[ j] selected by the user (e.g. a lever arm, scale factor, etc.), and v[ j]k
is a Z × 1 discrete white Gaussian noise process with covariance matrix R[ j]k . Given the
estimated quantities xˆ−k , ˆ
[ j]−
k , pˆ[
j], the Z × 1 measurement residual, r[ j]k , at time t = tk for
sensor j is given by
r[ j]k = z
[ j]
k − h[ j]
[
xˆ−k , ˆ
[ j]−
k ,uk, tk, pˆ
[ j]
k
]
. (3.3)
Additionally, the residual vector from (3.3) is expected to follow the distribution
r[ j]k ∼ N
(
0
Z×1
,S[ j]k
)
, (3.4)
S[ j]k = H
[ j]
k P
−
k H
[ j]T
k + R
[ j]
k , (3.5)
where H[ j]k is the Z × (N + M) Jacobian of h[ j] about the current estimate, and P−k is the
(N + M) × (N + M) state estimation error covariance matrix at time t = tk. In this context,
the goal of ARMAS is to ensure incoming measurements z[ j]k truly adhere to their stated
models by analyzing the statistical distribution of their residuals; and if not, protecting the
core navigation solution, xˆ, while attempting to modify [ j] and/or p[ j] to enable continued
sensor use.
3.3.1.1 Sensor Initialization.
As previously stated, ARMAS places each sensor into one of four operating modes
plus a failed state. In a plug-and-play environment with an ongoing navigation process,
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each new sensor is initialized into one of two modes: monitoring or validation. This initial
placement is based on how confident users may be in the current model available for a
particular sensor. For example, sensors that have well understood models and stochastic
processes, such as a GPS receiver in a threat-free environment, could be considered
“trusted”, and placed directly into monitoring mode, while emerging alternative sensors
with more questionable error models could be considered “untrusted” and placed into
validation mode. To take advantage of this functionality, an ARMAS user can specify
the initial trust for each sensor (e.g., trusted or untrusted), or provide a default setting for
all new sensors.
3.3.1.2 Monitoring Mode.
Monitoring mode is used to detect, identify, and exclude faulty sensors in a multi-
sensor problem. In this context, a faulty sensor refers to a sensor whose stated model
is not consistent with its observed performance, which could be caused by temporary
or permanent failures, as well as dynamic changes to the sensing environment (e.g.,
atmosphere, terrain, multi-path, etc.). Sensors in monitoring mode are able to fully affect
the navigation solution provided to the user since they are trusted. This poses a challenge to
detecting model divergence using a single-filter solution, since the effects of a mismodeled
sensor on the navigation solution are not easily attributable to a particular sensor. An
example of this problem is a strong (i.e., low measurement noise strength) sensor with an
unmodeled bias that “pulls” the filter solution away from truth to absorb the bias. In that
case, the faulty sensor’s residuals would be statistically valid, while potentially making
the residuals from weaker yet not faulty sensors, invalid. Any method that can robustly
detect, attribute, and exclude sensor faults can be used in this mode. For our particular
all-source implementation, we created a novel multi-filter, sensor-agnostic fault detection
and exclusion approach that does not constrain faults to biases, or to single sensors, and
can guarantee system performance with a specified false alarm rate, α, and integrity error
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Figure 3.1: Proposed state transition diagram for ARMAS framework. New sensors
(oﬄine) begin in either validate or monitor mode. A failed monitoring test starts a
calibration and remodeling loop, whose effectiveness is evaluated by the validation test.
The loop continues until the validation test is passed or the sensor model selection is
unchanged. Failed sensors can be periodically re-validated to recover from temporary
anomalies using RSR.
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bound, αI . The specific details of our implementation are found in Chapter 4 and [58].
The monitoring test is run continuously for every sensor in monitoring mode, with a test
decision produced for each sensor at a user-defined rate. The test is failed if a fault is
detected and attributed to the sensor in question, and passed otherwise. If the test is
passed, the sensor in question remains in monitoring mode. Otherwise, the sensor is no
longer allowed to affect the solution and is placed into validation mode, where its stated
model is independently validated against the other (trusted) sensors. To take advantage of
monitoring functionality, an ARMAS user needs to specify the following:
1. The monitoring period (e.g., number of samples or time elapsed between tests).
2. The fault detection false alarm rate, α.
3. The integrity monitoring error bound, αI .
3.3.1.3 Validation Mode.
Validation mode is used to statistically validate an untrusted sensor model using
information from trusted sensors. Sensors in validation mode are only able to affect
state estimates for their unique states, [ j], while the core navigation states, x, are only
affected by trusted sensors (i.e., sensors in monitoring mode). This poses a challenge when
initializing or processing measurements from an untrusted sensor since we are to consider
the stochastic distribution of all filter states while only allowing an untrusted measurement
update from sensor j to affect [ j]. An example of this challenge would be estimating
a receiver clock error without allowing the receiver to affect the navigation solution, and
while preventing the clock error estimate from absorbing any other missing error sources.
To solve this challenge in a plug-and-play environment, we developed a novel method for
initialization and validation of a sensor with a questionable sensor model that can estimate
sensor-unique states, [ j], while protecting the integrity of the core navigation solution,
x, using only the existing main filter. Employing the partial update [17] formulation of
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the Kalman Schmidt filter [81], measurement updates from a sensor in validation mode
are only able to affect its sensor-unique states, [ j], while measurement updates from
sensors in monitoring mode (i.e., trusted) are able to affect all filter states. This not only
protects the core navigation solution during the estimation of [ j], but it also improves
fault detection performance since sensor faults are prevented from being absorbed into the
core navigation solution. The specific details of our implementation are found in Chapter
5 and [57]. Similar to monitoring mode, a validation test is run continuously for every
sensor in validation mode, with a test decision produced at a user-defined rate. The mode
transition from validation mode is determined by both the results of the validation test
and the previous ARMAS mode of the sensor in question. As illustrated in Figure 3.1,
validation mode is used to externally validate sensor models after failing a monitoring test,
completing a calibration sequence, and completing a remodeling selection. Additionally,
validation mode can be used to periodically re-evaluate permanently failed sensors to check
for passage of temporary anomalies that might have caused an insuperable failure. This
process is referred to as Resilient Sensor Recovery (RSR). To take advantage of validation
functionality, an ARMAS user needs to specify the following:
1. The validation period (e.g., number of samples or time elapsed between tests).
2. The fault detection false alarm rate, α.
3. Which states used in h[ j] are core navigation states (i.e., x).
4. Which states used in h[ j] are sensor-unique states (i.e., [ j]).
5. If RSR is enabled, the RSR period (i.e., how often to attempt post-fail validation).
3.3.1.4 Calibration Mode.
Calibration mode is used to dynamically re-estimate variable model parameters when
a sensor model has been identified as faulty. Sensors enter calibration mode after having
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failed an initial or post-monitoring validation test, and are considered untrusted until they
can be validated and placed back into monitoring mode. In calibration mode, the functional
form of the sensor model is assumed correct, but certain model parameters, p[ j], inside the
measurement model function from (3.2) are to be re-estimated. The parameter estimation
may also require specific sequencing (i.e., estimate subsets of p[ j] in a specified order) in
order to maintain observability, which in turn requires specifying sequencing criteria, or a
method for determining when a step in the sequence is complete. An example of this type
of problem would be the camera calibration algorithm described in [106], where the camera
extrinsic parameters (lever arm and orientation) are estimated separately (orientation first,
then lever arm) in order to maintain observability, and the transition between sequence
steps is driven by convergence of the associated state covariance matrix. For our particular
implementation, we generalized the calibration process into a set of simple instructions
provided by users such that any sensor calibration method that can be expressed in terms
of a sequenced state vector augmentation and corresponding sequence transition criteria
can be easily and autonomously executed. The parameter estimation is performed using a
calibration sub-filter that is initialized based on a copy of the main filter whenever a sensor
enters calibration mode. Once all steps in the stated calibration sequence are completed, the
sensor in question is placed back into validation mode to externally validate the calibration
results against trusted sensors as described above. It is also important to note here that since
sensors in calibration mode are considered untrusted, their measurement updates during a
calibration sequence are only able to affect estimates for [ j] and p[ j], which tends to
increase observability on p[ j] since estimates for x are provided by trusted sensors. To take
advantage of calibration functionality, an ARMAS user needs to specify the following:
1. Which parameters in h[ j] are to be estimated during calibration (i.e., p[ j]).
2. The initial estimate for each parameter (i.e., p[ j]0 (i), i = 1, . . . , P).
3. The initial uncertainty for each parameter (i.e., σ[ j]0 (i), i = 1, . . . , P).
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4. The sequence group for each parameter (i.e., when to start estimating).
5. Transition criteria for each parameter (i.e., when to stop estimating).
Subsequently, if the sensor in question enters calibration mode, ARMAS automatically
augments the filter states using the provided initial estimates and uncertainties for the first
group in the sequence, then transitions to the next group once every group member has met
its transition criteria, until all groups are completed.
3.3.1.5 Remodeling Mode.
Remodeling mode is used to dynamically modify the functional form of the
measurement model when a sensor model has been identified as faulty. Sensors enter
remodeling mode after failing a post-calibration validation test or if a calibration routine
was not provided. Similar to other modes, sensors in remodeling mode are considered
untrusted until they can be validated and placed back into monitoring mode. In remodeling
mode, the functional form of the sensor model is now assumed incorrect. This poses
a challenge since a measurement function h[ j] could be incorrectly stated in an infinite
number of ways. To solve this, we leverage user experience for each sensor application to
create a reasonable and finite set of S model options that are dynamically evaluated if the
sensor in question enters remodeling mode. Then, we use a statistical test to select the best
model from the set. An example of this type of problem would be a VINS user that initially
only models radial lens distortion, but includes the option to also model tangential lens
distortion if the camera sensor ever enters the remodeling mode. Similarly, a laser range
finder user may elect to initially attempt a First Order Gauss-Markov (FOGM) error model,
but include the option to try second-order, constant bias, or the combination thereof, if the
sensor ever enters remodeling mode. Any method that can evaluate multiple models and
statistically select the most appropriate one can be used in this mode. For our particular
implementation, we leveraged Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation (MMAE) research
such as [24][30][43], but used Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [2] for the model
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selection decision since it balances model complexity with error reduction. Additionally,
we only evaluate multiple models when the sensor in question enters remodeling mode,
spawning S remodeling sub-filters initialized as copies of the main filter, and collecting
residuals using (3.3) until all remodeling termination criteria are met. Once a model
selection decision is made, the sensor in question along with the selected model are placed
into validation mode. Similarly to calibration mode, sensors in remodeling mode are
untrusted and only able to affect estimates of [ j] and p[ j], which strengthens the model
selection process since it is heavily influenced by external and trusted sensors. To take
advantage of remodeling functionality, an ARMAS user needs to specify the following:
1. A list of candidate measurement models (i.e., h[ j]i i = 1, . . . , S ).
2. The initial estimate for all sensor-unique states in each model (i.e., [ j]i0 i = 1, . . . , S ).
3. The initial covariance for all sensor-unique states in each model (i.e., Σ[ j]i0 , i =
1, . . . , S ).
4. The remodeling termination criteria (e.g., number of samples, time period, covari-
ance, etc.).
Subsequently, if the sensor in question enters remodeling mode, ARMAS automatically
spawns S parallel filters using the main filter statistics for the core states, x, and the
provided initial estimates and covariances for each set of sensor-specific states in each
candidate model.
3.3.1.6 Implementation Summary.
As shown in the previous sections, ARMAS provides an autonomous method
for implementing various sensor model management functions given a minimal set of
additional specifications for each sensor beyond the usual modeling requirements. It is
important to note, certain functions including multi-sensor fault detection and identification
as well as RSR, are available without any additional sensor-centric specifications, and using
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only default settings. Table 3.2 summarizes the additional information required to enable
ARMAS functionality for each mode of operation.
3.3.2 Example Scenarios.
This section describes two example scenarios that relied on the ARMAS framework
for resilient sensor management. It is important to note that these are simply two examples
of how the proposed framework could be used. A user of the framework has the flexibility
to adopt the framework to the specific problem at hand. In both scenarios, the use
of ARMAS enabled continued operations in cases that would have resulted in either
significant navigation solution errors or irrecoverable sensor failures. Consider a two-
dimensional navigation problem with two vehicles (Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2) obtaining
their navigation solutions from an EKF driven by a 2D kinematic model given by
x˙(t) =

x˙p(t)
x˙v(t)
x˙a(t)
 =

xv(t)
xa(t)
− 1
τa
xa(t)
 +

0
0
w(t)
 , (3.6)
where xp is the vehicle’s 2D position in [m], xv is the 2D velocity in [m/s], xa is the 2D
acceleration in [m/s2] and driven by a FOGM process with time constant τa = 90 [s], and
w(t) is a 2D white Gaussian noise process with E
[
w(t)w(t + τ)T
]
= Qδ(τ) and
Q = (1.5 × 10−3)2 I
2×2
[m2/s5]. (3.7)
The initial state estimate, xˆ(0), and state error covariance, P(0), for both vehicles at
the beginning of each scenario is given by
xˆ(0) =
[
0 0 100 0 0 0
]T
, (3.8)
P(0) = diag
([
1 1 10 10 1.5 × 10−3 1.5 × 10−3
]2)
. (3.9)
Each vehicle obtains discrete measurement updates from three sensors (Sensor A,
Sensor B, and Sensor C). Sensor A is a two-dimensional position sensor with a model
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given by
z[A]k = s  xpk + v[A]k , (3.10)
v[A]k ∼ N
(
0
2×1
, 1002 I
2×2
)
, (3.11)
where s = [sx sy]T is a two-dimensional scale factor,  denotes the Hadamard product, and
I is an identity matrix. Sensor B is a two-dimensional, eight-satellite pseudorange sensor
with a model given by
z[B]k =

∥∥∥t1 − xpk∥∥∥
...∥∥∥t8 − xpk∥∥∥
 +

bk
...
bk
 + v
[B]
k , (3.12)
v[B]k ∼ N
(
0
8×1
, 202 I
8×8
)
, (3.13)
where ti is the two-dimensional position of satellite i, xpk is the two-dimensional position
of the vehicle at time tk, and bk is a FOGM process simulating a simple receiver clock
error with time constant τB = 3600 [s] and σ2 = 80002 [m2]. Finally, Sensor C is a
two-dimensional velocity sensor with the model
z[C]k = xvk + v
[C]
k , (3.14)
v[C]k ∼ N
(
0
2×1
, 502 I
2×2
)
. (3.15)
3.3.2.1 Example 1: Temporary sensor anomaly.
In this scenario, ARMAS was used to detect the presence of a temporary anomaly in
Sensor B. Aircraft 1 was equipped with a standard EKF while Aircraft 2 used ARMAS.
ARMAS specifications for this scenario were as follows:
• The significance level for monitoring and validation was set to 0.05.
• The monitoring period was defined by time elapsed and set to 20 [s].
• The validation period was defined by time elapsed and set to 60 [s].
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• The RSR period was defined by time elapsed and set to 60 [s].
• The core navigation states were defined as all states shown in (3.6) (e.g., xp, xv, xa).
• Sensor B included a sensor-unique state, bk, as defined in (3.12).
• There were no calibration routines or remodeling options specified for any sensor.
At the start of the scenario, all sensors in Aircraft 2 were in monitoring mode. After
five minutes, a temporary anomaly defined by an unmodeled bias, which grew from 0 [m]
to 1500 [m] over 10 minutes, was applied to the fourth entry in z[B]k from (3.12). As shown
in Figure 3.2, Aircraft 1 had no means to detect the growing Sensor B bias, causing its
solution to drift from the truth. In contrast, Aircraft 2 was equipped with ARMAS and
therefore, was able to quickly identify the mismatch between the solution versions across
the three sensors, and identify Sensor B as the cause of the divergence. Next, as shown
in Figure 3.3, Sensor B failed the monitoring test, and was placed into validation mode,
where it also failed the validation test. Since no calibration routine or remodeling options
were provided, Sensor B transitioned from validation mode to a failed state, where RSR
periodically validated its performance. Aircraft 2 continued navigation using only Sensor A
and Sensor C, as indicated by the increase in position covariance in Figure 3.2. After some
time, the two aircraft physically transitioned away from the anomaly area, and the solution
in Aircraft 1 quickly converged towards the truth. Meanwhile, Aircraft 2 continued to
navigate using only Sensor A and Sensor C until RSR led to a passing validation test. Once
Sensor B was validated, Aircraft 2 returned to navigation with all sensors in monitoring
mode. Table 3.3 compares the solution performance between the two aircraft for this
scenario. Note the large difference in Root Sum Squared (RSS) position error between
the two aircraft at the point the temporary anomaly ended, as shown in Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: Trajectory comparison between Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2, Example 1.
Figure 3.3: ARMAS mode history for Sensor B, Example 1.
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Table 3.2: ARMAS example implementation summary.
Required by1
Parameter name Symbol M V C R Example specification
False alarm rate α • • 0.001
Integrity error bound αI • 0.05
Monitoring period • 20 [s]
Validation period • 60 [s]
RSR period • 30 [s]
Core navigation states x • • • EKF States: 1-6
Sensor-unique states [ j] • • • EKF States: 7-8
Calibration parameters2 p[ j] • h =
[
sxx(1) syx(2)
]T
Parameter values2 p[ j]0 • p0 = [1 1]T
Parameter uncertainty2 σ[ j]0 • σ0 = [10 10]T
Calibration sequence2 • Group 1: {p(1)}
Group 2: {p(2)}
Transition criteria2 • p(1): 300 [s]
p(2): 300 [s]
Candidate models3 h[ j]i • h1 = [x(1) + b1 x(2)]T
h2 = [x(1) + b1 x(2) + b2]T
Initial state estimates3 [ j]i0 • 10 = 0
20 = [0 0]
T
Initial state covariances3 Σ[ j]i0 • Σ10 = 100
Σ20 =
 100 00 100

Termination criteria3 • 100 residual samples
1 M - Monitoring, V - Validation, C - Calibration, R - Remodeling
2 Example: 2D scale factor, p = [sx sy], each dimension estimated separately, time-based sequencing
between dimensions
3 Example: Model 1 adds 1D bias, Model 2 adds 2D bias, both models use sample size for
termination
55
Table 3.3: Key events and RSS position error comparison, Example 1.
RSS Position Error [m]
Sensor Event Time [m] Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 % Change
All Start 0 0 0 0
B Anomaly: On 5 2.2 2.2 0
B Anomaly: Off 15 369.6 10.9 -97.1
All End 20 4.8 4.8 0
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3.3.2.2 Example 2: Multiple sequential faults.
In this scenario, ARMAS was used to validate and remodel an untrusted sensor model
for Sensor B, as well as detect the need to calibrate Sensor A. Again, Aircraft 1 was
equipped with a standard EKF while Aircraft 2 used ARMAS. ARMAS specifications
for this scenario were as follows:
• The significance level for monitoring and validation was set to 0.05.
• The monitoring period was defined by time elapsed and set to 20 [s].
• The validation period was defined by time elapsed and set to 60 [s].
• The RSR period was defined by time elapsed and set to 60 [s].
• The core navigation states were defined as all states shown in (3.6) (e.g., xp, xv, xa).
• Sensor B included a sensor-unique state, bk, as defined in (3.12).
• Sensor A was equipped with a calibration routine defined by
p[A] =
[
sx sy
]T
, (3.16)
h[A] =
[
sxxp(1) syxp(2)
]T
, (3.17)
p[A]0 =
[
1 1
]T
, (3.18)
σ[A]0 =
[
10 10
]T
, (3.19)
where the calibration sequence requires estimation of p(1) = sx for 150 [s] first, then
p(2) = sy for an additional 150 [s].
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• Sensor B was equipped with S = 8 remodeling candidates defined by
h[B]1 = h
[B] +
[
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
]
, (3.20)
h[B]2 = h
[B] +
[
0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0
]
, (3.21)
... (3.22)
h[B]8 = h
[B] +
[
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c
]
, (3.23)
where h[B] is the baseline measurement model defined in (3.12), and the constant
bias, c, has initial statistics given by
c0 ∼ N
(
0 [m], 10002 [m2]
)
. (3.24)
At the start of the scenario, only Sensor A and Sensor C were online in both vehicles.
Additionally, both online sensors in Aircraft 2 were in monitoring mode. As shown in
Figure 3.4, Sensor B was initialized after five minutes. However, the sensor developers
were not confident in the sensor model from (3.12), and provided ARMAS an additional
eight model versions, each modeling the addition of a constant bias to a particular satellite.
Meanwhile, Aircraft 1 was limited to using (3.12) as given. The actual measurements from
Sensor B included a 1500 [m] constant bias added to the fourth entry in z[B]k from (3.12). As
shown in Figure 3.5, the sensor model provided for Sensor B was incomplete, causing the
solution in Aircraft 1 to shift away from the truth. Meanwhile, Aircraft 2 used the validation
mode in ARMAS to recognize the model mismatch without compromising its navigation
solution. Since there were no calibration routines provided for Sensor B, it transitioned into
remodeling mode, where all model options were evaluated in parallel, while continuing to
navigate using the other two sensors. The model selection from the remodeling mode was
then successfully validated, placing Sensor B into monitoring mode. Five minutes later,
an aircraft maneuver changed the variable scale factor on Sensor A from s = [1 1]T to
s = [1.2 1.3]T. As shown in Figure 3.4, the change did not affect Aircraft 1 since the effect
58
Table 3.4: Key events and RSS position error comparison, Example 2.
RSS Position Error [m]
Sensor Event Time [m] Aircraft 1 Aircraft 2 % Change
All Start 0 0 0 0
B Online 5 15.9 15.9 0
A Scale factor 10 370.3 5.8 -98.4
B Oﬄine 20 438.9 2.5 -99.4
All End 25 2.78 × 104 22.8 -99.9
on the navigation solution from Sensor A was attenuated by the measurement updates from
the other two sensors. Conversely, ARMAS in Aircraft 2 detected the growing residuals
and identified Sensor A as the source. As shown in Figure 3.6, Sensor A transitioned
from monitoring to calibration mode, where the provided scale factor calibration sequence
was augmented into the navigation state. The newly calibrated Sensor A then passed the
validation test and was placed back into monitoring mode. Finally, ten minutes later,
Sensor B was taken oﬄine. At that point, with only Sensor A and Sensor C available
to provide additional information, the solution in Aircraft 1 began to exhibit the effects of
the un-calibrated Sensor A. Meanwhile, Aircraft 2 continued to operate nominally since it
had previously detected the need for and successfully executed the calibration of Sensor A.
Table 3.4 compares the solution performance between the two aircraft for this scenario.
Note the diverging performance in terms of RSS position error between the two aircraft,
especially after the un-calibrated Sensor A becomes the only source of position information
in Aircraft 1.
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Figure 3.4: Trajectory comparison between Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2, Example 2.
Figure 3.5: ARMAS mode history for Sensor B, Example 2.
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Figure 3.6: ARMAS mode history for Sensor A, Example 2.
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3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has introduced a novel sensor management framework that provides
sensor-agnostic autonomous and resilient sensor management for alternative multi-sensor
navigation problems. The proposed framework, named Autonomous and Resilient
Management of All-source Sensors (ARMAS), provides a breadth of sensor management
functions across four modes of operation: monitoring, calibration, remodeling, and
validation. Using a coherent interconnection between these modes, ARMAS was shown
to provide resilient and autonomous sensor management across two example multi-sensor
navigation scenarios that required a combination of fault detection and identification, online
parameter calibration, multiple-model selection, and sensor model validation. In the two
examples provided, a vehicle equipped with the ARMAS framework exhibited up to 99.9%
less position RSS error during temporary sensor anomalies and multiple sequential sensor
failures, when compared to a non-ARMAS equipped vehicle. Future work in this area
includes continued development of the novel methods for multi-sensor fault detection and
sensor model validation used in the monitoring and validation modes as well as multi-
trial Monte Carlo performance analysis using actual and simulated multi-sensor navigation
data.
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IV. Sensor-Agnostic All-source Residual Monitoring
This chapter focuses on the monitoring objective from the overall ARMAS framework.
As previously stated, all-source navigation has become increasingly relevant over the past
decade with the rise in alternative sensor technologies. However, as the number and type
of sensors informing a system increases, so does the probability of corrupting the system
with sensor modeling errors, signal interference, and undetected faults. Though the latter of
these has been extensively researched, the majority of existing approaches have constrained
faults to single-sensor biases, and designed algorithms centered around the assumption
of simultaneously redundant, synchronous sensors, none of which are guaranteed for all-
source systems. This chapter develops a novel sensor-agnostic fault detection, exclusion,
and integrity monitoring method that minimizes the assumptions on the fault type, all-
source sensor composition, and the number of faulty sensors. The proposed method is
validated against traditional fault detection techniques, and shown to adequately detect and
isolate a variety of faults across several all-source configurations, without the need for
scenario-based customization. At the time of this writing, the research developed in this
chapter is in review for publication in [58].
4.1 Introduction
All-source navigation and Assured Position Navigation and Timing (APNT) have
become increasingly important research areas over the past two decades, especially as
alternative navigation sensor technologies (e.g., vision [97], radio [27], magnetic [22],
etc.) have been matured and integrated into navigation systems [38]. However, each
additional sensor allowed into a navigation system introduces another opportunity for
corrupting the navigation solution with errors in sensor modeling, unexpected signal
interference, or undetected sensor faults. Of these challenges, the latter has been
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extensively researched [11][12][13][15][16][20][21][36][66][70][86][93][108][109] as a
multi-sensor fault detection problem where each satellite in the GPS constellation is
regarded as a different (albeit identical in nature and synchronous) sensor in the multi-
sensor system, and the “fault” is defined as an unmodeled bias that is assumed to only
affect one of the sensors (satellites) at any given time. As shown in Chapter 3 and [54], our
overall research motivation is to create a resilient sensor management system that provides
APNT through the online detection and self-correction (i.e., auto-tuning) of sensor models
that do not match observed measurements. In support of this overall effort, the specific
developments presented in this chapter seek to determine when any of the above sources
of corruption are present by detecting any general mismatches between a sensor’s stated
model (i.e., measurement function, function parameters, and error covariance matrix) and
its observed measurements, where an unmodeled bias is simply one specific case of a
mismatch. Additionally, our research shifts away from identical and synchronous sensors
such as GPS satellites, and focuses on all-source multi-domain (e.g., position, velocity,
etc.) and asynchronous sensors. In the following section, we discuss several classes of
techniques generally used in GPS fault detection, and highlight the novel developments
and adaptations we have made in order to achieve our research objectives.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Basic Threshold Methods.
One of the most practical methods for detecting unmodeled biases is to place an alarm
threshold on an observable quantity that has a predictable range of acceptable values. In
[76], the value of the likelihood function for a set of Kalman filter [59] measurement
residuals is tracked using a moving window. A fault is then declared if the value of the
likelihood function falls below a set threshold, which can happen when either a bias is
present or an incorrect measurement error covariance matrix is provided by the sensor
model. Similarly, in [70], pseudorange and/or position estimates from each satellite are
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compared to their predicted values derived from the other satellites in view. In this case, a
fault is declared if any of the differences exceeds a threshold defined by satellite geometry,
which can happen if one of the satellites is biased. Though simple to implement, both of
these types of methods are generally limited in that they are only able to detect a fault (in
some cases just a bias), and unable to identify the culprit sensor in a multi-sensor system.
4.2.2 Least Squares Methods.
Another set of bias detection methods such as the parity vector [36][93] and least
squares residuals [86] approaches rely on multiple GPS satellites being in view at any given
time. In these methods, redundant pseudorange measurements from various satellites are
used to form a linear least-squares projection matrix that, combined with assumptions on
the distribution of the bias, defines the hypotheses of the fault-free and fault-present cases.
Similar to previous methods, these methods also define the fault as a bias in one of the
satellites. These so-called snapshot methods are not only effective at detecting faults and
identifying the culprit sensor, but also lend themselves to statistically rigorous definitions
for system integrity, or the guarantee of system performance under a specific set of
assumptions. However, by definition, these methods rely on redundant measurements being
available at every time step and often assume linear measurement models, which are good
assumptions for GPS, but not the case for all-source multi-domain sensor applications.
Additionally, much like the threshold methods, the fault is once again defined as the
presence of a bias in a single satellite, which is only part of the sensor model, and excludes
the possibility of a wrongly stated measurement error covariance matrix. Finally, although
technically possible, none of these methods have been presently adapted to detect faults
outside the position domain, as would be needed for velocity-based (or any other domain)
all-source sensors.
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4.2.3 Filtered Methods.
A third class of bias detection methods relies on testing the statistical distribution
of quantities estimated by Kalman filters [18][59][76][77], which is practical given
many navigation systems already employ such filters for producing the navigation
solution. In [20] and [66], the fault detection test is developed statistically and
geometrically, respectively, by analyzing the difference between the a-priori and a-
posteriori horizontal position estimates, as well as their corresponding covariances.
Meanwhile, in [15][16][21][108][109], a similar statistical test is formed by computing
the difference in horizontal position estimates (and associated covariances) between a main
filter that is informed by all sensors, and a series of parallel sub-filters, each excluding one
sensor. These multi-filter methods are advantageous in that they are not only able to identify
the culprit sensor but also produce a navigation solution that is theoretically free from
faulty measurements under a single-fault assumption. However, similar to the previously
mentioned methods, they have only been presently implemented to detect single-sensor
biases in the position domain, which is not sufficient for our desired all-source applications.
Additionally, these methods also require the computation of the cross-covariance terms
for accurately estimating the expected covariance of the difference in position estimates
between the main filter and each of the sub-filters. Finally, in [11][12][13][110], the
test statistic is derived not from “solution separation” vectors, but rather from averaging
a time sequence of residuals terms from the Kalman update equations. These filter-residual
methods are useful in detecting insidious biases with varying growth rates depending on the
averaging time used in the test statistic. However, much like the other methods described,
they have only presently been implemented to detect GPS pseudorange biases, which is
insufficient for all-source applications.
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4.2.4 Contributions.
As shown in the previous section, a substantial amount of research has been developed
in the area of GPS fault detection, identification, and exclusion, but even the state-of-the-
art methods were found inadequate or incomplete to accomplish our research objectives
without significant development and adaptation. As such, the method developed in
this chapter, refered to henceforth as Sensor-Agnostic All-source Residual Monitoring
(SAARM), provides a significant contribution to the state-of-the-art in that it:
• Does not constrain faults to only biases,
• Can easily be scaled for multiple simultaneous sensor faults,
• Detects faults (sensor model mismatches) in and across multiple domains,
• Does not require simultaneously redundant sensors to provide fault detection and
identification,
• Provides fault exclusion without the need to compute cross-filter covariances, and
• Provides a robust measure of system integrity without constraining the fault type.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three additional sections. Section 4.3 develops
the necessary multi-filter multi-sensor notation, the residual test statistic, the fault detection
and exclusion process, and the system integrity assumptions and guarantees. In Section
4.4, the detection performance of the proposed method is compared against existing
snapshot methods in a simulated GPS navigation problem and several simulated all-source
navigation problems. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes the research contributions from this
chapter and provides ideas for future work.
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4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Multi-Sensor Multi-Filter Notation.
This section expands the conventional Kalman filter [59] notation from [76][77] to
include estimates from multiple filters as well as measurements from multiple non-identical
sensors. The notation and underlying considerations will be crucial in the later development
of the residual-space test statistic and the resulting fault identification process. Consider a
(possibly) non-linear dynamic system of the form
x˙(t) = f [x(t),u(t), t] + G(t)w(t), (4.1)
where x is the N × 1 navigation state vector containing the system states, u is the control
input vector, G is an N ×W linear operator, and w is a W × 1 white Gaussian noise process
with a W × W continuous process noise strength matrix Q. Suppose the discretized [96]
system states are estimated by J separate filters. Then at time t = tk, the system state
estimate vector and corresponding state estimation error covariance matrix from filters
j = 1, . . . , J are given by xˆ[ j](tk) and P
[ j]
xˆxˆ (tk), respectively. Next, each of the J filters
can be informed by any, all, or a subset of I sensors. At time tk, the i = 1, . . . , I sensor
provides (possibly) multidimensional Zi × 1 measurements of the form
z[i](tk) = h[i] [x(tk),u(tk), tk] + v[i](tk), (4.2)
where h[i] is a (possibly) nonlinear measurement function, and v[i](tk) is a Zi × 1 discrete
white Gaussian noise process with covariance matrix R[i](tk). Immediately prior to a
measurement update, the estimated measurement for sensor i from filter j, zˆ[i, j], is
generated using
zˆ[i, j](t−k ) = h
[i]
[
xˆ[ j](t−k ),u(tk), tk
]
, (4.3)
while its estimated covariance matrix, P[i, j]zˆzˆ (t
−
k ), is generated based on the type of filtering
algorithm. For example, in a linearized filter (such as an Extended Kalman Filter) it can be
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computed using
P[i, j]zˆzˆ = H
[i]P[ j]xˆxˆ H
[i]T , (4.4)
where the time index (t−k ) is omitted for simplicity, and H
[i] represents the Jacobian of
h[i] about the point xˆ[ j](t−k ). For information on generating Pzˆzˆ in an Unscented Kalman
Filter (UKF), the reader is referred to [101]. Finally, the (so-called) pre-update residual
vector computed between sensor i and filter j, r[i, j], and associated covariance matrix,
P[i, j]rr , is given by
r[i, j](tk) = z[i](tk) − zˆ[i, j](t−k ) (4.5)
P[i, j]rr (tk) = R[i](tk) + P
[i, j]
zˆzˆ (t
−
k ). (4.6)
4.3.2 Fault Detection Test Statistic.
Having derived the residual vector, r[i, j](tk), and its associated covariance matrix,
P[i, j]rr (tk), in (4.5) and (4.6), we now define a residual-space test statistic to determine if a
set of observed residuals between a specific sensor-filter pair are adhering to their expected
distribution. Since our goal is to limit the assumptions on the type of fault (i.e., the fault
could be a bias, an incorrectly stated noise covariance matrix, or incorrect calibration of
measurement function parameters), we did not model two competing distributions as would
be needed to employ a LRT [63]. Instead, we focused on the single likelihood function of
the residuals, based on measuring their Mahalanobis distances [28] due to their simplicity
and “standardizing” properties, which were found useful in time-changing processes such
as navigation.
Given a Zi-dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean µ, and covariance matrix Σ,
the squared Mahalanobis distance, d2, between an observation y, and the centroid of the
distribution is then given by
d2 = (y − µ)T Σ−1 (y − µ) . (4.7)
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Additionally, d2 is known [23][28] to follow a Chi-Square distribution with Zi degrees of
freedom. Moreover, the sum of M independent d2 distances is also known to follow a
Chi-Square distribution with M × Zi degrees of freedom. Since Kalman filter pre-update
residuals are assumed to be a zero-mean white sequence [76], we let y = r[i, j](tk) from
(4.5), Σ = P[i, j]rr (tk) from (4.6), and µ = 0. Subsequently, we can develop a fault detection
test, given set of M, Zi-dimensional residual vectors collected between t = tk and t = tk+M
using
H0 : χ∗[i, j] > χ
2(α/2,M × Zi) and (4.8)
χ∗[i, j] < χ
2(1 − α/2,M × Zi)
H1 : χ∗[i, j] < χ
2(α/2,M × Zi) or (4.9)
χ∗[i, j] > χ
2(1 − α/2,M × Zi),
where M defines the number of averaging samples in the test, α is the significance level of
the test (i.e., probability of false alarm, PFA), H0 is defined as a a fault not present in filter
j, H1 is defined as a fault present in filter j, and
χ∗[i, j] =
k+M∑
s=k
d2[i, j](ts), (4.10)
d2[i, j](tk) = r
[i, j]T(tk)
[
P[i, j]rr (tk)
]−1
r[i, j](tk). (4.11)
It is important to note a few key points about the above test statistic. First, it is designed
to detect mismatches (in any domain such as position, velocity, etc.) between sensor
measurements and their stated models, in both the upper and lower ends of the resulting
Chi-Square distribution. This was purposely done so that our method could not only detect
unlikely large or variable residuals resulting from biases, problems in the measurement
function, its parameters, or under-stating the measurement error covariance matrix, but
additionally, unlikely small residuals resulting from over-stating the measurement error
covariance matrix. Next, similarly to [94], we experimentally found the thresholds in (4.8)
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and (4.9) needed to be adjusted (by approximately ±5% during our simulations) to account
for differences between their theoretical and empirical values (such as linearization errors)
in order to mitigate unnecessary false alarms. Finally, the test can only determine if any of
the I sensors providing measurement updates to filter j has a fault. In order to determine
which sensor(s) within filter j are faulty, additional assumptions and computations must be
made, as shown in the next section.
4.3.3 Fault Identification Process.
Up to this point, we’ve defined how a time-sequence of residual vectors from a specific
sensor-filter combination may be tested for likelihood, without making assumptions on the
domain of the sensor measurement, or the type of fault. Here it is important to emphasize
that a H1 result derived from a set of residual vectors from a particular sensor-filter pair
(i, j) does not imply that sensor i is faulty. It is only an indication that one of the sensors
informing filter j is faulty. In other words, low-likelihood residuals can then either be
caused by faulty measurements, z[i], or faulty estimated measurements, zˆ[i, j], the latter of
which is influenced by all sensors informing filter j whose state-space overlaps with sensor
i. To solve this challenge, we developed a “fault consensus” process that associates the
presence of a sensor with the presence of a fault in order to determine the most probable
sensor associated with H1 (faulty) results. Though the proposed method is not limited to
just single sensor faults, it is best to begin our discussion with this case before scaling to
the generalized multiple simultaneous fault cases. The next two sections develop the single
and multiple fault cases, respectively.
4.3.3.1 Single Serial Faults.
As described in Section 4.2, a commonly assumed fault scenario is a single sensor
fault per testing epoch (i.e., during a single M-sample test window in our case). Multiple
faults are still considered, but restricted to occur serially. In this case, we set up our
fault identification process by creating J = I filters, each informed by a unique set of
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I − 1 sensors. In other words, each filter excludes one of the I sensors. Here, it is
important to note two points. First, since we expect all-source sensors to be non-identical,
some states may become unobservable within a particular filter if the only sensor that has
observability over them is excluded from that filter. To prevent potential numerical issues
with the covariance of unobservable states, we can perform a stochastic observability test
[7] on each filter and/or design the set of sensors such that all states are observable in all
filters. Second, as with other parallel-filter methods, a “main filter” that is informed by
all sensors is also created, but in this method we do not use its information for “solution
separation” comparisons, thereby eliminating the need for computing the cross-covariance
terms between it and all other filters. Having designed the set of filters using this method
guarantees, under the assumption that, at most, one sensor can fail simultaneously, at least
one of the filters will be completely unaffected by faulty measurements. As shown below,
we can then use this axiom in conjunction with the full set of (i, j) residual test results to
determine the culprit sensor.
We begin the fault identification process by populating the I × J (which becomes I × I
in this single-fault case) test results matrix, T, using
T(i, j) =

0, Sensor i does not inform filter j,
0, χ∗[i, j] yields H0 (no fault detected),
1, χ∗[i, j] yields H1 (fault detected).
(4.12)
Figure 4.1 illustrates the information from each sensor-filter pair needed to populate T in
the case where the jth filter excludes the jth sensor. In the figure, each of the i = 1, . . . , I
rows corresponds to the measurement, z[i], and its associated error covariance matrix, R[i],
obtained from the ith sensor. These two parameters define the modeled distribution of the
sensor measurement, and make up the first half of (4.5) and (4.6), respectively. Next,
each of the j = 1, . . . , J (J = I in this single fault case) columns corresponds to the
estimated measurement, zˆ[i, j], and its associated error covariance matrix, P[i, j]zˆzˆ . These two
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parameters make up the remainder of (4.5) and (4.6) and define the modeled distribution of
the estimated sensor measurement. As shown in the figure, these last two parameters are
influenced by all sensors informing the filter in the jth column, which corresponds to all
sensors except the jth sensor.
Once populated, a fault is declared when T contains any non-zero entries. This means
a fault is declared when any of the I2 − I residual test results from (4.8) and (4.9) that are
contained in T result in H1, which theoretically increases the probability of false alarm
up to a maximum of PFA ≤ α(I2 − I) for the single sensor fault assumption. If a fault
is declared, the culprit sensor may be identified if a consensus is reached. That is, since
each sensor is excluded from one filter, we can identify a faulty sensor if only a single filter
(presumably the filter that excluded it) remains fault free. Mathematically, we first compute
the fault scores vector, s, whose dimension is equal to the number of filters, J, using
s( j) =
I∑
i=1
T(i, j), (4.13)
which produces a sum across the rows (sensors) for each column (filter) in T. Once
computed, we have four possible scenarios:
1. If s contains all zeros, then no fault has been detected,
2. If s contains at least one non-zero entry, but more than one zero entry, then a fault is
declared and the culprit is not identified,
3. If s( j) is the only zero entry in s, then a fault is declared and the culprit sensor is
the sensor that was excluded from the jth column in T, or the jth filter, if constructed
according to Figure 4.1.
4. Finally, if s contains no zero entries, then more than one sensor is faulty, and the
assumptions of the test have been violated.
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Each of these “states” can be used in conjunction with the system integrity computations
presented in Section 4.3.4 in order to continuously inform users of their APNT protection
status. Depending on the type and dynamics of the fault, as well as the set and type of
sensors in the system, the results in T may continue to change during every epoch and
eventually lead to a culprit. If and when a culprit is determined, the corresponding fault-
free filter is used as the new main filter, and a new set of I − 1 filters is initialized using
its states. The process can then be repeated sequentially for multiple serial faults with
the assumption that a second fault does not occur during the first M samples after having
re-spawned the filter set, which will be addressed in the next section.
4.3.3.2 Simultaneous Faults.
The serial-fault methodology described above can be easily scaled to enable detection
of a secondary fault occurring during the first M samples after an initial fault, as well as
multiple simultaneous faults. To do so, we first re-define the number of filters required, J,
the structure of the associated test results matrix, T, and the dimension of the faults score
vector, s, as a functions of the assumed maximum number of simultaneous faults, which we
define as a “layer.” In general, the number of additional filters required, J, for each layer,
N, is given by
JN =
(
I
I − N
)
=
I!
N!(I − N)! . (4.14)
As shown in Section 4.3.3.1, in layer one, we assumed N = 1 simultaneous fault was
possible, and created
J1 =
(
I
I − 1
)
=
I!
1!(I − 1)! = I (4.15)
filters each excluding one sensor, which were then used to populate T1 ∈ RI×J1 , detect the
fault, and identify the single culprit using s1. If we now assume N = 2 simultaneous faults
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the multi-sensor multi-filter test statistic matrix, T.
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are possible, we require an additional
J2 =
(
I
I − 2
)
=
I!
2!(I − 2)! =
I2 − I
2
(4.16)
filters each excluding two sensors, which are then used to populate T2 ∈ RI×J2 . Using
this two-layer configuration, the culprit sensor in a single fault scenario can continue to be
identified as previously described, using T1 and s1. In the case of a simultaneous fault, s1
indicates the single fault assumption has been violated (no non-zero entries remain), which
prompts the system to use T2 and s2 to identify the two culprits. In the case of a secondary
fault during the first M samples after an initial fault, the the subset of filters in the J2 layer
that excluded the first culprit corresponds exactly to the new J1 layer of filters needed after
re-spawning, which enables uninterrupted fault detection.
For example, consider a system with I = 5 sensors where up to two simultaneous
sensor faults are assumed. The first layer consists of J1 = 5 filters, and each filter excludes
one of the sensors, as shown in Table 4.1. Using (4.16), the second layer consists of J2 = 10
filters, and each filter excludes two of the sensors, as shown in Table 4.2. Suppose Sensor
3 experiences a fault. In this case, Filter 3 (shaded gray in Table 4.1) is uncorrupted by
any faulty measurements, and its corresponding column in T1 ∈ R5×5 uniquely contains all
zeros. After determining Sensor 3 is the culprit via (4.13), Sensor 3 is taken oﬄine and
a new set of J1 = I − 1 = 4 filters, each excluding one of the remaining four sensors, is
spawned. Without a J2 layer, this would mean the system could not detect a subsequent
fault while it repopulates the new T1 ∈ R4×4. However, having the J2 layer already running,
we can see the new J1 layer of filters is actually equivalent to the subset of J2 filters that
had also excluded Sensor 3 (shaded gray in Table 4.2), which guarantees uninterrupted
fault detection after detecting an initial fault. Finally, suppose both Sensor 3 and Sensor
5 experience a simultaneous fault. In this case, every single filter in the J1 layer (i.e.,
every column in Table 4.1) would be corrupted and no column in T1 would contain all
zeros. However, the J2 filter that excluded both Sensor 3 and Sensor 5 (shaded dark
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Table 4.1: Sensor-filter configuration for layer J1, I = 5 sensors
Included in filter
Sensor 1 2 3a 4 5
1 • • • •
2 • • • •
3 • • • •
4 • • • •
5 • • • •
aThis filter is uncorrupted by faulty Sensor 3 measurements
gray in Table 4.2) would be guaranteed to be uncorrupted by faulty measurements, and
its corresponding column in T2 ∈ R5×10 would uniquely contain all zeros. In principle,
this process can be scaled up to any number of layers, corresponding to any number of
simultaneous faults. It is important, however, to consider the trade-off in computational
power required to support the growing number of required filters for each additional layer.
4.3.4 Integrity Assumptions and Guarantees.
Having defined an all-source fault detection, identification, and exclusion process,
we now turn our attention to the resulting system integrity computation. In general, we
define system integrity as a guarantee of system performance under a particular set of
assumptions. This definition fits the established methods in the previously mentioned
GPS integrity methods. Namely, the guarantees of performance for GPS-based methods
are commonly given as a Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) or Horizontal Integrity
Limit (HIL), which are essentially constant-probability ellipses in the horizontal plane
that are guaranteed to contain the true position while meeting the assumptions of the fault
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Table 4.2: Sensor-filter configuration for layer J2, I = 5 sensors
Included in filter
Sensor 1 2a 3 4 5a 6 7 8a 9b 10
1 • • • • • •
2 • • • • • •
3 • • • • • •
4 • • • • • •
5 • • • • • •
aThese filters are uncorrupted by faulty Sensor 3 measurements
bThis filter is uncorrupted by faulty Sensor 3 and Sensor 5 measurements
detection test (e.g., bias distribution, single-sensor fault, probability of missed detection,
etc.). Similarly in SAARM, we aim to provide an HPL guaranteed to contain the true
position under the assumptions of our method. Our lack of assumptions in terms of the
type, number, and domain of the fault(s), or the type and number of sensors, arguably
complicated our fault detection process. At the same time however, it allows us to simplify
our fault identification assumption into a single axiom: assuming at least one of the filters
is informed entirely by properly modeled, uncorrupted sensors, then at least one filter
contains consistent state estimation error statistics. In other words, since it is assumed
that one of the filters is fault-free (based on properly designing the set of filters), then
the estimated error statistics from one of the filters truly describe actual errors committed
by the filter. Defining αI as the acceptable error bound, we can then derive an accurate
100(1−αI)% error ellipse on the horizontal position using the uncorrupted filter’s horizontal
position estimate and its associated error covariance matrix. Given the uncorrupted filter is
not identifiable prior to determining a culprit, we simply union the 100(1−αI)% horizontal
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position error ellipses from all of the filters, thereby guaranteeing the true horizontal
position is contained within the union with at least a 100(1 − αI)% probability, since the
union can only grow the resulting ellipse. This guarantee is valid regardless of the status of
the underlying fault detection and identification process.
To illustrate our HPL, consider a 2D navigation problem using I = 5 sensors. The
sensor suite is composed of three 2D position sensors: POS1, POS2, POS3, and two
2D velocity sensors: VEL1, VEL2. The system dynamics are propagated using a 2D
kinematics model driven by 2D FOGM acceleration. In order to best visualize the effects
of faults on HPL, the fault has been defined as a growing bias starting from 0 [m] at
tk = 60 [s], growing at a rate of 2 [m/s], and applied to the x-dimension measurements
from the POS2 sensor. Figures 4.2 through 4.5 illustrate a time sequence of events along a
sample instantiation of the simulation. As shown in the figures, an error bound of αI = 0.05
was used to produce 95% error ellipses. The HPL derived from the union of the 95%
horizontal position error ellipses from all filters is guaranteed to contain the true location
at least 95% of the time, regardless of the presence of a fault, ability to detect, or ability
to determine a culprit. In all examples, the main filter is informed by all sensors but its
states and their error covariances are not used in the detection of faults or the computation
of HPL. Finally, though these sample illustrations were limited to a single fault and two
dimensions, the underlying axiom and assumptions are still valid for multiple faults and
the error ellipses can be scaled to 3D error ellipsoids, if desired.
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Figure 4.2: Example SAARM HPL: No fault present. In this example, there is no fault
induced into any of the five sensors, and no fault has been detected (all entries in s are
zero), which is shown to the user as a green HPL. All filters are uncorrupted. The HPL is
comprised of the union of the 95% position error ellipses from all filters, and contains the
true position at least 95% of the time.
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Figure 4.3: Example SAARM HPL: Undetected fault. In this example, a 30 [m] bias is
affecting the POS2 sensor, but no fault has been detected yet (all entries in s are still zero),
which is shown to the user as a green HPL. All filters except Filter 2 are corrupted. The
HPL is comprised of the union of the 95% position error ellipses from all filters, and it is
guaranteed to contain the true position at least 95% of the time since one of the filters is
guaranteed to be uncorrupted.
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Figure 4.4: Example SAARM HPL: Unidentified culprit. In this example, a 44 [m] bias
is affecting the POS2 sensor, and a fault has been detected (at least one entry in s is non-
zero), but no culprit has been identified (there is more than one zero entry in s), which is
shown to the user as an orange HPL. All filters except Filter 2 are corrupted. The HPL is
comprised of the union of the 95% position error ellipses from all filters, and it is guaranteed
to contain the true position at least 95% of the time since one of the filters is guaranteed to
be uncorrupted.
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Figure 4.5: Example SAARM HPL: Culprit identified. In this example, a 56 [m] bias is
affecting the POS2 sensor, a fault has been detected and the culprit has been identified
(there is a single zero-entry in s), which is shown to the user as a red HPL. All filters
except Filter 2 are corrupted. The HPL is comprised of the union of the 95% position error
ellipses from all filters, and it is guaranteed to contain the true position at least 95% of the
time since one of the filters is guaranteed to be uncorrupted. Immediately after this time
step, the POS2 sensor is taken oﬄine, and a new set of filters is re-spawned from Filter 2.
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4.4 Simulation Results
The proposed method was evaluated using Monte Carlo simulations across a variety
of navigation problems. For all simulations, the true system dynamics were driven by a 2D
kinematic model given by
x˙(t) =

x˙p(t)
x˙v(t)
x˙a(t)
 =

xv(t)
xa(t)
− 1
τa
xa(t)
 +

0
0
w(t)
 , (4.17)
where xp is the vehicle’s 2D position in [m], xv is the 2D velocity in [m/s], xa is the 2D
acceleration in [m/s2] and driven by a FOGM process with time constant τa = 90 [s], and
w(t) is a 2D white Gaussian noise process with E
[
w(t)w(t + τ)T
]
= Qδ(τ) and
Q = (1.5 × 10−3)2 I
2×2
[m2/s5]. (4.18)
For each level or fault type in each simulation, 3000 trials were conducted. For each trial
in each simulation, the initial true position and initial position state estimates were set to
zero. The initial true velocity was randomly drawn from a N
(
0, 102
)
[m2/s2] distribution
for both the x and y axes, while the initial velocity state estimates were set to zero. The
initial true acceleration and acceleration state estimates were set to zero. The initial state
estimation error covariance was set to 102 [m2] in position, 102 [m2/s2] in velocity, and
(1.5 × 10−3)2 [m2/s4] in acceleration. Each trial was propagated using ∆tk = 0.5 [s], starting
at tk = 0 [s] with a prescribed fault occurring at tk = 22 [s], and ending at tk = 60 [s]. Across
all simulations, the SAARM test significance level was set to α = 1/15000 = 6.67 × 10−5,
while the test epoch was set to M = 40 samples, which was equivalent to 20 [s].
4.4.1 RAIM Comparisons.
In the first set of simulations, SAARM was applied to the common pseudorange fault
detection and identification problem from GPS, and compared to the results from the least-
squares Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) method developed in [86],
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using rD = 9.5 [m] for detection, and rI = 11 [m] for isolation. The RAIM detection and
isolation thresholds values were chosen such that the algorithm would generally match the
performance shown in [86, Table 4] for a 25 [m] bias. For these simulations, I = 8 2D
pseudorange sensors were used, each with a nonlinear measurement model given by
z[i]k =
∥∥∥ti − xpk∥∥∥ + bk + v[i]k , (4.19)
v[i]k ∼ N
(
0, 42
)
[m2], (4.20)
where ti is the 2D position of the ith satellite, xpk is the 2D position of the vehicle at time tk,
and bk is a FOGM process simulating a receiver clock error with time constant τb = 3600
[s] and σ2 = 80002 [m2]. For each trial, the true initial clock error was drawn from
a N
(
0, 80002
)
[m2] distribution, while its corresponding initial state estimate was set to
zero.
The first four rows in Table 4.3 summarize the results across varying bias levels
from 10 [m] up to 100 [m]. In the last row, the fault was defined by a sudden change
in observed pseudorange measurement noise (i.e., 10x scaling of R). The columns of Table
4.3 summarize the probability (between 0 and 100%) of false alarm, missed detection, fault
detection and isolation, and fault detection without isolation, respectively. As intended,
RAIM performance matched its expected performance for a 25 [m] bias since its thresholds
were tuned as such. As shown, SAARM generally outperformed RAIM for biases under
50 [m], and performed just as well for larger biases. Here, it is important to note the
objective of the simulations in Table 4.3 was not to show how SAARM would perform
against RAIM in a real GPS environment, but rather demonstrate that it performs no worse
than an established RAIM method, given a simple bias fault, and using a reasonable set
of significance and threshold levels. It is important, however, to point out that SAARM
clearly outperformed RAIM in detecting a fault other than a simple bias. And although
different rD and rI thresholds could be derived for RAIM for such cases, the generality
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Table 4.3: Fault detection and identification comparison, simulated pseudoranges
Probability (%)
False alarm Missed Isolated Detect only
Fault SAARM RAIM SAARM RAIM SAARM RAIM SAARM RAIM
10 [m] bias 0.00 0.00 5.25 100.0 57.15 0.00 37.60 0.00
25 [m] bias 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.48 100.0 7.31 0.00 74.20
50 [m] bias 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0 100.0 0.00 0.00
100 [m] bias 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0 100.0 0.00 0.00
10x R scale 0.00 0.00 7.23 91.27 78.05 0.65 14.72 8.08
- SAARM: M = 40 samples, α = 6.67 × 10−5, RAIM: rD = 9.5 [m], rI = 11 [m]
- Pseudorange measurement noise modeled as N (0,R), R = 42 [m2]
of the SAARM method allows such performance with no additional modification to the
underlying algorithm, which will be further showcased in the all-source simulations below.
4.4.2 All-source Performance.
Having established a benchmark for performance in a simulated but well understood
GPS pseudorange problem, the next set of simulations were focused on establishing
SAARM performance across a wide variety of fault types and domains, without the need
to modify any portion of the fault detection and isolation algorithm. To do so, five all-
source navigation simulations were conducted, each using three out of four sensors, which
are described in Table 4.4. The fault detection results from each of the five scenarios is
summarized in Table 4.5. In the first two scenarios, a simple position bias was injected
into the x-axis of the POS1 position sensor, with the other two sensors chosen as velocity
sensors. In these scenarios, SAARM detected and isolated the majority of 30 [m] and
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Table 4.4: Sensor configuration for all-source scenarios
Scenario Fault Affected sensor Other sensors
1 30 [m] bias POS1 VEL1, VEL2
2 40 [m] bias POS1 VEL1, VEL2
3 2 [m/s] bias VEL1 POS1, POS2
4 5 [m/s] bias VEL1 POS1, POS2
5 0.1x R scale POS2 POS1, VEL1
POS1: 2D position sensor, R = diag
(
[102, 102]
)
[m2]
POS2: 2D position sensor, R = diag
(
[202, 202]
)
[m2]
VEL1: 2D velocity sensor, R = diag
(
[12, 12]
)
[m2/s2]
VEL2: 2D velocity sensor, R = diag
(
[12, 12]
)
[m2/s2]
all of the 40 [m] position biases using velocity sensors for redundancy, which could not
be done using least-squares methods or position “solution separation” methods without
specific customization. Similarly, in the second set of simulations (scenarios 3 and 4), a
simple velocity bias was injected into the x-axis of the VEL1 velocity sensor, with the
other two sensors chosen as position sensors. In this case, SAARM detected and isolated
the majority of 2 [m/s] and all of the 5 [m/s] velocity biases using position sensors for
redundancy. Finally, in the last scenario, SAARM detected virtually all faults defined by a
sudden change of the measurement noise variance in the POS2 sensor using a position and
a velocity sensor for redundancy. It is important to note here, the change in noise variance
in this scenario caused the observed measurements to become less noisy than prior to the
fault. This type of detection is not critical for safety of flight or protection, but would be
necessary in a system that self-corrects or auto-tunes sensor models, as stated in our overall
research objective.
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Table 4.5: Fault detection and identification performance, all-source simulations
Probability (%)
Scenario False alarm Missed Isolated Detected only
1 0.00 13.19 86.75 0.07
2 0.00 0.00 100.0 0.00
3 0.20 6.55 64.15 29.30
4 0.07 0.00 100.0 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 99.93 0.07
SAARM: M = 40 samples, α = 6.67 × 10−5
4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has proposed a novel method for fault detection and isolation in all-
source navigation systems. The proposed method, referred to as SAARM, did not constrain
faults to only biases, as has been done in the majority of existing research, and additionally
provided a mechanism for detection of multiple simultaneous faults. Driven by a sensor-
and fault-agnostic residual monitoring algorithm, the proposed method was not only shown
to perform comparably to existing RAIM techniques in the case of a single-satellite bias,
but more importantly, shown to detect and isolate various types sensor model mismatches
in and across multiple sensing domains such as position and velocity, without the need for
synchronous or simultaneous sensor redundancy. Finally, the proposed method was shown
to provide a robust measure of system integrity under minimal assumptions, guaranteed
to contain the true vehicle horizontal position (within a specified error bound) throughout
all phases of the fault detection and identification process. The research in this chapter
directly enables self-correcting plug-and-play open architecture navigation systems as
well as APNT by providing a generalized and robust method for system integrity in the
challenging application of all-source multi-domain navigation.
88
V. Real-time Validation for Plug-and-play Sensors
As part of the overall all-source resilient navigation objective in our ARMAS
framework, this chapter contributes a key component - validation of sensors which
have questionable sensor models, in a fault- and sensor-agnostic manner, and without
compromising the ongoing navigation solution in the process. The proposed algorithm
combines a residual test statistic with the partial update formulation of the Kalman-Schmidt
filter to provide a reliable method for sensor model validation that protects the integrity of
the navigation solution during the validation process, all using a single existing filter. The
proposed method is validated via Monte Carlo simulations against conventional residual
monitoring and shown to outperform the standard approach in both fault detection and
errors incurred during the validation process. At the time of this writing, the research
developed in this chapter is in review for publication in [57].
5.1 Introduction
All-source navigation and APNT have become increasingly relevant over the past two
decades, as the research community continues to mature sensor technologies (e.g., vision
[97], radio [27], magnetic [22], etc.) and integrate them into navigation systems [38].
However, each additional sensor allowed into a navigation system creates an opportunity
for corrupting the navigation solution with errors in sensor modeling, unexpected signal
interference, or undetected sensor faults. Though the latter of these challenge areas has
been extensively researched [11][12][13][15][16][20][21][36][66][70][86][93][108][109],
the primary objective has traditionally been to provide navigation solution integrity (via
fault detection and exclusion) in an ongoing multi-sensor navigation process, with the
assumption that each sensor in the system is equally likely to experience a fault, and
that sensors are properly modeled at the start of the navigation process. Additionally, the
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research in this challenge area has focused almost exclusively on simultaneously redundant
and synchronous multi-sensor systems such as the satellites in the GPS.
Our overall research motivation was to address the APNT challenge for all-source
navigation by creating a general sensor-agnostic resiliency framework, which is described
in Chapter 3 and [54]. The ARMAS framework provides APNT through the online or real-
time detection and self-correction (i.e., auto-tuning) of sensor models that do not match
observed measurements, where a biased sensor is simply one possible model mismatch. In
support of this overall objective, two specific all-source research areas were investigated
for the aforementioned framework: (1) the ability to monitor online sensors (i.e., sensors
currently informing the navigation solution) for fault detection and exclusion, and integrity
computations, and (2) the ability to initialize oﬄine sensors by validating their stated
measurement models while protecting the navigation solution. Of these two processes,
the former is partly addressed in the previously mentioned research for systems like GPS
(though faults are limited to single-sensor biases), and in Chapter 4 and [58] for all-source
sensors, multiple-sensor faults, and faults beyond biases. The latter, which we are referring
to as the sensor validation problem, is virtually unaddressed (at the time of writing) in
current research and constitutes the focus of this chapter.
5.2 Background
In the context of our research, sensor validation refers to the process of initializing
an oﬄine plug-and-play sensor into an ongoing navigation system that is already being
informed by a set of (previously initialized) online sensors, and determining whether or not
its measurements are statistically adhering to their stated measurement model. The set of
online sensors are presumably being monitored for fault detection and exclusion using one
of the many integrity monitoring methods previously discussed, such as [58]. In this sense,
the oﬄine sensor is initialized separately due to the presumption of possible errors in sensor
modeling or the presence of sensor faults. This concept also encompasses the possibility
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of re-initializing a sensor that was previously found “faulty” and placed oﬄine by a multi-
sensor integrity monitoring process (e.g., due to temporary interference or model changes
due to environmental variables). Therefore, the challenge in sensor validation is not focused
around continuous integrity monitoring for the duration of the navigation sequence, but
rather during a fixed “initialization” period, after which the sensor is either determined
valid and placed into the integrity monitoring pool with all other online sensors, or deemed
invalid and either placed back into oﬄine status or placed into sensor model remedial
procedures as described in [54]. The primary challenge in validating an oﬄine sensor
is ensuring its (presumed) faulty measurements do not corrupt the ongoing navigation
solution, while simultaneously ensuring the chosen statistical test is capable of detecting
nuanced differences between the observed measurements and their stated measurement
model [52]. Technically, this could be accomplished via two existing methods, neither
requiring additional development. The first method would be to simply collect a series
of pre-update residuals between the oﬄine (untrusted) sensor and the (trusted) navigation
solution, without actually applying the measurement update, and testing the observed
statistical distribution [20][28][76]. However, this method would preclude any sensors that
require additional filter state estimates (i.e., not currently being estimated by the filter)
as part of the measurement model such as a GPS receiver clock error state, a sensor
run-to-run variable scale factor, or variable camera intrinsic and extrinsic parameters, to
name a few, since they are only observable by the untrusted sensor. The second method
would be to add the untrusted sensor to the pool of trusted online sensors already being
monitored by a fault detection or integrity monitoring method. However, this would
not only require an additional sub-filter in the multi-filter fault exclusion architecture,
but more importantly, it would unnecessarily degrade the system integrity computations
by allowing an untrusted sensor to affect the various sub-filter solutions involved in the
fault exclusion process. As later shown, our proposed method leverages the concept of a
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“partial update” [17], derived from the Kalman-Schmidt [81] filter formulation in order to
provide sensitive fault detection for sensor model validation while protecting the ongoing
navigation solution, using a single-filter architecture. As such, the method developed in this
chapter, refered to henceforth as Real-time Validation for Plug-and-play Sensors (RVPS),
provides a significant contribution to the state-of-the-art in that it:
• Provides a general method for all-source plug-and-play sensor model validation,
• Estimates additional sensor states without compromising the navigation solution, and
• Protects system integrity computations during validation using a single existing filter.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three additional sections. Section
5.3 develops the necessary notation, the partial update formulation, and the residual test
statistic used for validation. In Section 5.4, the performance of the proposed method is
compared (in terms of probability of detection and navigation solution corruption) against
full-update residual methods in a simulated all-source navigation problem. Finally, Section
5.5 summarizes the research contributions and provides ideas for future work.
5.3 Methodology
Adapting the Kalman filter [59] notation from [76][77], consider an ongoing
(possibly) non-linear dynamic system of the form
x˙(t) = f [x(t),u(t), t] + G(t)w(t), (5.1)
where x is the N × 1 navigation state vector containing the system states, u is the control
input vector, G is an N ×W linear operator, and w is a W × 1 white Gaussian noise process
with a W ×W continuous process noise strength matrix Q. At time t = tk, the state estimate
vector and corresponding state estimation error covariance matrix are given by xˆ(tk) and
Pxˆxˆ(tk), respectively, and produced by the system’s “main filer,” which is informed by a
set of online (trusted) sensors that are presumably being monitored for fault detection and
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exclusion. Next, starting at a given initialization time, we wish to begin validating an
oﬄine and untrusted plug-and-play sensor that provides (possibly) multidimensional Z × 1
measurements of the form
z(tk) = h [x(tk), (tk),u(tk), tk] + vk, (5.2)
where h is a (possibly) nonlinear measurement function,  is a U × 1 vector of sensor-
unique states needed for measurement processing but not currently estimated by the filter,
and vk is a Z × 1 discrete white Gaussian noise process with covariance matrix R(tk). In
order to initialize the sensor and process measurements, the sensor-unique states, , must
be augmented into x using their initial estimate ˆ(t−i ) and corresponding initial estimation
error covariance matrix, Pˆˆ(t−i ), where ti is the initialization time. After augmenting the
state-space, we wish to begin collecting “pre-update” residuals in order to evaluate their
likelihood given the stated measurement model in (5.2). In order to prevent the initial
uncertainty in , Pˆˆ(t−i ), from dominating the uncertainty around the residuals (and thus
masking any potential sensor model faults), we must estimate  by accepting measurement
updates. However, since the sensor is untrusted, we wish to protect the ongoing navigation
solution, x, while doing so. Employing the partial update [17] formulation of the Kalman-
Schmidt filter [81] allows us to accept measurement updates while designating a subset
of the state-space variables as “consider” states whose statistical distribution is considered
during the measurement update, but whose distribution (e.g., the state estimate and error
covariance matrix) is unaffected by the measurement update. Though traditionally the
states designated as “consider” states have been primarily unobservable biases, in our
research, we designate the “core” navigation solution states (e.g., position, velocity,
acceleration, etc.) as “consider” in order to protect their estimates from corruption during
the estimation of any sensor-unique states. To formulate the partial update, we initialize
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the augmented state-space as
yˆ(t−i ) =
[
xˆ(t−i ) ˆ(t
−
i )
]T
, (5.3)
Pyˆyˆ(t−i ) =
 Pxˆxˆ(t
−
i ) 0
0 Pˆˆ(t−i )
 , (5.4)
where yˆ is the (N + U) × 1 augmented state estimate, Pyˆyˆ is the corresponding (N + U) ×
(N + U) augmented state estimation error covariance matrix, and keeping in mind the state
dynamics associated with the propagation of  must also be augmented into G, w, and Q.
Next, we define a partial update vector, β, using
β
(N+U)×1
=
[
0
1×N
1
1×U
]T
, (5.5)
where the entries in β corresponding to x are set to zero, and the entries corresponding to 
are set to one. Once β is defined, we execute a standard (full) measurement update to obtain
the post-update augmented state estimate, yˆ(t+i ), and its corresponding error covariance
matrix, Pyˆyˆ(t+i ). Then, as shown in [17], we essentially “roll back” the distribution of the
protected states using
yˆ(t++i ) = β  yˆ(t+i ) + γ  yˆ(t−i ), (5.6)
Pyˆyˆ(t++i ) = B  Pyˆyˆ(t+i ) + Γ  Pyˆyˆ(t−i ), (5.7)
where  is the Hadamard or point-wise product, and
γ = 1 − β, (5.8)
Γ = γγT, (5.9)
B = 1 − Γ. (5.10)
In essence, the partial updates prevent the untrusted sensor measurements from corrupting
the navigation solution to account for a bad model or a fault, and increase fault observability
in the residuals (i.e., prevent residuals from becoming zero-mean), as later shown.
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Therefore, the application of partial updates becomes critical when initializing an untrusted
sensor that has a low measurement noise error covariance matrix compared to the online
sensors since it would otherwise greatly influence the ongoing navigation solution. The
partial update process described above can be then repeated after ti until steady-state is
reached, or for a fixed number of samples, as set by the user. Once this first initialization
phase is complete, we can then continue applying partial updates and begin collecting
residuals to be tested for likelihood. Immediately prior to a partial measurement update,
the estimated measurement, zˆ, is generated using
zˆ(t−k ) = h
[
yˆ(t−k ),u(tk), tk
]
, (5.11)
where xˆ(t−k ) and ˆ(t
−
k ) are contained in the augmented state vector yˆ(t
−
k ). Meanwhile, the
error covariance matrix for the estimated measurement, Pzˆzˆ(t−k ), is generated based on the
type of filtering algorithm. For example, in a linearized filter (such as an Extended Kalman
Filter) it can be computed using
Pzˆzˆ = HPyˆyˆHT, (5.12)
where the time index (t−k ) is omitted for simplicity, and H represents the Jacobian of h about
the point yˆ(t−k ). For information on generating Pzˆzˆ in an UKF, the reader is referred to [101].
Finally, the pre-update residual vector, r, and its associated covariance matrix, Prr, is given
by
r(tk) = z(tk) − zˆ(t−k ) (5.13)
Prr(tk) = R(tk) + Pzˆzˆ(t−k ). (5.14)
Having derived the residual vector, r(tk), and its associated covariance matrix, Prr(tk),
in (5.13) and (5.14), we now define a residual-space test statistic to determine if a set of
observed residuals are adhering to their expected distribution. Since our overall research
objective is to limit the assumptions on the type of fault (i.e., the fault could be a bias, an
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incorrectly stated noise covariance matrix, or incorrect calibration of measurement function
parameters), we did not model two competing distributions as would be needed to employ
a LRT [63]. Instead, we focused on the single likelihood function of the residuals, based
on measuring their Mahalanobis distances [28] due to their simplicity and “standardizing”
properties, which were found useful in time-changing processes such as navigation.
Given a Z-dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean µ, and covariance matrix Σ,
the squared Mahalanobis distance, d2, between an observation g, and the centroid of the
distribution is then given by
d2 = (g − µ)T Σ−1 (g − µ) . (5.15)
Additionally, d2 is known [23][28] to follow a Chi-Square distribution with Z degrees of
freedom. Moreover, the sum of M independent d2 distances is also known to follow a
Chi-Square distribution with M × Z degrees of freedom. Since Kalman filter pre-update
residuals are assumed to be a zero-mean white sequence [76], we let g = r(tk) from (5.13),
Σ = Prr(tk) from (5.14), and µ = 0. Subsequently, we can develop a fault detection test,
given set of M, Z-dimensional residual vectors collected between t = tk and t = tk+M using
H0 : χ∗ > χ2(α/2,M × Z) and (5.16)
χ∗ < χ2(1 − α/2,M × Z)
H1 : χ∗ < χ2(α/2,M × Z) or (5.17)
χ∗ > χ2(1 − α/2,M × Z),
where M defines the number of averaging samples in the test (and consequently the sensor
validation period), α is the significance level of the test (i.e., probability of false alarm, P f ),
H0 is defined as the sensor model is valid (fault not present), H1 is defined as the sensor
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model is invalid (fault present), and
χ∗ =
k+M∑
s=k
d2(ts), (5.18)
d2(tk) = rT(tk) [Prr(tk)]−1 r(tk). (5.19)
It is important to note a few key points about the above test statistic. First, it is designed
to detect mismatches (in any domain such as position, velocity, etc.) between sensor
measurements and their stated models, in both the upper and lower ends of the resulting
Chi-Square distribution. This was purposely done so that our method could not only detect
unlikely large or variable residuals resulting from biases, problems in the measurement
function, its parameters, or under-stating the measurement error covariance matrix, but
additionally, unlikely small residuals resulting from over-stating the measurement error
covariance matrix.
In summary, this section has developed the formulation needed to:
• Estimate a set of sensor-unique states for an untrusted oﬄine sensor while protecting
the ongoing and trusted navigation solution,
• Prevent the untrusted sensor from “masking” an invalid sensor model or fault by
corrupting the navigation solution, and
• Test a collection of residuals for likelihood with minimal assumptions on the fault
type.
5.4 Simulation Results
The proposed method was evaluated via a series of Monte Carlo simulations using
two vehicles informed by an online trusted 2D position sensor (Sensor A) and an oﬄine
untrusted 2D velocity sensor (Sensor B). In the first vehicle (Aircraft 1), RVPS was used to
initialize and validate Sensor B based on the method described in this chapter, namely
using partial updates during the collection of the residual test statistic. In the second
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vehicle (Aircraft 2), the residuals from Sensor B were monitored using the same residual
statistic but without using partial updates, thereby allowing its measurements to influence
the trusted solution. For all simulations, the true system dynamics were driven by a 2D
kinematic model given by
x˙(t) =

x˙p(t)
x˙v(t)
x˙a(t)
 =

xv(t)
xa(t)
− 1
τa
xa(t)
 +

0
0
w(t)
 , (5.20)
where xp is the vehicle’s 2D position in [m], xv is the 2D velocity in [m/s], xa is the 2D
acceleration in [m/s2] and propagated by a FOGM process with time constant τa = 90 [s],
and w(t) is a 2D white Gaussian noise process with E
[
w(t)w(t + τ)T
]
= Qδ(τ) and
Q = (1.5 × 10−3)2 I
2×2
[m2/s5]. (5.21)
Sensor A measurements were modeled using
z[A](tk) = xp(tk) + v[A]k , (5.22)
E
[
v[A]k v
[A]T
k
]
= R[A](tk) =
 20
2 0
0 202
 [m2], (5.23)
and its simulated measurements were drawn from the modeled distribution. Meanwhile,
Sensor B measurements were modeled as
z[B](tk) =   xv(tk) + v[B]k , (5.24)
E
[
v[B]k v
[B]T
k
]
= R[B](tk) =
 1
2 0
0 12
 [m2/s2], (5.25)
where  is a constant but unknown 2D scale factor. Additionally, Sensor B measurements
were corrupted by adding a constant x-velocity bias. The simulations consisted of seven
different velocity biases, and one scaling of R[B]. For each simulation, 3000 trials were
conducted. For each trial in each simulation, the initial true position and initial position
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state estimates were set to zero. The initial true velocity was randomly drawn from a
N
(
0, 102
)
[m2/s2] distribution for both the x and y axes, while the initial velocity state
estimates were set to zero. The initial true acceleration and acceleration state estimates
were set to zero. The initial state estimation error covariance was set to 102 [m2] in position,
102 [m2/s2] in velocity, and (1.5 × 10−3)2 [m2/s4] in acceleration. Each trial was propagated
using ∆tk = 0.5 [s], starting at tk = 0 [s] with an oﬄine sensor initialization at ti = 60 [s],
and terminating at tk = 180 [s]. At ti, the constant Sensor B scale factor was drawn from
a N
(
1, 0.12
)
distribution for both the x and y axes, their initial estimate was set to 1 for
both axes, and their initial uncertainty was set to 0.12. Across all simulations, the RVPS
false alarm rate was set to α = 1/15000 = 6.67 × 10−5, while the sensor validation period
was set to 120 samples, which was equivalent to 60 [s]. The first half of the validation
period (60 samples) was used to allow the estimation of the Sensor B scale factor to reach
steady-state, and the second half was used in formulating the residual test statistic shown
in (5.16) and (5.17), making the testing epoch M = 60 samples.
From a partial update perspective and using (5.8) through (5.10), at the time of Sensor
B initialization in Aircraft 1, the 6 × 1 trusted navigation solution, x, was augmented with
the 2 × 1 scale-factor states, , to form the 8 × 1 augmented state vector, y, resulting in
β =
[
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
]
, (5.26)
γ =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
]
, (5.27)
Γ
8×8
=
 16×6
...
. . . 0
 , (5.28)
B
8×8
=
 06×6
...
. . . 1
 . (5.29)
Figure 5.1 illustrates a sample trajectory comparison from one of the biased Monte
Carlo trials, while Figure 5.2 illustrates the corresponding d2 observations used in the
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computation of the test statistic from (5.18). As shown, the Aircraft 1 (using RVPS)
navigation solution was unaffected while the system estimated the scale factor, , resulting
in higher than expected Mahalanobis distances due to the unmodeled bias, and ultimately
leading to a correct H1 decision (sensor model invalid). In contrast, the navigation solution
from Aircraft 2 (using only the residual monitoring test from (5.16) and (5.17) without
partial updates) was corrupted due to the filter’s ability to absorb the Sensor B unmodeled
bias into observable states, causing the corresponding d2 observations to rapidly fall to
statistically expected values, and ultimately leading to an incorrect H0 (sensor model valid)
decision.
Table 5.1 summarizes the Monte Carlo detection performance for each of the seven
bias levels and the simulation where R[B] was scaled by 10x from its stated model value.
As shown, using the same residual test statistic and P f , the RVPS method (using partial
updates) clearly outperformed conventional residual monitoring in its ability to detect an
unmodeled sensor bias while simultaneously estimating the unknown scale factor, . In
the case of an incorrectly stated measurement noise covariance matrix, RVPS performed as
well as conventional residual monitoring in terms of detection, but still provided significant
benefits in terms of solution integrity during detection as shown below.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the distribution of the mean (across 3000 trials) position RSS
errors (between each aircraft’s navigation solution and the true trajectory) committed
during the 120 [s] validation period. As shown, using RVPS prevented an improperly
modeled sensor from corrupting the ongoing navigation solution during the validation
period, resulting in significantly lower position RSS errors across all fault types.
Finally, Figure 5.4 illustrates the fault detection performance for a fixed 30 [m/s] bias
based on 30 detection threshold levels, each with 3000 trials. Once again, this demonstrates
using RVPS clearly improves the system’s ability to detect an invalid sensor model using
the proposed residual test statistic.
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Table 5.1: Sensor validation fault detection comparison, 2D velocity sensor
Probability (%)
False alarm Missed Detected
Fault type RVPS RM RVPS RM RVPS RM
1 [m/s] bias 0.00 0.00 99.15 100.0 0.85 0.00
5 [m/s] bias 0.00 0.00 74.30 99.35 25.70 0.65
10 [m/s] bias 0.00 0.00 56.57 100.0 43.43 0.00
20 [m/s] bias 0.00 0.00 32.61 91.85 67.39 8.15
30 [m/s] bias 0.00 0.00 17.49 85.50 82.51 14.50
50 [m/s] bias 0.00 0.00 4.76 73.11 95.24 26.89
100 [m/s] bias 0.00 0.00 0.48 61.16 99.52 38.84
10x R scale 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0 100.0
*χ2 test for both RVPS and residual monitoring (RM) was set up using:
M = 60 samples, α = 6.67 × 10−5
Figure 5.1: Example 2D trajectory comparison, 2D velocity sensor, bias = 20 [m/s]
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Figure 5.2: Example residual d2 comparision, 2D velocity sensor, bias = 20 [m/s]
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of mean position RSS errors, RVPS vs. residual monitoring.
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5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has proposed a novel method for real-time model validation for plug-and-
play sensors, specifically aimed at all-source navigation systems. The proposed method,
referred to as RVPS, enabled the estimation of sensor-unique states without compromising
the navigation solution, thereby protecting the system integrity computations during the
validation period, all using a single existing filter. A series of Monte Carlo simulations
demonstrated the method’s ability to not only detect invalid sensor models more reliably,
but additionally prevent the detection process from corrupting the navigation solution. This
method complements previous developments in all-source APNT integrity monitoring,
such as the ones described in Chapter 4 and [58], and directly enables self-correcting plug-
and-play open architecture navigation systems such as the one described in Chapter 3 and
[54].
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Figure 5.4: Fault detection ROC curve comparison, bias = 30 [m/s]
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VI. A Complete Online Algorithm for Air Data System Calibration
This chapter provides one of two sensor calibration methods that complement the
overall resilient navigation research thrust. Specifically, this chapter details a novel Pitot-
static online calibration algorithm suitable for inclusion in the calibration mode of the
ARMAS framework. Air Data Systems require costly calibration of their static pressure
sensors to characterize errors caused by the act of flying. Altitude-based methods for
measuring these so-called static position errors, such as the Tower Fly-by, produce accurate
results but require an elaborate fly-by site, multiple experiments to capture the relationship
between error and airspeed, and are limited to subsonic airspeeds due to inherent hazards
to land-based and aircraft structures from low-altitude supersonic flight. Airspeed-based
methods using GPS are generally easier to execute, but tend to yield less precise results, and
still require multiple experiments. Additionally, they require temperature probe calibration
from external sources. This chapter proposes a self-contained, online method for complete
air data calibration. The proposed method uses a Kalman Smoother to fuse GPS altitude
and airspeed measurements, aircraft attitude, and air data, to produce the full static position
error curve as a function of Mach number in a single experiment, with no need for external
temperature calibration, and with no supersonic limitations. The proposed method is
validated using T-38C flight data, and is shown to reduce cost by 88% while modeling
a 42% larger domain when compared to current methods. The research developed in this
chapter has been published in [56].
6.1 Introduction
Production aircraft are typically equipped with a Pitot-static sensor system, sometimes
referred to as an Air Data System (ADS). The ADS is composed of a Pitot-tube, which
measures total air pressure, a static port, which measures static air pressure, and an Air
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Data Computer (ADC), which combines the sensor readings into various airspeed and
altitude instrument readings. The ADC uses Pitot-static relationships to convert differences
between total and static pressure into airspeed readings, and static pressure measurements
into altitude readings. Since airspeed and altitude are directly derived from pressure,
they are intrinsically linked to lift and drag, which in turn, are linked to key performance
parameters such as climb rate, climb angle, specific range, and endurance. Unfortunately,
the act of flying through an air mass inherently corrupts the static port’s ability to measure
ambient pressure, or the true static pressure in the undisturbed atmosphere, and creates an
error called Static Position Error (SPE) [42].
SPE, or ∆Pp, is defined as the difference between static pressure, Ps, and ambient
pressure, Pa, and is often normalized by Ps when comparing readings from various flight
conditions, using
∆Pp
Ps
=
Ps − Pa
Ps
. (6.1)
Since it affects static pressure readings, SPE is responsible for errors in both airspeed
and altitude. Such errors are not only unique for each type of aircraft, but also tend
to change as a function of Mach number and AoA. Many oﬄine algorithms have been
used to estimate SPE via altitude or airspeed measurements [33][42][51][72][73][80][83].
However, even the most advanced techniques tend to either: require a large logistical
footprint, result in biased estimates, or use assumptions that only apply to a small subset of
airframes. This chapter proposes a novel algorithm for determining SPE that is significantly
more accurate than state-of-the-art methods, and can be executed in an online fashion for
any aircraft without the need for multiple controlled experiments.
6.2 Background
A considerable amount of research has been devoted to solving the problem of SPE.
Most notably, the flight test community has developed numerous experiments designed to
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characterize SPE for each type of aircraft across its entire Mach number domain. In general,
three types of techniques have been found in literature: altitude methods, airspeed methods,
and pressure methods. Since SPE affects both altitude and airspeed, such techniques are
aimed at determining airspeed and altitude error, respectively, as a function of airspeed,
using external truth sources. Meanwhile, pressure techniques directly measure static
pressure errors using ambient pressure readings from weather balloons.
6.2.1 Altitude Methods.
The most widely used altitude method for SPE calibration is called the Tower Fly-
by (TFB) [33][42]. A general TFB diagram is shown in Figure 6.1. The TFB technique
is easy to execute from a flying perspective and also produces data that is easy to process.
The TFB aims to determine an altitude error correction, ∆Hpc, by comparing the indicated
altitude in the aircraft’s altimeter, Hic, to an externally measured reference altitude, Hc,
which is derived from a theodolite measurement at a ground-based observation tower. The
aircraft flies at a constant altitude and airspeed as it passes by the observation tower, where
the “truth” altitude, Hc, is recorded. At the same time, the aircraft records its altitude, Hic.
The error correction relationship is then given by
∆Hpc = Hc − Hic. (6.2)
The error correction given by (6.2) is then used to sample SPE across the entire Mach
number domain for a given aircraft by repeating the TFB at various Mach number
conditions. The resulting altitude error can be converted to a corresponding pressure error
using (6.1) with
Ps = PS L
(
1 − 6.875 59 × 10−6Hic
)5.2559
, (6.3)
Pa = PS L
(
1 − 6.875 59 × 10−6Hc
)5.2559
, (6.4)
where PS L is the atmospheric pressure at sea level on a standard day [6]. The computed
pressure error can then be used to infer airspeed errors at similar conditions. Even though
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it is simple and accurate, the TFB method is limited in that it requires multiple (time-
consuming) fly-bys to sample the underlying ∆Hpc(M) curve, a team of individuals at the
tower site to perform manual theodolite readings, and most importantly, an established
TFB site with known geometric conditions. Additionally, obtaining TFB data for transonic
and supersonic conditions proves to be problematic due to sonic boom concerns for nearby
structures and personnel, as well as structural concerns for the test aircraft due to the high
dynamic pressure experienced at supersonic speeds and low altitude.
6.2.2 Airspeed Methods.
Airspeed methods for characterizing SPE have seen the most innovation in recent
literature due to the emergence and proliferation of Differential Global Positioning System
(DGPS) in military and commercial aircraft. Several state-of-the art airspeed techniques
[51][72][73][80][83] rely on a simplified two-dimensional transformation from the body-
frame (b-frame) to the navigation frame (n-frame), usually referred to as the “wind
triangle”, and shown in Figure 6.2.
In [51], the true airspeed error, ∆VT , which is caused by SPE, is estimated using DGPS
by assuming a constant and unknown wind vector. The aircraft flies a 360-degree turn at
a constant indicated altitude and indicated airspeed, which allows the unknown parameters
(vW and vTi) to become observable to a linear model. The model is developed using two-
dimensional vector geometry from the wind triangle via
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Fly-by line
Theolodite
Fly-by tower
Figure 6.1: Illustration of the Tower Fly-by.
Figure 6.2: Illustration of the wind triangle.
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vT + vW = vG (6.5)
=⇒ (vTi + ∆VT ) + vW = vG (6.6)
=⇒ ∆VT + vW = vG − vTi (6.7)
=⇒ ∆VT cos(ψ) + vWN = vG cos(φ) − vTi cos(ψ), (6.8)
∆VT sin(ψ) + vWE = vG sin(φ) − vTi sin(ψ) (6.9)
=⇒

vG1 cos(φ1) − vTi1 cos(ψ1)
...
vGM cos(φM) − vTiM cos(ψM)
vG1 sin(φ1) − vTi1 sin(ψ1)
...
vGM sin(φM) − vTiM sin(ψM)

2S×1
=

cos(ψ1) 1 0
...
...
...
cos(ψM) 1 0
sin(ψ1) 0 1
...
...
...
sin(ψM) 0 1

2S×3

∆VT
vWN
vWE
 , (6.10)
where S is the number of data samples collected during the turn, vTi is the aircraft’s
measured (or SPE corrupted) True Airspeed (TAS), ψ is true heading, vG and φ are ground
speed and ground track respectively, as measured by DGPS, ∆VT is the unknown TAS error,
and vWN and vWE are the unknown constant wind vector components. In contrast to similar
methods such as the Cloverleaf [72] (where the aircraft is flown at three distinct headings
instead of around a full circle), this method produces a statistical model for its estimated
variables that takes advantage of modern-day in-flight data recording systems. However, it
is limited in the fact that, much like the TFB, it relies on multiple experiments to collect
the necessary point samples of the underlying ∆Vpc(M) function, and some aircraft may
not be able to sustain a constant-speed turn at supersonic conditions. Additionally, vTi
is difficult to measure since it must be derived from Indicated Airspeed (IAS), Vic, and
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ambient temperature, Ta, which is given by
Ta =
Tic
1 + 0.2KtM2pc
, (6.11)
where Tic is the measured temperature (known as Total Temperature), Mpc is SPE-corrected
Mach number, and Kt is a temperature calibration parameter that must be derived from other
experiments such as the TFB, or external sources such as weather balloons. As shown,
(6.11) requires knowledge of SPE to correct Tic, however, determining SPE requires Kt.
Therefore, the problem is usually solved by determining Kt prior to SPE and approximating
Mpc with indicated Mach number, Mic, when deriving vTi , and iterating until convergence is
achieved. Having obtained ∆VT , the subsonic airspeed error can be converted to a pressure
error using
∆Pp
Ps
=
 1qcic
Ps
+ 1
− 1qc
Pa
+ 1
 PTPs , (6.12)
where
qc
Pa
=
1 + 0.2 (VTi + ∆VTa
)27/2 − 1, (6.13)
qcic
Ps
=
1 + 0.2 (VTia
)27/2 − 1, (6.14)
a = aS L
√
Ta
TS L
, (6.15)
aS L is the speed of sound at sea level on a standard day [6], and TS L is the standard
temperature at sea level. It is important to note (6.13) and (6.14) take different forms for
supersonic vT and vTi , which can be found in [33].
Another class of calibration methods [26][41][50][80], use recursive estimation
techniques such as the KF [59] in order to converge onto calibration parameters of interest.
In [26], a so-called scale factor, γv, which is assumed to be constant for the entire airspeed
(or Mach number) domain such that
VT = γvVTi , (6.16)
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is estimated using DGPS measurements, and often estimating AoA and AoS simultane-
ously. These recursive methods along with the angle of sideslip estimation simulations in
[69] provided the baseline foundation for the proposed solution due to their use of the KF
and non-linear regression [8][75]. However, they were limited in the fact that the constant
scale factor assumption is only valid for small aircraft (namely unmanned vehicles) with
a limited Mach number domain, as shown in Section 6.4. Additionally, their use of a KF
was limited to static airspeed conditions similar to the methods in [51][72][80], requiring
once again the need to repeat the experiment at multiple Mach number conditions in order
to sample the underlying function.
6.2.3 External Reference Methods.
One of the most accurate methods for estimating SPE is the pressure survey method
[42]. In this technique, a weather balloon capable of measuring Ta, Hc, and Pa is launched
into the local airmass. The balloon measurements of Pa can then directly be used to
compute SPE using (6.1). Obviously, this method provides the most accurate results since it
directly measures the desired error. However, it is rarely used unless experimental budgets
are amenable due to its cost and associated logistical footprint. Besides the financial
and logistical complications, the survey method is also limited by the assumed constant
atmospheric properties between the balloon launch site and the area where the experimental
aircraft collects its data. This assumption also limits the ability to perform this technique
in an online fashion since the truth data needed for calibration is only available and/or
valid for a limited time and geographical region. Similarly, in the Pacer method [33], an
aircraft that has been previously calibrated can also be used as an external reference when
flown alongside the uncalibrated aircraft. The benefits of such a method include the ability
to compare both altitude and airspeed simultaneously, model a large portion of the Mach
number domain in a single experiment (if a level acceleration is performed), and model
supersonic airspeeds at safe altitudes. However, much like the pressure survey method, the
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Pacer method suffers similar logistical footprint issues since it may be difficult to schedule
a calibrated aircraft with a similar performance envelope as the aircraft to be calibrated.
Additionally, any errors incurred during the calibration of the pacer aircraft will be directly
transferred into the calibration of the aircraft in question.
6.2.4 Contributions.
Having explored the underlying characteristics of the SPE problem and the state-
of-the-art solutions, we now turn to the proposed algorithm, henceforth referred to as
Jurado-McGehee Online Self-Survey (JMOSS), and its specific contributions. The JMOSS
algorithm provides a drastic improvement over all other methods in that it:
(a) Utilizes a hybrid pressure-airspeed-altitude algorithm inside a Backwards Smoothing
Extended Kalman Filter (BSEKF) framework to estimate ∆Pp and Kt in an online
fashion, without the need for multiple experiments or external truth sources.
(b) Develops an autonomous information-theory-based spline smoothing process, re-
ferred to as the Akaike Spline Model (ASM), which balances model complexity with
error reduction, and captures transonic and supersonic effects with no prior knowl-
edge of the ∆Pp(Mic) functional form.
(c) Enables full Mach number domain characterization including transonic and super-
sonic effects using a single experiment, without the need to sustain supersonic speeds.
6.2.5 Outline.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into three additional sections. Section 6.3
develops the flying and data processing algorithms that enable the research advancements
proposed herein. Section 6.4 presents results from a T-38C flight test program comparing
the proposed algorithm against state-of-the-art airspeed, altitude, and pressure methods,
using weather balloon pressure survey data as the reference truth. Finally, Section 6.5
summarizes the research effort, and presents conclusions and future work.
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6.3 Methodology
This section describes the flight and data processing algorithms developed during this
research, which enable the specific contributions previously outlined. Figure 6.3 illustrates
the information flow from required input data to BSEKF output and subsequent ASM
estimation. The specific methods used are described in the following sections.
6.3.1 Flight Technique.
The flight technique needed to meet observability requirements is based on [51].
However, it was found that SPE estimates tend to become noisy during non-level flight,
most likely due to dynamic changes in AoA and AoS during turns. As such, the flight
technique for the proposed algorithm was modified to meet the observability requirements
for wind estimation and Mach number dependency by separating them into three distinct
phases:
(i) A constant-altitude deceleration from Mmax to Mturn,
(ii) A constant altitude, constant airspeed, 360-degree turn at Mturn,
(iii) A constant-altitude deceleration from Mturn to Mmin,
where Mmax is the aircraft’s maximum Mach number, Mmin is the minimum Mach number,
and Mturn is an arbitrary constant turning speed within that domain. The three-phase design
of the flight technique provided three main efficiencies in the context of data collection.
First, it enabled collection of flight test data across the entire Mach number domain in
a single experiment, without the need for sustained supersonic conditions. Next, the
constant-Mach turn phase allowed for wind observability. Finally, the decoupling of turning
and deceleration allowed for collection of non-corrupted SPE data while still meeting
wind observability requirements. Several experiments were conducted in order to establish
repeatability and algorithm stability. Table 6.1 summarizes the actual values for the above
conditions that were used for experimental data collection. Additionally, the experiments
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Table 6.1: Summary of flight conditions for JMOSS experiments.
Conditions
Experiment Hic [ft. PA] Mmax Mturn Mmin Duration [min]
1 18.27K 1.06 0.54 0.52 7.40
2 19.95K 1.05 0.64 0.54 6.81
3 18.82K 1.06 0.73 0.53 8.95
4 21.23K 1.05 0.92 0.54 8.32
Table 6.2: Summary of flight conditions for comparison methods.
Method Points Domain [M] Duration
Level Turn 10 0.53-0.92 53.57
Cloverleaf 9 0.52-0.94 56.69
Tower Fly-by 10 0.54-0.90 42.00
summarized in Table 6.2 were performed in order to collect data for later comparison
against the proposed method.
6.3.2 Required Data.
One of the key enabling technologies provided in this chapter is the development of a
hybrid pressure-airspeed-altitude method using a BSEKF. As such, pressure readings (PT
and Ps) from the ADS are used directly, instead of indirectly via Hic or Vic. As previously
discussed, Tic is required in order to estimate Ta, which is done inside the algorithm,
eliminating the need for an external temperature calibration. Next, AoA and AoS from the
ADS, along with aircraft body angles from the IMU are required to compute the necessary
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Table 6.3: Required data parameters for JMOSS algorithm.
Name Symbol Source
Static pressure Ps
ADS
Total pressure PT
Total temperature Tic
Indicated AoA αi
Indicated AoS βi
Roll angle Φ
IMUPitch angle Θ
Yaw angle Ψ
North ground speed vN
GPS
East ground speed vE
Down ground speed vD
Geometric altitude hg
DCMs to transform vectors from the wind frame (w-frame) to the n-frame. Finally, GPS
velocity and altitude measurements are required to compute flight path angle (a parameter
needed in AoA and AoS correction), and provide measurement updates to the BSEKF.
6.3.3 AoA and AoS Corrections.
Begin by correcting indicated AoA, αi, for upwash errors, which are a function of
Mach number [107], using
αc = αi + ∆α(Mic), (6.17)
∆α(Mic) = βˆ0 + βˆ1Mic + βˆ2M2ic, (6.18)
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where Mic is derived from Ps and PT using standard Pitot-static equations [33], αc is
corrected AoA, αi is indicated AoA, and the function ∆α(Mic) is given by the second-order
polynomial model 
Θ1 − γ1 − αi1
...
ΘS − γS − αiS
 =

1 Mic1 M
2
ic1
...
...
...
1 MicS M
2
icS


β0
β1
β2
 , (6.19)
where Θ is pitch angle, S is the number of measurements, γ is the flight path angle given
by
γ = arcsin
(−vD
vT
)
, (6.20)
which can be approximated using the ground velocity vector, vg, by
γ ≈ arcsin
−vD∥∥∥vg∥∥∥
 , (6.21)
assuming VT is much larger than the wind speed. Finally, AoS is corrected by projecting βi
onto the corrected w-frame using
βc = arctan (cos(αc) tan(βi)) . (6.22)
6.3.4 Ambient Temperature Optimization.
Prior to processing the data using the BSEKF, an estimate of ambient temperature is
obtained by minimizing the least-squares [75] cost function given by
min
b1,b2,b3
C(b1, b2, b3) =
S∑
s=1
[
Tics − Tˆics
]2
, (6.23)
where
Tˆics = Tˆas
(
1 + 0.2Kˆts M
2
ics
)
, (6.24)
Tˆas = TS L fθH (hgs) + b1, (6.25)
Kˆts = b2 + b3M
2
ics , (6.26)
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and the function fθH is given in [33]. Essentially, minimizing (6.23) leads to optimal
coefficients b1, b2, b3 that best approximate the actual Tic measurements while constraining
Tˆa to follow the standard temperature profile given by hg, plus a constant bias, and Kt to
depend on M2ic. Once converged, the resulting optimal estimates of Tˆa are used as control
inputs in the BSEKF, where a better estimate of Kt, based on Mpc is produced alongside
the other variables of interest.
6.3.5 BSEKF Implementation.
Using the notations described in [76], the main estimation engine of the algorithm is
driven by a six-state BSEKF [59][76][77][87] with system dynamics defined by
x˙(t) = G(t)w(t), (6.27)
x =
[
∆Pp vWN vWE vWD Kt P0
]T
, (6.28)
G =
 1 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 1 0

T
, (6.29)
where ∆Pp is SPE, vWN , vWE , and vWD are the wind components, Kt is the temperature
recovery factor, P0 is an ambient pressure about which the relationship between geometric
altitude and pressure altitude is linearized, and w(t) is a bivariate Gaussian white-noise
process with
E [w(t)] =
[
0 0
]T
, (6.30)
E
[
w(t)w(t + τ)T
]
= 0.1
 δ(τ) 00 δ(τ)
 . (6.31)
The BSEKF discrete measurement model at time k is defined by
zk = h[xk,uk] + vk, (6.32)
u =
[
Ps PT αc βc Φ Θ Ψ h¯g Tˆa
]T
, (6.33)
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where h¯g is the mean geometric altitude, and the vector vk is composed of five independent
Gaussian white-noise processes with
E [vk] = 0
5×1
, (6.34)
E
[
vkvTl
]
= I
5×5
δkl. (6.35)
The nonlinear measurement function, h, in (6.32) estimates incoming GPS groundspeed
and altitude measurements, as well as total temperature measurements, to form the vector
zˆk =
[
vˆnT + vˆW hˆg Tˆic
]T
(6.36)
=
[
vˆN vˆE vˆD hˆg Tˆic
]T
, (6.37)
and is constructed from standard Pitot-static equations [33] using
Pˆa = Ps − ∆ˆPp, (6.38)
Mˆpc = f (Pˆa, PT ), (6.39)
Tˆic = Tˆa
(
1 + 0.2KˆtMˆ2pc
)
, (6.40)
aˆ = aS L
√
Tˆa
TS L
, (6.41)
vˆT = Mˆpcaˆ, (6.42)
vˆwT =
[
vˆT 0 0
]T
, (6.43)
vˆnT = C
n
bC
b
wvˆ
w
T , (6.44)
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where the function in 6.39 is given in [33], the DCMs Cnb, and C
b
w are created using the
frame transformations in [35] given by
Cbw =

cos(αc) cos(βc) − cos(αc) sin(βc) − sin(αc)
sin(βc) cos(βc) 0
sin(αc) cos(βc) − sin(αc) sin(βc) cos(αc)
 , (6.45)
Cnb =

cos(Θ) cos(Ψ) cos(Ψ) sin(Θ) sin(Φ) − cos(Φ) sin(Ψ) sin(Φ) sin(Ψ) + cos(Φ) cos(Ψ) sin(Θ)
cos(Θ) sin(Ψ) cos(Φ) cos(Ψ) + sin(Θ) sin(Φ) sin(Ψ) cos(Φ) sin(Θ) sin(Ψ) − cos(Ψ) sin(Φ)
− sin(Θ) cos(Θ) sin(Φ) cos(Θ) cos(Φ)
 ,
(6.46)
the estimated wind vector, vˆW , is given by
vˆW =
[
vˆWN vˆWE vˆWD
]T
, (6.47)
the estimated geometric altitude measurement, hˆg, is given by
δˆ =
Pˆa
PS L
, δˆ0 =
Pˆ0
PS L
, (6.48)
Hˆc = fHδ(δˆ), Hˆc0 = fHδ(δˆ0), (6.49)
θˆ = fθH (Hˆc), (6.50)
Tstd = TS Lθˆ, (6.51)
hˆg = h¯g +
Tˆa
Tstd
(
Hˆc − Hˆc0
)
, (6.52)
PS L is sea-level standard pressure, and the functions fHδ and fθH are given in [33].
In order to enable online estimation, the BSEKF is initialized with no prior knowledge
of the system states. As such, all initial estimates are set to zero, with the exception of Kˆt,
which is set to 1. Additionally, the initial state estimation covariance matrix is set to a 6×6
identity matrix. Since the turn data (Mic = Mturn) is not necessarily collected at tk = 0, the
BSEKF is processed “forward” from tk = 0 to tk = (M − 1)∆t, where ∆t is the sampling
period, in order to converge onto accurate estimates of the wind states and corresponding
121
∆ˆPp, Kt, and P0. Next, the resulting final state estimates from the forward run are used as
initial estimates for the BSEKF smoothing run from tk = (M − 1)∆t to tk = 0 in order to
smooth any biased ∆ˆPp, Kt, and δP0 estimates that occurred on the forward run prior to
Mic = Mturn.
6.3.6 Akaike Spline Model.
Having obtained the estimates from the BSEKF, one may choose to fit a model to the
SPE observations with respect to Mach number in a number of ways. In this research, the
resulting BSEKF estimates of SPE, are modeled as a function of Mic using a novel linear
smoothing spline model referred to as ASM. The ASM algorithm is crucial in smoothing
BSEKF output with no prior knowledge of the functional relationship between ∆Pp/Ps
and Mic for the ADS being calibrated. Additionally, it allows for the accurate modeling of
unknown changes to the functional form in the transonic and supersonic regions as shown
in Section 6.4.
Algorithm 6.1 illustrates a pseudocode implementation of the ASM process. ASM
smoothing begins with a simple second-order model of the form
∆ˆPp1
Ps1
...
∆ˆPpS
PsS

y
=

1 Mic1 M
2
ic1
...
...
...
1 MicS M
2
icS

X

β0
β1
β2

β
, (6.53)
where S is the number of measurements in the experiment. Next, a simple optimization
routine is executed to sequentially add smoothing spline knots using
∆ˆPp1
Ps1
...
∆ˆPpS
PsS

y
=

1 Mic1 M
2
ic1
(
Mic1 − s1
)2
+ . . .
(
Mic1 − sP
)2
+
...
...
...
... . . .
...
1 MicS M
2
icS
(
MicS − s1
)2
+ . . .
(
MicS − sP
)2
+

X

β0
β1
β2
...
βP+3

β
, (6.54)
where each sp, p = 1, . . . , P, referred to as a knot, is a preselected inflection point along
the Mach number domain, and the operator ()+ denotes negative values of its argument
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are set to zero, which is equivalent to multiplying by the Heaviside function centered at the
knot location. The optimization is based on minimizing the resulting AICc value [2], which
balances error reduction with model complexity. At each increment, a single spline knot is
added to the linear model (6.53), at a location within the Mic domain based on statistical
quantiles [89]. Then, the resulting AICc model criterion is compared to its previous value
to verify that at least a one-percent decrease in AICc was achieved by the additional knot. If
at any point this criterion is not met, the optimization is considered complete and the spline
model is finalized. Finally, if the particular experiment contained supersonic data (i.e.,
Mic > 1), an additional seven knots are automatically added evenly between Mic = 0.93
and Mic = 1.00 in order to capture any potential drastic changes to the functional relation
in the transonic and supersonic regions. Once completed, the resulting model inferences
such as Prediction Interval (PI) were computed using [68].
6.4 Results
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the state estimation histories of the forward and backward
BSEKF passes for a single JMOSS experiment, respectively. As shown in Fig. 6.4, the
BSEKF states are unobservable (and inaccurate) during forward pass from Mic = Mmax
until the turn is executed, and begin to converge after Mic <= Mturn as the measurements
are processed from Mmax to Mmin. Using the final estimates of the forward pass (i.e., when
Mic = Mmin) as initial estimates for the backward smoothing pass produced stable and
accurate estimates of all six states as shown in Fig. 6.5.
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 illustrate the results from a single JMOSS experiment, and all
JMOSS experiments combined, respectively. As shown in Fig. 6.6, a single JMOSS
experiment yielded accurate results across the entire Mach number domain, with no need
for external sources or prior knowledge, while simultaneously calibrating the temperature
recovery factor, Kt. As shown in Fig. 6.7, combining the BSEKF results from all four
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Figure 6.3: Data processing flow for JMOSS algorithm.
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Algorithm 6.1 ASM = fitASM(mic, ∆ˆPp/Ps)
Input: ∆ˆPp/Ps,mic I Inputs are BSEKF output for SPE, and computed Mic
1: y← ∆ˆPP/Ps I Create observation vector
2: if max(mic) > 1 then I If supersonic data present, add supersonic knots
Mic ∈ (0.93, 1)
3: superSonic←true
4: end if
5: P← 0, go←true I Initialize loop with P = 0 knots
6: while go do
7: X← createSplineRegressor(P,mic,superSonic) I Use Eq. (6.54) to create X
based on P
8: βˆ, AICc(P + 3)←
(
XTX
)−1
XTy I Compute P + 3 total coefficients and AICc
9: if P = 0 then
10: Xprev, βˆprev, AICcprev ← X, βˆ, AICc I First time in the loop, add a knot
11: P← P + 1
12: else
13: if AICc < 1.01×AICcprev then I If AICc is decreased by 1%, add a knot
14: Xprev, βˆprev, AICcprev ← X, βˆ, AICc
15: P← P + 1
16: else
17: X, βˆ← Xprev, βˆprev I Otherwise, stop the loop
18: go←false
19: end if
20: end if
21: end while
Output: ASM
ASM.Model← βˆ
ASM.deltaPp Ps← Xβˆ
ASM.machIC← mic
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experiments slightly increased the associated model PI, due to the variation in BSEKF
estimates across experiments, but increased accuracy when compared to the survey truth
data.
Figures 6.8 through 6.10 illustrate the calibration results from Level Turn, Cloverleaf,
and TFB techniques. As previously mentioned, these methods required varying levels
of logistical footprints, were limited in their Mach number domain, and/or required prior
knowledge of Kt. As shown, all methods yielded results that closely followed survey truth
data, with varying levels of bias and PI widths. It is important to note the data reduction
for the Level Turn and Cloverleaf methods included the enhancements that were developed
as part of the JMOSS algorithm (i.e., AoA and AoS corrections, direct computations of
airspeeds using pressures, and three-dimensional reference frame rotations), which may
have contributed to their accuracy.
Finally, Table 6.4 compares effort metrics across all methods tested during this
research. To highlight the true potential in efficiency from the JMOSS algorithm, only
the results from a single experiment were considered. The time figures were computed
by summing all flight time dedicated to collecting data for each experiment. The cost
figures are directly proportional to T-38C flight time at a representative flight test rate of
$11.3K/hr. Meanwhile, ∆ Mach captures the difference between minimum and maximum
Mach number modeled by each experiment. Finally, the mean bias was taken as the
average difference between each method’s results and survey truth data, contained within
the bounds of each method’s Mach number domain, and normalized by that width (i.e.,
divided by ∆ Mach). As shown, the JMOSS algorithm was able to produce accurate results
with as much as 90% fewer test points, 88% less time/cost, 83% less bias, and 78% less
uncertainty, all while modeling 42% more Mach number domain.
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Table 6.4: Metric comparison for ADS calibration algorithms.
JMOSS Level Turn Cloverleaf TFB
Points 1 10 9 10
Time [min] 6.81 53.57 56.69 42.00
Cost [USD] 1.3K 10.1K 10.7K 7.9K
Min Mach 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.54
Max Mach 1.05 0.92 0.94 0.90
∆ Mach 0.51 0.39 0.42 0.36
Mean Bias −7.75 × 10−4 1.89 × 10−3 4.61 × 10−3 −8.85 × 10−4
95% PI ±1.59 × 10−3 ±7.23 × 10−3 ±1.33 × 10−3 ±3.82 × 10−4
6.5 Chapter Summary and Future Work
This chapter has introduced a fully self-contained, pressure-airspeed-altitude hybrid
BSEKF-based ADS calibration algorithm with an accompanying autonomous smoothing
spline process rooted in information theory. As shown in the previous sections, the
proposed algorithm models a larger portion of the Mach number domain while drastically
reducing the cost, flight time, mean error, and maximum width of the 95% prediction
intervals around the resulting model. Additionally, when experimental data from multiple
dates and across varying atmosphere conditions were used, the model proved to have stable,
repeatable results. The JMOSS algorithm introduced herein provides a fully automated
and self-contained means of establishing an accurate SPE correction curve for any aircraft
with no prior knowledge and minimal maneuver requirements for observability. The
proposed method sets the course for an emerging class of online calibration and dynamic
performance modeling algorithms that not only take advantage of modern data collection
capabilities, but also make full use of sensor fusion technology in order to relax the required
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experimental conditions for such modeling. Future work in this area includes developing
more robust post-BSEKF smoothing techniques beyond ASM (e.g., neural networks),
identifying potential additional sources of information for sensor fusion, and expanding
the concept of sensor-fusion-based online calibration to aircraft performance and flying
qualities.
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Figure 6.4: Illustration of JMOSS BSEKF output on forward pass.
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Figure 6.5: Illustration of JMOSS BSEKF output on backward pass.
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Figure 6.6: JMOSS results for a single test point.
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Figure 6.7: JMOSS results when combining all test points.
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Figure 6.8: Results from Level Turn test points.
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Figure 6.9: Results from Cloverleaf test points.
134
Figure 6.10: Results from Tower Fly-by test points.
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Figure 6.11: Results comparison across all methods.
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VII. A Regression-Based Methodology to Improve Estimation of Inertial Sensor
Errors Using Allan Variance Data
This chapter proposes a novel, autonomous, regression-based methodology for Allan
variance analysis of Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) sensors, which much like the
research provided in Chapter 6, also complements the overall resilient navigation research
thrust by contributing a novel autonomous sensor calibration technique suitable for the
calibration objective in the ARMAS framework. Current methods for Allan variance
analysis have been rooted in the human-based interpretation of linear trends, referred to
as the slope method. The slope method is so prolific, it is referenced among electrical
and electronics engineering standards for IMU error analysis [46]. However, the graphical
nature and visual-inspection based use of the method limits its ability to be programmed
as a generalized algorithm, and lacks the autonomy desired in modern-day navigation
computations. Using nonlinear regression with a ridge-regression initial guess, the
proposed method is shown to produce comparable results as the gold standard slope method
when using standard-length data collections, and outperforms the slope method when the
amount of available data is limited. This development directly enables accurate navigation
solutions for all vehicles in land, air, sea, and space operations. The research developed in
this chapter has been published in [53] and [55]. Additionally, at the time of this writing, a
collaborative effort based on this research and similar wavelet-based methods is currently
in review for publication in [39].
7.1 Introduction
Inertial navigation systems are used to track the location and velocity of an object and
are relied upon commonly by many vehicles as a means of establishing orientation in open
spaces such as ships in the ocean and airplanes in the sky. However, the availability of an
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accurate inertial navigation solution depends on the proper calibration of the deterministic
and stochastic errors associated with accelerometers and gyroscopes, which compose
the IMU. Without proper quantification of their deterministic and stochastic errors, the
solutions rendered by the IMU based upon accelerometer and gyroscope measurements are
subject to drift and are, at best, erroneous and at worst, provide fatal navigation information.
As such, a considerable amount of time and energy has been invested in the understanding
and modeling of the various sources of noise that affect the components of the IMU.
Adequate modeling of inertial sensor errors begins with an understanding of the physical
processes from which deterministic and stochastic errors arise. In general, any given sensor
output signal can be written in the form
yk = Mxk + k, (7.1)
where yk is the measured output signal, xk is the true signal, M is a linear operator on xk
and k is an additive, possibly non-linear signal composed of a combination of stochastic
and deterministic errors, which vary with sensor type. For inertial sensors, the majority
of existing research adapts a version of (7.1) to both accelerometers and gyroscopes by
providing specific forms of M and further refining the deterministic components and
stochastic processes governing k.
In [95], Titterton provides general error models for gyroscopes and accelerometers in
order to describe a wide array of deterministic and stochastic errors. For gyroscopes, the
relationship between true (ωx) and measured (ω˜x) angular rate for a single axis x is given
by
ω˜x = (1 + S x)ωx + Myωy + Mzωz + B f x + Bgxax + Bgzaz + Baxzaxaz + ηx, (7.2)
where S x is the x-axis scale factor, My and Mz are cross coupling coefficients, B f x is
a constant x-axis bias (non g-sensitive), Bgx and Bgz are g-sensitive bias coefficients
along the input and spin axes, Baxz is the anisoelastic bias coefficient, and ηx is zero-
mean additive white Gaussian noise. It is important to note the previosuly discussed
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terms may be deterministic or stochastic in nature. Most often, such terms are modeled
as correlated stochastic processes, which eventually motivates the need for a reliable
stochastic characterization method such as Allan variance [4]. The expanded form in (7.2)
can be applied to the remaining two axes and expressed in terms of (7.1) by letting
y =

ω˜x
ω˜y
ω˜z
 , x =

ωx
ωy
ωz
 , (7.3)
M =

1 + S x My Mz
Mx 1 + S y Mz
Mx My 1 + S z
 , (7.4)
 =

B f x + Bgxax + Bgzaz + Bgxzaxz + ηx
B f y + Bgyay + Bgxax + Bgyxayx + ηy
B f z + Bgzaz + Bgyay + Bgzyazy + ηz
 . (7.5)
Similarly, [95] also describes a general error model for accelerometers in terms of the
relation between true (ax) and measured (a˜x) acceleration for a single axis x as
a˜x = (1 + S x)ax + Myay + Mzaz + B f + Bvaxay + ηx, (7.6)
where S x is the x-axis scale factor, My and Mz are cross coupling coefficients, B f is a
constant measurement bias, Bv is the vibro-pendulus error coefficient, and ηx is zero-mean
additive white Gaussian noise. Again, (7.6) can be expressed using the form in (7.1) by
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letting
y =

a˜x
a˜y
a˜z
 , x =

ax
ay
az
 , (7.7)
M =

1 + S x My Mz
Mx 1 + S y Mz
Mx My 1 + S z
 , (7.8)
 =

B f + Bvaxay + ηx
B f + Bvayaz + ηy
B f + Bvazay + ηz
 . (7.9)
Subtle differences in M and  are found throughout literature based on the technology
used in sensor development (i.e. mechanical, ring laser, etc...). Although such differences
affect the specific set of parameters found in M, in general, all models for gyroscopes
and accelerometers can be expressed as an adaptation of (7.1), with  composed of a
common mixture of deterministic and stochastic terms. Focusing on such terms, [67] uses
a form similar to (7.1) and describes three types of stochastic gyroscopic errors in  as:
“constant bias, uncorrelated white noise, and 1/ f (flicker) noise.” Similar terms appear
along with additional sources of error in [45], where a common set of five error sources are
modeled using the “Allan variance slope method” [4][32][34]. Although many stochastic
modeling and calibration methods have been developed, the “Allan variance slope method”
is commonly used in the navigation community, and listed as the method of choice in IMU
error analysis standards [46]. As such, this research focuses on improving the mathematical
methods for autonomously analyzing Allan variance data in the context of IMU calibration.
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7.2 Allan Variance
Having established the importance of properly modeling the sources of noise in ,
we now turn to the most commonly used method for doing so found in literature, Allan
variance [4]. It is important to note that although very common, Allan variance is not the
only existing method for IMU characterization. Other methods based on Power Spectral
Density (PSD) and Autocorrelation Function (ACF) [32][45], as well as modern and
robust wavelet-variance methods [40][88][92] are often used when analysis of complex
signals is inadequate with Allan variance (e.g., when the signal is composed of more than
one latent correlated noise process). Though wavelet-variance methods such as the ones
referenced have been shown to produce more optimal IMU characterization results than
Allan variance, Allan variance remains the standard method of choice [46], and therefore
motivates this research. Nevertheless, Allan variance was originally developed for the
analysis of error sources in atomic clocks. Later, it was found useful for identifying
error sources in accelerometers and gyroscopes using a “slope method” for analyzing Allan
variance measurements. Such use of Allan variance in IMU modeling is so prolific across
literature that it was compiled into an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) standard [46]. In general, the Allan variance, σ2a(τ), of a continuous time signal,
Ω(t), is a function of a quantity called averaging time, τ, and is given by
σ2a(τ) =
1
2(N − 2n)
N−2n∑
k=1
[
Ω¯k+1(τ) − Ω¯k(τ)
]2
, (7.10)
n =
τ
∆t
, (7.11)
where N is the total number of samples in the discretized signal, ∆t is the sampling period,
and
Ω¯k(τ) =
1
τ
∫ tk+τ
tk
Ω(t)dt, ∆t ≤ τ ≤ N∆t/2. (7.12)
Essentially, (7.10) divides the sampled signal into clusters, Ω¯k(τ), which are averaged over
a duration, τ, and computes the variance among groups as a function of varying τ. It is
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important to note the form of (7.10) is referred to as “non-overlapping,” since the clusters
Ω¯k(τ) do not overlap across time. Additionally, since each Allan variance point is computed
from a finite set of samples per cluster, a percent error was derived in [85] and is given by
δa =
1√
2
(
N
n − 1
) . (7.13)
Allan variance can then be equated to the PSD of the input signal using
σ2(τ) = 4
∫ ∞
0
S Ω( f )
sin4(pi f τ)
(pi f τ)2
d f , (7.14)
where f is frequency and S Ω( f ) is the PSD of Ω(t). The relationship illustrated in
(7.14) is then used in [45] and [32] to exploit the properties of five key error sources:
quantization, velocity/angle random walk, bias instability, acceleration/angular rate random
walk, and rate ramp. Each of the five sources of error are systematically identified from
an Allan variance plot of sensor (accelerometer or gyroscope) data using the slopes of the
relationship between the PSD of each error source and its corresponding Allan variance
formula. This relationship is explored in the following sections in order to develop an
understanding of the slope method.
7.2.1 Slope Method.
This section describes the prolific slope method of identifying the five aforementioned
sources of accelerometer and gyroscope error using Allan variance analysis. As shown
below, this method exploits the relationship between an error source’s PSD and its
corresponding Allan variance formula in a graphical context, whereby the slope of the
Allan variance vs. τ graph is visually analyzed in order to extract the necessary information
to estimate error. Although this method is simple and generally accurate, it suffers
from two main limitations. First, it is difficult to automate since it is rooted in human
visual inspection of an Allan variance vs. τ graph. As such, it requires complex logical
programming or human intervention in the presence of nonstandard conditions (e.g.,
missing sources of noise). Additionally, when the length of sensor data is incomplete (i.e.,
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not long enough to capture the underlying noise processes), the resulting Allan variance
curve tends to become much more variable across data collections as τ increases. Such
variability results in Allan variance slope behavior that is difficult to predict, making
automated slope detection unreliable. Table 7.1 summarizes the key components of the
slope method while Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the process.
7.2.1.1 Quantization Error.
Quantization is defined as the act of sampling an analog signal into discrete levels of
size ∆ during the analog-to-digital conversion process. The errors (differences between the
analog signal and the digitize signal) caused by such quantization can be characterized
as additive noise [9][46], which is uniformly distributed between −∆/2 and ∆/2 [46].
Analyzing the relationship between the PSD function and the Allan deviation, σa(τ), of
a signal composed only of quantization noise [45] gives
σa(τ) =
σq
√
3
τ
= σq
√
3τ−1. (7.15)
Next, taking the common logarithm of both sides in (7.15) yields
log10(σa(τ)) = log10(σq
√
3τ−1) (7.16)
= − log10(τ) + log10(σq) + log10(
√
3), (7.17)
which implies σq can be identified in an Allan deviation curve by finding a −1 slope when
plotting log10(σa(τ)) against log10(τ). Additionally, letting τ =
√
3 in (7.17) solves the
equation for σq, which means if the −1 slope line is projected to τ =
√
3, the value of
σa(τ) at that point will equal σq. This process is illustrated in Figure 7.1 and summarized
in Table 7.1.
7.2.1.2 Angle/Velocity Random Walk.
As indicated by its name, angle or velocity random walk is a random walk process
observed in the angle or velocity signal output of an inertial sensor. In terms of (7.2) or
(7.6), angle/velocity random walk arises from integrating ηx in ω˜x or a˜x. The relationship
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between the Allan deviation and the PSD for a signal of this type is given by
σa(τ) =
σrw√
τ
= σrwτ
−1/2. (7.18)
Repeating the process followed for quantization noise yields
log10(σa(τ)) = log10(σrwτ
−1/2) (7.19)
= −1
2
log10(τ) + log10(σrw), (7.20)
which implies σrw can be identified in an Allan deviation curve by finding a −1/2 slope
when plotting log10(σa(τ)) against log10(τ). Letting τ = 1 in (7.20) solves the equation for
σrw, which means if the −1/2 slope line is projected to τ = 1, the value of σa(τ) at that
point will equal σrw.
7.2.1.3 Bias Instability.
Bias instability, sometimes referred to ironically as bias stability, refers to the tendency
of an inertial sensor’s constant bias (B f in (7.2) or (7.6)) to change or drift during use.
The most accurate description of the stochastic process behind this drift is flicker (or 1/ f )
noise as shown by [67]. However, due to complications in the modeling of flicker noise
in common navigation estimation algorithms, such as a Kalman filter [59], this process is
often approximated by a first order Gauss-Markov process [46, Fig. C.6][76] . Following
the slope method process yields
σa(τ) = σb
√
2 log(2)
pi
= σb
√
2 log(2)
pi
τ0, (7.21)
log10(σa(τ)) = 0 log10(τ) + log10(σb) + log10

√
2 log(2)
pi
 , (7.22)
which indicates there is no relation to τ in (7.21). That is, the flicker noise coefficient can
be identified in an Allan deviation curve by finding a 0 slope when plotting log10(σa(τ))
against log10(τ). Additionally, (7.22) implies the value of σa(τ) at that point should be
scaled by
√
2 log(2)/pi to solve for σb.
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7.2.1.4 Acceleration/Angular Rate Random Walk.
In contrast to angle/velocity random walk, rate random walk refers to a random walk
process observed in the inertial sensor’s rate signal (acceleration or angular rate). In terms
of (7.2) or (7.6), rate random walk arises from integrating white noise found in ˙˜ωx or ˙˜ax.
Again, the relationship between the Allan deviation and the PSD for a signal of this type
yields
σa(τ) = σrrw
√
τ
3
= σrrw
1√
3
τ1/2, (7.23)
log10(σa(τ)) =
1
2
log10(τ) + log10(σrrw) −
1
2
log10(3), (7.24)
which implies σrrw can be identified in an Allan deviation curve by finding a +1/2 slope
when plotting log10(σa(τ)) against log10(τ). Letting τ = 3 in (7.24) solves the equation for
σrrw, which means if the +1/2 slope line is projected to τ = 3, the value of σa(τ) at that
point will equal σrrw.
7.2.1.5 Rate Ramp.
Finally, rate ramp refers to the deterministic, linear and usually long-term increase
of the inertial sensor’s rate signal output. In terms of (7.2) or (7.6), rate random walk
arises when B f x or B f linearly changes over time at a deterministic (e.g., non stochastic but
unknown) rate. The slope method then yields
σa(τ) = σrr
τ1√
2
, (7.25)
log10(σ(τ)) = log10(τ) + log10(σrr) − log10(
√
2), (7.26)
which implies σrr can be identified in an Allan deviation curve by finding a +1 slope when
plotting log10(σa(τ)) against log10(τ). Letting τ =
√
2 in (7.26) solves the equation for σrr,
which means if the +1 slope line is projected to τ =
√
2, the value of σa(τ) at that point
will equal σrr.
Although the five sources of error are well defined mathematically along the Allan
deviation curve via the use of the slope method, methods for solution are based upon visual
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inspection of the graph. That is, for a specific sensor and application, lines with the specific
slope(s) of interest are created and estimates for each parameter are back solved by hand or
through human-visual inspection. With current autonomous systems, this tedious process
hampers efficient calibration of IMUs, especially when the available sensor data is not
long enough to ensure a stable Allan variance curve. Although the length of available data
required varies with each source of error and its true underlying value, general rules of
thumb [46][45] suggest several hours of data are usually required for the slope method to
provide accurate estimates of all sources, especially for those prevalent in the latter regions
of the τ domain (e.g., σrrw and σrr) since their effects are only visible after several hours of
continuous IMU operation.
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Figure 7.1: Illustration of Allan variance slope method for quantization noise.
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Figure 7.2: Illustration of Allan variance slope method for common stochastic noise
processes.
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Table 7.1: Summary of Allan deviation slopes for common IMU noise processes.
Graphical ID
Noise source Symbol Relation to PSD Slope τ at desired σ Coefficient units∗
Quantization σq σa(τ) = σq
√
3τ−1 −1 √3 [deg] or [m/s]
Random walk σrw σa(τ) = σrwτ−1/2 −1/2 1 [deg/
√
hr] or [m/s/
√
hr]
Bias instability σb σa(τ) = σb
√
2 log(2)
pi
τ0 0 – [deg/hr] or [m/s/hr]
Rate random walk σrrw σa(τ) = σrrw 1√3τ
1/2 1/2 3 [deg/hr/
√
hr] or [m/s/hr/
√
hr]
Rate ramp σrr σa(τ) = σrr 1√2τ
1 1
√
2 [deg/hr/hr] or [m/s/hr/hr]
*Units result from σ(τ) measured in [deg/hr] or [m/s/hr] and τ measured in [hrs]
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7.3 An autonomous method for estimating noise strength
The proposed method, referred to as Autonomous Regression Method for Allan
Variance (ARMAV) from hereon, differs from the slope method in that it combines
linear ridge regression [44] and nonlinear model estimation [8] in order to yield accurate
and stable estimates for the five common noise sources in IMUs instead of using
visual inspection of graphical methods, which are hard to automate. As designed,
ARMAV not only performs comparably in terms of estimation accuracy, but is also
completely autonomous, stable under limited data conditions, and suitable for online IMU
characterization.
The key components of the slope method, which are summarized in Table 7.1,
provide the fundamental relationships between observed data (Allan variance) and its
predictor variable, τ. However, the slope method identifies each noise strength coefficient
individually by restricting the graphical search to the areas of the τ domain where each
noise source is dominant. Using [46], and the assumption of independence among the
sources of noise, the combined relationship between total Allan variance, σa, and the
contributions from each of the sources is given by
log10
(
σ2a
)
= log10
(
σ2aq + σ
2
arw + σ
2
ab + σ
2
arrw + σ
2
arr
)
. (7.27)
Next, substituting the relationships from Table 7.1 yields
log10
(
σ2a
)
= log10
[(
σq
√
3τ−1
)2
+
(
σrwτ
−1/2
1
)2
+
σb
√
2 log(2)
pi
2 + (σrrw 1√
3
τ1/2
)2
+ +
(
σrr
1√
2
τ
)2]
, (7.28)
from which a nonlinear regression problem with N observations of the form
log10(y
2) = log10
[
(Xβ)2
]
+ , (7.29)
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where
y =

σa1
...
σaN
 , (7.30)
X =

√
3τ−11 τ
−1/2
1 1
1√
3
τ1/21
1√
2
τ1
...
...
...
...
...
√
3τ−1N τ
−1/2
N 1
1√
3
τ1/2N
1√
2
τN
 , (7.31)
β =

σq
σrw
σ∗b
σrrw
σrr

, (7.32)
and
 ∼ N (0,Σ) , (7.33)
Σ =

(σa1δa1)
2 0 . . . 0
0 (σa2δa2)
2 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 (σaNδaN )
2

, (7.34)
can be constructed and solved using any weighted least-squares nonlinear regression
algorithm such as Gauss-Newton [8] or Levenberg-Marquardt [75]. However, since
nonlinear regression problems often require an accurate initial guess, β0, to converge onto
the global minimum, we first use a linear approximation of (7.29) to solve the linear model
σa1
...
...
σaN

y∈RN×1
=

√
3τ−11 τ
−1/2
1 1
1√
3
τ1/21
1√
2
τ1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
√
3τ−1N τ
−1/2
N 1
1√
3
τ1/2N
1√
2
τN

X∈RN×5

σq0
σrw0
σ∗b0
σrrw0
σrr0

β0∈R5×1
+ . (7.35)
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The model described in (7.35), however, presents a significant multicollinearity problem
since almost every column in X is dependent on τ. Although multicollinearity is usually not
a problem when evaluating the model’s ability to predict the observed data, it is extremely
problematic here since the desired inference (i.e. the initial guess) is based on the individual
coefficient values in β. Therefore, ridge regression [44] is used to solve (7.35) using
βˆ0 =
(
XTX + λI
)−1
XTy, (7.36)
where λ is a tunable, small biasing constant. Using the initial guess βˆ0, the nonlinear model
(7.29) is then solved to produce βˆ. Finally, it is important to realize the desired estimate
of σb is not directly given by σˆ∗b since it is simply an estimate of the model’s intercept. To
obtain the desired σˆb, the fitted model in (7.29) is used along with (7.22) to yield
σˆb =
√
pi
2 log(2)
min
(
Xβˆ
)
. (7.37)
This process is summarized in Algorithm 7.1. The ARMAV method was validated
using a series of Monte-Carlo simulations along with real-world sensor data from a STIM-
300 (tactical grade) IMU; the results of which are discussed in the following sections.
7.4 Simulation
A 3000-trial Monte-Carlo simulation was executed across 30 unique levels where the
length of available sensor data was incrementally decreased from 6 hours (5.4 million
samples) to 6 minutes (90 thousand samples). Using simulated IMU data, both the slope
method and ARMAV (Algorithm 7.1) were used to estimate the five known simulated noise
strength coefficients. The true coefficients were fixed for the entire simulation and are
summarized in Table 7.2. Simulated IMU data were generated using the numerical methods
described by [53], and are summarized in the following paragraph for completeness.
In general, simulated IMU data were generated as rate signals, with units of [deg/s] or
[m/s/s], by applying the appropriate arithmetic operation to the underlying random process
for each source of noise, and with the corresponding standard deviation from Table 7.2.
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Algorithm 7.1 Autonomous Regression Method for Allan Variance
Input: σa, τ I Allan deviation data in [hrs]
1: X1 ←
[ √
3
τ
1√
τ
1
√
τ√
3
τ√
2
]
I Construct linear regressor matrix
2: β0 ←
(
XT1 X1 + λI
)−1
XT1σa I Ridge regression for initial guess
3: X2 ←
[
3
τ2
1
τ
1 τ3
τ2
2
]
I Construct nonlinear regressor matrix
4: f (X,β)← log10(Xβ2) I Build nonlinear regression function
5: wi ← 1(σaiδai )2 i = 1, . . . . ,N I Create weight vector from percent error formula
6: β1 ←fitnlm(X2, log10(a2), f ,β0, ’weights’,w) I Use nonlinear solver to estimate
Output: σq, σrw, σb, σrrw, σrr
σq ← β1(1) I Extract quantization noise coefficient
σrw ← β1(2) I Extract random walk noise coefficient
σb ←
√
pi
2 log(2) min (X1β1) I Extract bias instability noise coefficient
σrrw ← β1(4) I Extract rate random walk noise coefficient
σrr ← β1(5) I Extract rate ramp noise coefficient
For example, Angle/Velocity Random Walk (σrw) data were generated directly as zero-
mean White Gaussian Noise (WGN) since a random walk process in the integrated signal,
with units [deg] or [m/s], arises from the integration of WGN in the rate signal, which
has units [deg/s] or [m/s/s]. Meanwhile, Rate Random Walk (σrrw) data were generated by
numerically integrating a WGN sequence, with units [deg/s/s] or [m/s/s/s], since the desired
random walk was to be found in the rate signal and not its integral.
Next, the ARMAV method was programmed as shown in Algorithm 7.1, with a
λ = 5 × 10−3 value. The particular λ value was found experimentally by monitoring
Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) values [68]. It is important to note, the specific value
of λ did not have a significant effect on the final coefficient estimates since it only affected
the initial guess used in nonlinear regression.
Finally, the slope method was programmed for comparison to ARMAV also using
the methods described by [53]. As a brief summary, the slope method was programmed to
calculate the slope of the observed Allan deviation data and find the closest point (Euclidean
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distance) on the slope curve to each of the five slopes of interest. Then, the Allan deviation
value at the particular τ of interest was found by using a point-slope formula for the desired
line.
For each of the 30 distinct levels of available sensor data, 3000 trials were conducted,
and the resulting mean relative bias and associated 95% basic percentile confidence
intervals were estimated by bootstrapping. Figure 7.3 illustrates the percent relative mean
bias and associated 95% basic percentile confidence interval for each level of the simulation
and for each of the five noise sources, all relative to their respective true values from Table
7.2. Additionally, Table 7.3 summarizes percent relative bias results from the simulation at
the 1-hour, 3-hour, and 6-hour levels.
Overall, both the figure and the table illustrate more stable and generally more accurate
estimates when using ARMAV, especially when the length of available data is greater than
1 hour. As shown in both Figure 7.3 and Table 7.3, ARMAV produced substantially more
stable results (in terms of variance) as indicated by the width of the confidence interval,
especially as the length of available data decreased below 2 hours. With the exception
of σrrw, percent relative bias was smaller with less variability when ARMAV was used to
estimate the errors than when the slope method was used. In the case of σrrw, ARMAV
resulted in a lower percent relative bias until the length of available data fell below 0.5
hours. It is also important to note, the slope method resulted in several instances of large
variance for particular lengths of available data, generally less than two hours, across every
noise source.
Comparisons of resulting estimation of ARMAV to the slope method were also
conducted for applications and settings in which the Allan deviation curve is essentially
incomplete, that is, in scenarios where the simulated stochastic processes did not include
one of the five common noise components. Namely, where either quantization or rate ramp
components were not included in the simulated IMU data. In these comparisons, another set
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of 3000-trial Monte-Carlo simulations were conducted separately for each source of error
and in the same manner as previously presented, with the exception that the true σq and σrr
were set to zero in each simulation, respectively. For comparison, results from the slope
method were also computed using two techniques: in autonomous mode, the slope method
was allowed to run as previously described [53], with no additional human intervention,
while in manual mode, the slope method was re-programmed to skip the estimation of
the particular noise coefficient that was known to be zero. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 provide,
respectively, the results of these simulations for the cases when quantization and rate ramp
components were missing. Results are presented in terms of bias rather than percent relative
bias for better comparisons.
As shown in both tables, the non-normalized biases from ARMAV were up to four
orders of magnitude closer to the truth (zero) when compared to the autonomous slope
method. This is due to the fact the slope method, when programmed, looks for all
parameters (i.e., finds the closest answer matching the graphical method for each noise
coefficient). In contrast, the manual slope method was re-programmed to assume the
missing noise coefficient was zero. As expected, its results for all other coefficients
were an exact match to the autonomous-mode slope method. Here, it is important to
emphasize these scenarios had to be specially programmed from an initial visual inspection
of the Allan variance data for the slope method to produce good results. In contrast,
for data applications in which these sources of noise are not estimable from the data,
ARMAV autonomously and reliably provided reasonable estimates with no changes to the
programmed algorithm.
7.5 Application to STIM-300 IMU Analysis
The ARMAV method was applied to real-world sensor data from a STIM-300 (tactical
grade) IMU. The manufacturer of this sensor provides specifications for the values of σrw
and σb [91], which are reproduced along with the analysis results in Table 7.6. A a single
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6-hour data collection was performed at static conditions and room temperature for the
x-axis accelerometer and gyroscope at a sampling rate of 250 Hz. It is important to note
that the purpose of this data collect was to simply demonstrate the ability of ARMAV to
match manufacturer specifications, which were only specified for the random walk and
bias instability components. Therefore the internal temperature of the IMU was not tightly
controlled. The MATLAB code and inertial dataset used in this research are provided as
supplementary materials via [1]. Plots of the fitted Allan deviance curve resulting from the
application of the regression method for both the accelerometer and gyroscope are provided
in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. As shown, ARMAV is able to accurately model the observed data
from both devices with no need for human intervention and directly enables the accurate
estimation of the necessary noise strength coefficients. The resulting 95% prediction bands
generated in each figure cover the possible range of future observations simultaneously and
provides a measure of the model’s quality. Finally, Table 7.6 provides the results from
ARMAV on the STIM-300 IMU data and compares these estimates to the slope method.
As shown, the particular sensor tested did not exhibit quantization noise (i.e σq = 0),
yet ARMAV was able to accurately estimate all noise coefficients, and in the case of σq,
its estimates were up to five orders of magnitude closer to zero when compared to the
autonomous slope method. Additionally, in the case of σrw and σb, where the manufacturer
provided specifications [91], ARMAV was closer to specifications in the majority of cases,
and always at least as accurate as the slope method.
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Figure 7.3: Monte-Carlo comparison between slope and ARMAV methods. The ARMAV
method produced significantly more accurate, and stable results (in terms of variance) as
indicated by the confidence intervals, especially as the length of available data decreased
below 2 hours.
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Table 7.2: Summary of true noise coefficients for Monte-Carlo simulation
Noise source Value Units
σq 2 × 10−4 [deg] or [m/s]
σrw 8 × 10−3 [deg/
√
hr] or [m/s/
√
hr]
σb 1 × 10−1 [deg/hr] or [m/s/hr]
σrrw 2.00 [deg/hr/
√
hr] or [m/s/hr/
√
hr]
σrr 5.00 [deg/hr/hr] or [m/s/hr/hr]
158
Table 7.3: Mean percent relative bias comparison, slope vs. ARMAV.
Slope method ARMAV
Time βˆ Mean Std. dev. 95% LCL1 95% UCL2 Mean Std. dev. 95% LCL1 95% UCL2
1 hr
σˆq 1.03 × 10−2 1.48 × 10−2 −3.02 × 10−4 5.31 × 10−2 3.65 × 10−3 8.26 × 10−3 −8.47 × 10−3 2.37 × 10−2
σˆrw 6.15 × 10−1 2.87 2.93 × 10−1 4.16 × 10−1 −2.98 × 10−2 1.11 × 10−1 −2.67 × 10−1 1.26 × 10−1
σˆb 2.80 × 10−2 5.71 × 10−1 −1.65 × 10−1 1.93 −4.79 × 10−2 6.18 × 10−2 −1.48 × 10−1 1.05 × 10−1
σˆrrw 1.42 × 10−1 2.04 × 10−1 −2.28 × 10−1 6.00 × 10−1 −5.42 × 10−2 2.12 × 10−1 −4.92 × 10−1 3.50 × 10−1
σˆrr 3.16 × 10−1 4.34 × 10−1 −4.54 × 10−1 1.27 −1.26 × 10−1 5.25 × 10−1 −1.00 8.57 × 10−1
3 hrs
σˆq 6.38 × 10−3 8.56 × 10−3 2.27 × 10−6 3.04 × 10−2 9.81 × 10−4 5.77 × 10−3 −1.24 × 10−2 1.17 × 10−2
σˆrw 4.55 × 10−1 3.26 3.17 × 10−1 3.87 × 10−1 1.78 × 10−3 7.10 × 10−2 −1.30 × 10−1 1.61 × 10−1
σˆb −4.31 × 10−2 5.81 × 10−1 −1.29 × 10−1 −2.88 × 10−2 −4.64 × 10−2 5.37 × 10−2 −1.15 × 10−1 1.08 × 10−1
σˆrrw 1.66 × 10−1 1.86 × 10−1 −2.02 × 10−2 6.76 × 10−1 −6.57 × 10−3 1.51 × 10−1 −2.91 × 10−1 3.26 × 10−1
σˆrr 1.32 × 10−2 2.71 × 10−1 −5.15 × 10−1 5.41 × 10−1 −5.72 × 10−2 2.93 × 10−1 −6.80 × 10−1 4.91 × 10−1
6 hrs
σˆq 4.75 × 10−3 6.09 × 10−3 1.03 × 10−4 2.17 × 10−2 8.32 × 10−4 4.23 × 10−3 −9.06 × 10−3 8.82 × 10−3
σˆrw 3.53 × 10−1 1.30 × 10−2 3.27 × 10−1 3.78 × 10−1 4.26 × 10−3 5.32 × 10−2 −9.73 × 10−2 1.37 × 10−1
σˆb −6.32 × 10−2 5.05 × 10−1 −1.14 × 10−1 −4.25 × 10−2 −5.50 × 10−2 3.92 × 10−2 −1.05 × 10−1 5.96 × 10−2
σˆrrw 1.50 × 10−1 1.14 × 10−1 4.06 × 10−2 2.47 × 10−1 −5.18 × 10−3 1.09 × 10−1 −2.11 × 10−1 2.30 × 10−1
σˆrr 2.45 × 10−3 2.02 × 10−1 −4.16 × 10−1 3.92 × 10−1 −2.29 × 10−2 1.95 × 10−1 −4.35 × 10−1 3.50 × 10−1
1 LCL - Lower confidence level from basic percentile
2 UCL - Upper confidence level from basic percentile
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Table 7.4: Actual estimation bias comparison, slope vs. ARMAV, no quantization.
Slope method: Auto Slope method: Manual ARMAV
Time βˆ Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev.
1 hr
σˆq 4.25 × 10−3 1.69 × 10−2 – – 6.81 × 10−7 7.73 × 10−7
σˆrw 5.60 × 10−5 1.26 × 10−3 5.60 × 10−5 1.26 × 10−3 1.83 × 10−5 1.14 × 10−4
σˆb 1.39 × 10−1 1.44 × 10−1 1.39 × 10−1 1.44 × 10−1 1.14 × 10−1 1.17 × 10−2
σˆrrw 2.56 × 10−1 4.38 × 10−1 2.56 × 10−1 4.38 × 10−1 −1.20 × 10−1 3.77 × 10−1
σˆrr 1.57 2.33 1.57 2.33 −7.38 × 10−1 2.80
3 hrs
σˆq 1.40 × 10−3 3.13 × 10−2 – – 3.37 × 10−7 5.07 × 10−7
σˆrw 2.45 × 10−5 4.64 × 10−5 2.45 × 10−5 4.64 × 10−5 4.56 × 10−5 6.08 × 10−5
σˆb 1.19 × 10−1 1.49 × 10−1 1.19 × 10−1 1.49 × 10−1 1.13 × 10−1 6.60 × 10−3
σˆrrw 3.14 × 10−1 3.30 × 10−1 3.14 × 10−1 3.30 × 10−1 −2.41 × 10−2 2.17 × 10−1
σˆrr 2.66 × 10−1 1.27 2.66 × 10−1 1.27 −1.96 × 10−1 1.34
6 hrs
σˆq 7.71 × 10−5 4.07 × 10−5 – – 2.40 × 10−7 4.08 × 10−7
σˆrw 2.27 × 10−5 4.25 × 10−5 2.27 × 10−5 4.25 × 10−5 4.53 × 10−5 4.89 × 10−5
σˆb 1.09 × 10−1 4.08 × 10−3 1.09 × 10−1 4.08 × 10−3 1.12 × 10−1 5.04 × 10−3
σˆrrw 2.91 × 10−1 2.10 × 10−1 2.91 × 10−1 2.10 × 10−1 −2.09 × 10−2 1.68 × 10−1
σˆrr 3.94 × 10−2 1.02 3.94 × 10−2 1.02 −6.97 × 10−2 9.73 × 10−1
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Table 7.5: Actual estimation bias comparisons, slope vs. ARMAV, no rate ramp.
Slope method: Auto Slope method: Manual ARMAV
Time βˆ Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev.
1 hr
σˆq 5.04 × 10−5 1.56 × 10−3 5.04 × 10−5 1.56 × 10−3 2.94 × 10−6 3.46 × 10−6
σˆrw 1.28 × 10−2 4.32 × 10−2 1.28 × 10−2 4.32 × 10−2 −1.43 × 10−3 2.06 × 10−3
σˆb 1.83 × 10−1 1.69 × 10−1 1.83 × 10−1 1.69 × 10−1 1.28 × 10−1 1.78 × 10−2
σˆrrw −9.21 × 10−2 4.76 × 10−1 −9.21 × 10−2 4.76 × 10−1 −3.77 × 10−1 4.90 × 10−1
σˆrr 5.28 2.85 – – 1.17 1.66
3 hrs
σˆq 5.42 × 10−4 1.73 × 10−2 5.42 × 10−4 1.73 × 10−2 2.22 × 10−6 2.86 × 10−6
σˆrw 3.70 × 10−2 1.57 × 10−1 3.70 × 10−2 1.57 × 10−1 −9.57 × 10−4 1.47 × 10−3
σˆb 2.60 × 10−1 3.62 × 10−1 2.60 × 10−1 3.62 × 10−1 1.28 × 10−1 1.30 × 10−2
σˆrrw −8.31 × 10−2 3.69 × 10−1 −8.31 × 10−2 3.69 × 10−1 −1.90 × 10−1 3.06 × 10−1
σˆrr 3.04 2.08 – – 5.43 × 10−1 8.31 × 10−1
6 hrs
σˆq 9.36 × 10−4 2.87 × 10−2 9.36 × 10−4 2.87 × 10−2 2.01 × 10−6 2.60 × 10−6
σˆrw 6.83 × 10−2 3.06 × 10−1 6.83 × 10−2 3.06 × 10−1 −7.79 × 10−4 1.23 × 10−3
σˆb 3.25 × 10−1 5.28 × 10−1 3.25 × 10−1 5.28 × 10−1 1.29 × 10−1 1.23 × 10−2
σˆrrw −6.79 × 10−2 3.53 × 10−1 −6.79 × 10−2 3.53 × 10−1 −1.53 × 10−1 2.69 × 10−1
σˆrr 2.17 1.78 – – 4.02 × 10−1 6.32 × 10−1
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Figure 7.4: Illustration of ARMAV model on accelerometer Allan deviation measurements.
As shown, ARMAV is able to accurately model the observed data with no need for
human intervention, which directly enables the accurate estimation of the necessary noise
strength coefficients. The resulting 95% prediction intervals cover a possible range of Allan
deviation observations for each τ.
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Figure 7.5: Illustration of ARMAV model on gyroscope Allan deviation measurements.
As shown, ARMAV is able to accurately model the observed data with no need for
human intervention, which directly enables the accurate estimation of the necessary noise
strength coefficients. The resulting 95% prediction intervals cover a possible range of Allan
deviation observations for each τ.
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Table 7.6: Allan variance analysis results for STIM-300 IMU.
Accelerometer Gyroscope
βˆ Slope: Auto Slope: Manual ARMAV Spec Slope: Auto Slope: Manual ARMAV Spec
σˆq 7.44 × 10−5 – 7.28 × 10−10 – 1.61 × 10−2 – 3.28 × 10−5 –
σˆrw 5.08 × 10−2 5.08 × 10−2 5.41 × 10−2 6.00 × 10−2 1.51 × 10−1 1.51 × 10−1 1.51 × 10−1 1.50 × 10−1
σˆb 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.66 6.66 × 10−1 6.66 × 10−1 6.75 × 10−1 5.00 × 10−1
σˆrrw 3.79 × 101 3.79 × 101 3.84 × 101 – 1.33 1.33 9.00 × 10−1 –
σˆrr 4.28 × 101 4.28 × 101 4.73 × 101 – 9.85 × 10−1 9.85 × 10−1 8.45 × 10−1 –
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7.6 Chapter Summary and Future Work
This chapter has proposed a novel autonomous, regression-based method for Allan
variance analysis, in the context of IMU sensor calibration. The ARMAV method was
shown to be generally more accurate and stable than the state-of-the-art slope method,
especially when the length of available sensor data was greater than 1 hour. Additionally,
ARMAV was shown to be completely autonomous and simple to program, requiring no
further human input even when particular sources of noise were not present in the observed
data. These findings provide significant advances in the calibration of inertial sensors as the
state-of-the art method (the slope method) requires human input either via visual inspection
of Allan deviance curves, or specific coding that is not transferable to other observed or
updated data sets. As such, this method directly enables online or autonomous IMU sensor
calibration using Allan variance, with no prior knowledge on the specific sources of noise
affecting an inertial sensor of interest. Future work in this area involves the integration of
the ARMAV method into an online navigation framework, where a navigation computer
is able to constantly update its internal IMU model based on Allan variance analysis of
observed IMU output. The implications of this integration is a continually updated, safe,
accurate awareness of vehicle position, velocity, and orientation at all times.
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VIII. Summary and Conclusions
As evidenced by the variety and maturity of emerging alternative navigation sensors,
all-source navigation is not only becoming an imminent reality, but more importantly, it
is uniquely poised to provide precision navigation systems with much-needed redundancy
in GPS-challenged environments. The goal of this dissertation was to develop a means to
provide navigation assurance and resiliency in the emerging all-source environment. To
do so, this research detailed the development of an online autonomous and resilient sensor
management framework aimed at solving a multi-faceted problem set including: all-source
fault detection and exclusion, integrity monitoring, sensor initialization and validation,
online sensor calibration, and online model identification.
In Chapter 3, the proposed framework, named Autonomous and Resilient Manage-
ment of All-source Sensors (ARMAS), was shown to provide a breadth of sensor man-
agement functions across four modes of operation: monitoring, validation, calibration, and
remodeling. Using a coherent interconnection between these modes, ARMAS was success-
fully shown to provide resilient and autonomous sensor management across two example
multi-sensor navigation scenarios that required a combination of fault detection, sensor
model validation, online calibration, and model identification, for continued operations in
challenging environments.
In Chapter 4, a novel method for fault detection and isolation in all-source navigation
systems was developed as the key enabler of the framework’s monitoring mode. This
monitoring method, referred to as Sensor-Agnostic All-source Residual Monitoring
(SAARM), did not constrain faults to only biases, and provided a mechanism for detection
of multiple simultaneous faults. Driven by a sensor-agnostic and fault-agnostic residual
monitoring algorithm, SAARM was not only shown to perform comparably to existing
RAIM techniques in the case of a single-satellite bias, but more importantly, shown to
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detect and isolate various types sensor model mismatches in and across multiple sensing
domains such as position and velocity, without the need for synchronous or simultaneous
sensor redundancy. Finally, SAARM was shown to provide a robust measure of system
integrity under minimal assumptions, guaranteed to contain the true vehicle horizontal
position (within a specified error bound) throughout all phases of the fault detection and
identification process.
In Chapter 5, a novel method for real-time model validation for plug-and-play
sensors, specifically aimed at all-source navigation applications, was developed as the
key enabler of the framework’s validation mode. The proposed method, referred to
as Real-time Validation for Plug-and-play Sensors (RVPS), enabled the estimation of
sensor-unique states without compromising the navigation solution, thereby protecting the
system integrity computations during the validation period, all using a single existing filter.
Equipped with the partial update implementation of the Kalman Schmidt filter, RVPS was
shown not only to detect invalid sensor models more reliably than conventional residual
monitoring, but additionally, prevent the detection process from corrupting the navigation
solution.
In Chapter 6, a fully self-contained, pressure-airspeed-altitude ADS calibration
algorithm was developed along with an accompanying autonomous smoothing spline
process rooted in information theory. Driven by a BSEKF, the Jurado-McGehee Online
Self-Survey (JMOSS) algorithm was shown, using real-world supersonic flight data, to
model a larger portion of the Mach number domain while drastically reducing the cost,
flight time, mean error, and uncertainty around the resulting model.
Finally, in Chapter 7, a novel autonomous, regression-based method for Allan
variance analysis was developed. The Autonomous Regression Method for Allan Variance
(ARMAV) method was shown to be generally more accurate and stable than the standard
slope method, especially as the length of available data was reduced. Additionally,
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ARMAV was shown to be completely autonomous and simple to program, requiring no
further human input even when particular sources of noise were not present in the observed
data.
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